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1 Executive Summary 
1.1 Introduction 
The definition and setting of forest reference levels (RLs) is important in the design of REDD+1 under 
a future climate agreement. Two meanings and uses of RL may be distinguished: (i) the RL used to 
measure the effect or impact of REDD+ policies, where RL refers to the Business-as-Usual (BAU) 
scenario; and (ii) the financial incentive benchmark (FIB) used for estimating results-based incen-
tives, e.g. direct payment for emissions reductions (Angelsen, 2008). In this study RL is reserved 
only for meaning (i) and Financial Incentive Benchmark (FIB) for meaning (ii). This work explores 
how historical deforestation rates, drivers and costs relate to both RLs and FIBs.  Based on availabil-
ity of relevant data and earlier research undertaken, four tropical countries that are part of CIFOR’s 
Global Comparative Study were selected for in-depth case studies because the data for this exercise 
were readily available, and because they represent countries with a wide range of national circum-
stances.  The authors would welcome similar work on other countries. These countries are Cameroon, 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil.  
 
1.2 A step-wise approach for RL development 
Estimating RLs requires availability of good quality data, in particular on historical rates of deforesta-
tion, degradation and emission factors. Because data quality and availability vary between countries, 
the uncertainty of RL estimates will also vary. In Durban, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties recog-
nised the potential usefulness of a step-wise approach to develop national forest RLs, reflecting an 
appreciation of the variability in data on forest area and carbon stock changes, and in knowledge and 
understanding of forest change drivers (Decision 12/CP.17, UNFCCC, 2011). A step-wise approach 
may facilitate broad country participation, address national data availability, manage uncertainty by 
reducing the risk of payment for non-additional efforts, and provide incentives for countries to pro-
gress  as data availability improves.  
This idea of a step-wise approach (summarised in Figure 1) is analogous to the tiered approach intro-
duced by the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for Land-use Change and Forestry (GPG LULUCF) (IPCC, 
2003) and provides a way to address uncertain and incomplete national level data to estimate and 
report on forest carbon stocks and changes. The IPCC guidelines use a hierarchical Tier structure 
(Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3) where higher tiers reflect increased methodological accuracy.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 REDD+ refers to the UNFCCC agenda item Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 
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 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Activity data/area 
change 
Possibly IPCC Approach 
1 (national net change) 
but also 2 (national 
gross changes) or 3 
(national gross changes 
spatially explicit)  
IPCC Approaches 2 or 
3 (to estimate gross 
changes) 
IPCC Approach 3 (spa-
tially explicit data re-
quired) 
Emission factors/ 
carbon stocks 
IPCC Tier 1 (defaults) 
but also 2 and 3 (na-
tional data) if available 
Tier 2 or 3 (national 
data)  
Tier 2 or Tier 3 (na-
tional data) 
Data on drivers and 
factors of forest 
change 
No driver data available 
or used 
Drivers at national 
level known with 
quantitative data for 
key drivers 
Quantitative spatial 
assessment of driv-
ers/activities; spatial 
analysis of factors 
Approaches as 
guidance for devel-
oping reference 
levels 
Simple trend analy-
sis/projection using 
national statistics, 
based on historical data 
Country-appropriate 
methods for interpola-
tion/ extrapolation 
using historical data 
and statistical ap-
proaches  
Potential to use options 
such as spatially ex-
plicit modelling and 
other statistical meth-
ods for considering 
both drivers and other 
factors of forest 
change 
Adjustments/ devi-
ation from histori-
cal trend 
Simple rules (in tech-
nical terms) 
Assumptions and evi-
dence for adjustments 
key drivers/activities 
Analysis and modelling 
by drivers and activi-
ties 
Figure 1: Some dimensions of a stepwise approach for using different data and to develop forests’ reference levels 
(adapted from Herold et al., 2012) 
 
Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2010) encourages countries to identify land use, land-use change and 
forestry activities in developing countries, in particular those that are linked to the drivers of defor-
estation and forest degradation, and to assess their potential contribution to the mitigation of climate 
change. The relationship between available data, possible ways in which to develop adjustments for 
national circumstances which we assume here, means that reasons for expecting that deforestation in 
the future will deviate from trends apparent in the recent past, and related uncertainties, are consid-
ered in successively greater detail from step to step. 
 
1.3 Forests, deforestation and degradation drivers  
This study explores the idea of using a stepwise approach to set RLs that integrate better data as 
they become available, in order to make emissions projections that better represent country circum-
stances. The analysis of the countries that have been selected for this study assumes that we have a 
reasonable understanding of historical activity data (in the IPCC sense of the term), that we have 
Overview of Step-wise approaches for RELs
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Concept
Data on 
drivers and 
factors of 
forest 
change
No certain driver data 
available
Drivers in national level known
with quantitative data for key 
activities
Quantitative spatial assessment 
of drivers/activities causing 
forest and spatial analysis of 
factors
Approaches 
for as 
guidance for 
developing 
reference 
level
Simple trend projection 
using national statistics on 
historical data
Historical data and modelling 
approach using drivers, 
administrative / sub-national 
statistics and relationships 
with underlying causes
Historical data and spatially
explicit modelling and 
considering both drivers and 
factors of forest change and 
understanding of underlying 
causes
Adjustments
/ deviating 
from 
historical 
trend
Simple rules (in
technical terms)
Deviation assumptions for 
key drivers/activities
Future modelling by drivers
and activities
No robust uncertainty 
analysis possible (+- 75% 
Available national data 
sources should be checked, 
Independent quantitative 
uncertainty analysis possible 
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information on carbon stocks and emission factors in key land use systems for the country, and that 
we have quantitative socioeconomic data on drivers. 
 
Country analysis is presented for: 
 
 Brazil, with an area of 8.5 million km2, of which about half lies in the Amazon Basin. A large 
percentage of forests are located within protected areas which are divided into different cate-
gories, according to their management objectives and land uses. Deforestation occurs in all 
ecoregions with different drivers. Deforestation in the Amazon has been principally linked to 
globalized markets for beef, soybeans and timber. 
 Cameroon, where dense moist forest predominates and represents 36% of the country’s land 
cover. The Ministry of the Environment estimates that agriculture causes approximately 80% 
of forest cover loss. Drivers of this process are mainly slash-and-burn agriculture and expan-
sion of cash crops. 
 Indonesia, where the Ministry of Forestry divides the forest area into four categories based on 
function: production forest, convertible forest, protection forest and conservation forest. 
Around 40% of the national forest area is currently at some stage of degradation. Deforesta-
tion is driven largely by expansion of plantation crops such as palm oil, rubber and pulpwood. 
The expansion of smallholder agriculture also contributes a significant proportion of the de-
forestation. 
 Vietnam, with forest cover nearly 40% and plantations making up about 22% of the forest. 
The dynamics and causes of deforestation and forest degradation include the conversion of 
forests to industrial perennial crops, unsustainable logging, infrastructure development and 
forest fires. 
 
1.4 Opportunity costs and deforestation drivers 
Opportunity costs are one of several categories of costs that a country would incur while reducing 
rates of forest loss under REDD+. Linking opportunity costs with deforestation drivers will help ana-
lysts and policy makers understand the potential of REDD+ programmes to reduce deforestation and 
degradation, and therefore to design more effective REDD+ policies. This linkage will also help  un-
derstanding of how the FIB could be set, and help with the development of an integrated landscape 
approach that links measures for the agricultural sector to REDD+ strategies and policies. 
 
We take a bottom-up approach to assessing the opportunity cost of REDD+ program implementation. 
Based on a literature review of local studies, opportunity cost ranges are established for country-
specific deforestation drivers. The table below shows, as an example of the data collected,  an over-
view of agricultural deforestation drivers and costs for all four of the countries investigated in this 
report. Implementation and transaction costs that may arise during the three phases of REDD+ im-
plementation are also considered for each of our case study countries as part of this assessment.  
Chapter 6 provides more detail on the costs, by country, related to other drivers.  
 
 
  4 
 
 
Table 1-1 Country-specific importance of agricultural drivers of deforestation and driver-related opportunity costs  
*Contribution of the driver to national deforestation (≤ 25% = low, ≤ 50% = medium, ≤ 75% = 
high, > 75% = very high) 
 
1.5 Lessons learned from specific country case studies 
Regression analysis can be used to estimate future deforestation by seeking links between current 
deforestation rates and various explanatory factors, including historical deforestation, forest cover, 
income level, national circumstances and other drivers. An extensive set of analyses was undertaken, 
with different methods and model assumptions for sub-national and time series data from Brazil, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as global FAO-FRA data. The necessary sub-national time series data 
are currently not available for Cameroon so only a national case study was conducted using FAO-FRA 
data. Some major conclusions are: 
 
Historical deforestation is the key variable to predict future deforestation and explains most of the 
current variation across countries and sub-national units. Countries experiencing high rates of defor-
estation in the recent past are more likely to have high levels of current and future deforestation 
rates. However, the coefficients in almost all cases are below one, suggesting that a simple extrapo-
lation can be misleading, and that other factors might also be considered. Furthermore, simple ex-
trapolation will not predict significant inflection points in national deforestation rates due to changes 
in national circumstances. 
 
Evidence of a forest transition (FT) is observed. FT theory suggests that high forest cover-low de-
foresting countries 
Deforestation 
driver 
 Brazil Cameroon Indonesia Vietnam 
 
Agriculture 
(commercial) 
Importance of 
driver* 
Very high Low Medium High 
Opportunity 
cost range 
(USD ha-1) 
194  -  3275 450 - 1500 3 – 3000 N.A. 
Agriculture 
(small scale, 
including sub-
sistence and 
commercial 
activities) 
Importance of 
driver 
Low Very high Low Medium 
Opportunity 
cost range 
(USD ha-1) 
2 - 374 4 - 10 0.48 -  297 N.A. 
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tend to experience accelerating rates of deforestation, while countries with high deforestation rates 
and low forest cover experience decreasing rates of deforestation. The robustness of FT theory de-
pends, however, on the relative measure of forest stock. FT theory is supported by the data when 
forest stock is measured relative to the total land area, but the evidence is weak when forest stock is 
measured in absolute terms. This underscores the description of FT as a wide set of interdependent 
and context-specific economic, political and institutional processes in agriculture and forestry, where 
a regular global pattern is difficult to detect.  
 
A number of deforestation drivers were tested, with some contradictory findings across the four dif-
ferent data sets and for different models. For example, the impact of income (GDP per capita) varies 
across countries. Countries with a high dependence on agriculture, as measured by the sector’s share 
of GDP, are generally observed to have high deforestation rates, but eventually deforestation declines 
as agricultural income increases. Population density is found to have divergent relationships with high 
deforestation rates, and the same is true for a set of governance variables tested.  
 
The apparently contradictory relationships of national circumstances may in part be explained by the 
quality of data used, and because the interrelations of economic, political, cultural and institutional 
differ across countries, which points to the benefit of using national level rather than global analysis 
to predict deforestation rates. Overall, and given current constraints in data availability and quality, 
the analyses suggest that past deforestation rates and possibly the proportion of land covered by 
forest are the best predictors of future deforestation that can be applied widely.  
 
1.6 Results-based incentives 
By definition we consider that in an international system of results-based incentives, financial incen-
tives should be based on FIBs, which might or might not be the same as the RLs which measure ac-
tion relative to BAU. The relationship between RLs and FIBs is partly political and beyond the scope of 
this study, but the following considerations may be relevant: 
 
 Participation and leakage: FIBs should be set in such a way that broad participation by 
countries is encouraged and hence international leakage minimized.  
 Fair benefit and burden sharing: The question of differentiation of capabilities and respon-
sibilities among countries is certainly a matter for the negotiations, but arguments are made 
for middle income countries assuming higher responsibilities (and costs) than the poorest 
countries. This may affect differentially the relationship between the FIB and the RL. 
 Additionality: The relationship to the RL, so that the FIB encourages additional action.  
 Effectiveness and efficiency: In a fund-based system, effectiveness and efficiency is 
achieved when the total transfer just equals the REDD+ costs. 
 Uncertainty: RLs, costs, participation and effectiveness of REDD+ policies are uncertain fac-
tors, and countries need to factor this into the equation for setting the FIB. One option is the 
corridor approach, with a gradual increase in the rate of payment as emissions are reduced.  
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Background 
The definition and setting of forest reference levels (RLs) is a critical issue in the design of an effec-
tive REDD+ mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). Two different meanings and uses of RL may be distinguished: (i) the RL used to measure the 
effect or impact of REDD+ policies, in which case the RL refers to the Business-as-Usual (BAU) sce-
nario; and (ii) the benchmark used for estimating results-based incentives, e.g. direct payment for 
emissions reductions (Angelsen, 2008). In this study RL is reserved only for meaning (i) and Financial 
Incentive Benchmark (FIB) for meaning (ii). The FIB may differ from the RL, and the study discusses 
different considerations in setting the FIB once the RL had been established. 
 
This work explores causal links between drivers of deforestation and deforestation rates in order to 
understand how to incorporate national circumstances and costs into estimation of RLs and FIBs. Four 
tropical countries were selected for in-depth case studies, based on geographical spread and data 
availability: Cameroon, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil. 
 
2.2 A stepwise approach for RL and FIB development 
Estimating RLs and FIBs requires sufficient data, in particular on historical rates of deforestation, 
degradation and emission factors. Because data quality and availability vary between countries, the 
uncertainty of RL and FIB estimates will vary also. To address this we propose developing a stepwise 
approach, analogous with the IPCC system for greenhouse gas inventories. A stepwise approach 
could also facilitate broad country participation, address national data availability and uncertainty 
management, and allow countries to progress from one step to another as data availability improves. 
The application of the stepwise approach is explained in Chapter 4 of this report. 
 
2.3 Opportunity costs and deforestation drivers 
Opportunity costs, i.e. the forgone benefits from the best alternative land and resource uses, are one 
of the several categories of costs that a country would incur while reducing rates of forest loss under 
REDD+. Linking opportunity costs with deforestation drivers will help analysts and policy makers un-
derstand the potential of REDD+ programmes for reducing deforestation and forest degradation and 
to design more effective REDD+ policies. This link to costs could also inform how an FIB could be set 
in the context of the RL, and help in the development of an integrated landscape approach that links 
measures for the agricultural sector to REDD+ strategies and policies. In Chapter 6 of this study, we 
take a bottom-up approach to assessing the opportunity costs of REDD+ program implementation in 
Cameroon, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil. Opportunity costs are linked to country-specific deforesta-
tion drivers which are described in Chapter 4 of this report. Implementation and transaction costs, 
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which are not necessarily driver-specific, are also considered in Chapter 6. 
 
2.4 Lessons learned from specific country case studies 
Potentially a way to project future deforestation is through regression analysis, which seeks to estab-
lish the link between current deforestation rates and various explanatory factors, including historical 
deforestation, forest cover, income level and specific drivers. Historical deforestation is found to be 
the key variable to predict future deforestation and explains most of the current variation across 
countries and sub-national units. The coefficients in almost all cases are below one, suggesting that a 
simple extrapolation can be misleading, and that other factors might also be considered. The impact 
of other factors varies. The quality of regulations and governance factors is significant in reducing or 
driving deforestation. In some cases we find evidence to support the forest transition (FT) hypothe-
ses, i.e. high forest areas tend to have accelerating deforestation. The time period used in the analy-
sis may, however, be too short to detect clear transition pattern. For the short to medium term, a 
continuation of (high) deforestation rates is also possible as self-reinforcing and economics of scale 
effects may counteract the brake on deforestation suggested by the FT hypothesis. In chapter 5, the 
regression approach is applied on a global dataset and on datasets from Brazil, Vietnam and Indone-
sia. Chapter 7 discusses considerations related to FIBs, i.e. how the RL could be modified to set the 
FIB due to cost, effectiveness and efficiency, cost and benefit sharing, and uncertainty considera-
tions.  
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3 National Circumstances 
This section summarizes contextual information concerning the example countries that will be used 
as case studies in the subsequent chapters.   
 
3.1 Brazil 
3.1.1 Forests in Brazil 
Brazil has an area of 8.5 million km2, of which about half lies in the Amazon Basin. This is the most 
commonly known Brazilian forest but there are other forest ecoregions in the country e.g. the Atlantic 
Forest. Below we present a brief overview of the forested areas of the country  
 
The Amazon basin 
The Brazilian Amazon covers 4.1 million km2 and accounts for one third of the world’s remaining trop-
ical forests. When referring to the Brazilian Amazon, it is useful to distinguish between this portion of 
the basin located within the country’s boundaries (48% of the country’s surface area) and the ‘Legal 
Amazon’ (Amazônia Legal) – a geopolitical region created for administrative purposes that encom-
passes more than 5.2 million km2, or 61% of the country’s total area, including the states of Amazo-
nas, Acre, Amapá, Pará, Rondônia, Mato Grosso, Tocantins and part of Maranhão.  
 
Various types of tropical forests originally covered an estimated 73% of the Legal Amazon region. 
Non-forest forms of natural vegetation, such as savannahs, natural grasslands and campirana, also 
occur in the region. The portions of the Legal Amazon located outside the proper Amazon basin are 
covered mainly by savannah vegetation and transitional forests, principally within the vegetation type 
known as cerrado. 
 
The Cerrado  
The Cerrado is a vast tropical savanna ecoregion of Brazil with vegetation ranging from tropical 
broadleaf woodlands to scrublands. This ecosystem is a rich tropical region with enormous ranges of 
endemic plant and animal biodiversity. It is the second largest ecoregion in Brazil, covering 2 million 
km2 in the central area of Brazil; only 20% of which remains intact. It is characterized by vast plains, 
with soils that are highly weathered, have low fertility and have high aluminium and iron contents.  
These characteristics hinder the development of natural vegetation. The possibility of mechanizing 
agriculture in this landscape has been the main driver for land use change. The seasons are divided 
into a dry winter and a rainy summer.  
 
The Atlantic forest 
The Atlantic forest in Brazil is comprised of remnants that, because of  difficult access, survived colo-
nization and development. This ecosystem once covered the areas close to the coast from the state 
of Rio Grande do Norte 
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in the North, while in the South it occupied areas into Argentina and Uruguay. Today it is one of the 
most threatened tropical forests in the world, with less than 10% of the original area remaining. 
 
The Caatinga  
Caatinga is the name given to the dry savannah of the Brazilian Northeast. It occurs in a semiarid 
region characterized by sporadic rainfall and high temperatures. As with the Cerrado, the Caatinga is 
composed of a mosaic of vegetation types with different biomass densities varying from grasslands to 
forests. This ecosystem has received the least attention among conservationists and policy makers. It 
is one of the poorer regions in Brazil and most of the population in these areas lives in the cities in 
the coastal area, despite historic occupation of the interior. 
 
3.1.2 Key drivers and processes affecting forest cover and carbon change in Brazil 
Deforestation occurs in all Brazilian ecoregions, with different drivers. Despite well-known monitoring 
deforestation in the Legal Amazon using satellite images going back to 1988 other biomes have not 
received the same attention. Below we provide a summary by region and estimated land area, where 
available.  
 
The Legal Amazon 
Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest has historically received the greatest national and internation-
al attention. To address this issue the Brazilian Institute for Space Research (INPE) started monitor-
ing deforestation of the Amazon rainforest in 1988 using Landsat imagery. This effort measures 
changes in forest cover from one year to the next and does not consider regrowth, meaning that an 
area that is considered deforested in one year is considered deforested forever according to the 
measurement system adopted.   
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Figure 2: Deforestation of the Amazon forest in the Legal Amazon in Brazil.  Source:  PRODES web-
site http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/. 
 
According to analyses of remote sensing data by INPE (Figure 2), annual deforestation rates in the 
Brazilian Amazon (1) peaked at approximately 29 000 km2 in 1995 (about 0.8% of the remaining 
forestland of approximately 3.7 million km2), followed by a reduction in the second half of the 1990s. 
Subsequent rates of annual clearing increased substantially between 2000 and 2004, peaking again 
at 27 772 km2 in 2004 (0.78%). Deforestation rates subsequently dropped in the mid 2000s (<0.4%) 
followed by a slower decline (0.2%) in the past three years. 
Approximately 15% (0.75 million km2) of the total area of Brazil’s Legal Amazon has been trans-
formed for agricultural and ranching activities. The predominant land use within the deforested areas 
is cattle pasture, estimated to cover 82.3% of the deforested land or 0.62 million km2 in 2007. The 
remaining cleared areas are devoted to annual crops (mostly rice, bean, maize, soybean and cotton) 
and perennials (such as coffee, cacao and black pepper). The area devoted to cattle pastures in the 
Legal Amazon has expanded by 44.2% between 1985 and 2006 (Smeraldi and May 2009).11 
 
Around half of all Brazilian CO2 emissions arise from cattle ranching, predominantly due to deforesta-
tion and burning (Bustamante et al. 2010, Imazon cited in Valor Econômico). In addition to deforest-
ed areas, a much larger area of the Brazilian Amazon has been subjected to different forms of human 
intervention. A recent study by the Instituto do Homem e Meio Ambiente da Amazônia (Barreto et al. 
2005) estimates that by 2002, 47% of the Brazilian Amazon was under some type of human pres-
sure, including forest clearing, selective logging, fire and mining activities.  Thus, forest degradation 
is probably also an important source of CO2 emissions, but at the time of writing had not been quan-
tified in Brazil’s national greenhouse gas inventory, although relevant research was underway. 
Increasingly, deforestation trends in the Brazilian Amazon have been linked to globalised markets for 
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beef, hides, timber, soybeans, and other commodities. Recent decreases in deforestation rates may 
be linked to decreases in prices for beef and soybean, as well as other factors, including efforts un-
dertaken by the Brazilian government, especially related to the creation of protected areas in regions 
such as along the BR-163 corridor, the soybean moratorium and improved enforcement activities, 
have also yielded positive results (Barreto et al. 2009). 
 
The Cerrado 
Deforestation in the Cerrado ecoregion is a new concern and has been receiving increasing attention 
by policy makers and media. Deforestation was measured in this region for the first time in 2010 and 
it appears that the area is twice as large as the area deforested in the Amazon forest.  About 21,000 
square kilometers of Cerrado was deforested annually between 2002-2008, twice the rate of the Am-
azon biome.  
 
The main driver of deforestation in the Cerrado is the expansion of industrial scale agriculture, partic-
ularly the cultivation of soybean. Another important driver (about 30%) is land clearing to produce 
charcoal for pig iron production. Very large smelting firms buy charcoal from household producers 
without any form of environmental license or authorisation. 
 
The main underlying cause of this deforestation is a recent shift of soy supply from the northern to 
the southern hemisphere. Between 1980 and 2007, the area planted to soy in the United States re-
mained constant at around 0.26–0.27 million km2, whilst the area of plantation in Brazil increased 
from under 0.1 million km2 to just over 0.36 million km2. This trend reflects the fact that Brazil has 
land available for the expansion of agriculture. National incentives through tax credits and land own-
ership recognition have encouraged expansion of soybean cultivation in previously forested areas. 
Meanwhile, in the United States, federal subsidies for biofuel production made corn (maize) a more 
attractive commercial proposition than planting soy. As a result, major soy traders sought out new 
high-volume sources and accelerated the expansion of the industry in Latin America. Although soy 
production is not currently as technically viable in most parts of the Amazon basin as in the drier 
Cerrado, its expansion—along with that of sugarcane in response to greater demand for ethanol—has 
also had the indirect effect of pushing pastures further into the forest frontier (Searchinger et al. 
2008). Moreover, BSE outbreaks in Europe in the mid-1990s discouraged animal sourced protein in 
livestock feed, leading to a switch in demand across the region for soy protein sources. Furthermore, 
in 2007, demand from several developing nations led to growth rates in the high teens. China, for 
example, now accounts for 45% of all soybean imports from Brazil (Campbell et al. 2010). 
 
The Caatinga 
Deforestation in the Caatinga has not been measured and therefore no estimates exist for the 
amount of land cleared. The main driver of land clearing in this ecoregion is fuel wood production for 
household consumption. 
The Atlantic forest 
Deforestation in this ecoregion has been under control for some time, due to the difficult access to 
remnants as well as strict legislation. The biome has increased its area slightly in the past years. 
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3.2 Cameroon 
3.2.1 Forests in Cameroon 
The distribution of natural forest types in Cameroon is controlled primarily by the gradient of annual 
rainfall that ranges from 500 mm in the north to 1,700 mm in the south. Several land cover classifi-
cations have been proposed for Cameroon. Below a classification from the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations (FAO), is presented which is based on a national forest inventory 
carried out in 2004 [MINFOF/FAO, 2005]. (Table 3-1) 
Table 3-1 Forested land and other land uses in Cameroon, based on FAO data 
 
Area (ha) % of forest area 
% of total land 
area 
Dense Moist Ever-
green Forest  
11,389,468 53.6 24.0 
Semi-deciduous 
dense moist forest 
5 935 155 28.0 12.5 
Deciduous forest 361 236 1,7 0.8 
Gallery forest 1,706,372 8.0 3.6 
Swamp forest 1,779,649 8.4 3.7 
Other natural for-
ests 
57,963 0.3 0.1 
Total dense forest 21,229,843 100.0  
Tree savanna 9,232,433  19.4 
Shrub formations 3,482,524  7.3 
Grassy vegetation 1,944,742  4.1 
Fallow land 2,088,803  4.4 
Annual crops 5,105,665  10.7 
Perennial crops 1,238,249  2.6 
Grazing land 1,308,204  2.8 
Plantations 6,631  0.0 
Swamps 1,158,866  2.4 
Developed land 382,402  0.8 
Inland waters 272,839  0.6 
Source: MINFOF/FAO, 2005 and FAO, 2010b. 
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Since 1995, a zoning plan has stipulated that the southern Cameroon forest (14 Mha) should be di-
vided up into permanent forest estate (DFP) and non-permanent forest estate (DFNP). The DFP in-
cludes the production and protection forests that belong to the state and to local communes. In the 
DFNP non-forestry activities like agriculture, livestock rearing, etc. are combined with forestry activi-
ties, like timber sales. Within the DFNP, community forests (~650,000 ha or 15% of the DFNP) are 
subject to the implementation of a management plan and an environmental impact assessment. 
 
3.2.2 Key drivers and processes affecting forest carbon change in Cameroon 
The net annual deforestation rate in the dense forest zone was estimated to be 0.14% between 1990 
and 2000 and the net annual degradation rate was estimated to be 0.01% (Duveiller et al., 2008). 
However, for the entire country, between 2000 and 2005, the annual deforestation rate was calculat-
ed at 1% (MINFOF/FAO, 2005), and according to FAO, this rate increased 0.6% from 1980 to 1995, 
and then 0.9% from 1990 to 2000. A remote sensing survey by the EU’s Joint Research Centre pro-
vided somewhat different results (Table 3-2) 
 
Table 3-2 
1990-2000  2000-2005 
Country n Gross  
Deforestation 
Gross 
Reforestation  
Net 
Deforestation  
n Gross 
Deforestation  
Gross 
Reforestation  
Net 
Deforestation  
Cameroon 51 0.10±0.05% 0.02±0.01% 0.08% 20 0.17±0.14% 0.14±0.19% 0.03% 
 
According to the Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MINEF), GHG emissions from deforestation  
accounted for half of all the emissions in Cameroon in 1994 (MINEF, 2005). This is consistent with 
the estimate in the National Communication from Cameroon on the UNFCCC website. 
 
Agriculture is the main cause of deforestation in Cameroon and is responsible for 80% of the loss of 
forest cover (CARPE, 2005).  The recent trends have intensified as shown in Table 3-3, due to greater 
food demands. Agricuture includes includes fallow land (23%), annual crops (22%), perennial crops 
(20%), community forests (15%) and inhabited areas (5%) (MINFOF/FAO, 2005). Cash crops are 
also common in the north of the country, where cotton is encroaching into the savanna and open 
woodlands situated to the south of the traditional cotton-growing area. Elsewhere, population pres-
sure in densely inhabited zones such as the Bamiléké Highlands in the Lékié Department result in the 
migration of rural populations to sparsely populated regions.  
 
Agriculture represents 21% of the gross domestic product (GDP), with only a small percentage (4%) 
going to exports (INS, 2010).  This is a rich, diversified sector, with considerable subsistence produc-
tion or production for informal local and regional markets, aimed at neighbouring towns and countries 
(Equatorial Guinea, Gabon). The pressure from cash crops (coffee, cacao, cotton, oil palm, sugar, 
rubber trees, banana, tea, etc.) varies from one region to another. Agriculture is likely to continue to 
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expand in the country and this expansion will increasingly be driven by external investors e.g. China.   
 
Table 3-3 Trends in agricultural land ares in Cameroon (x 1000 ha) 
 
Subsistence agriculture  
(source: AgriStat spécial N°12 
& N°15) 
Total agriculture  
(source: FAOSTAT : FAO Sta-
tistics Division 2010) 
1999  3,403 
2000  3,583 
2001 2,446 3,751 
2002 2,604 3,955 
2003 2,804 4,239 
2004 2,992 4,458 
2005 3,179 4,688 
2006 2,661 4,589 
2007  4,575 
2008  4,491 
 
There are other less important drivers of deforestation, most notably mining and infrastructure de-
velopment.  Mining of iron, cobalt, diamonds, gold, nickel, manganese, bauxite, etc. is becoming an 
important economic activity, particularly in the south of Cameroon. However, quantitative estimates 
of their importance as drivers of deforestation are not available.   
 
Infrastructure development e.g. roads and railways for different industries (mining, forestry, dams, 
etc.) is responsible for a small portion of deforestation. Transport corridors open up the forests to 
migrants who farm the land, raise livestock and carry out other activities that are direct drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
 
Degradation 
Forest degradation is also an important source of GHG emissions.  We define forest degradation as 
any activity that results in a decline in carbon stocks, but that does not result in the disappearance of 
forest cover.  Domestic consumption of wood is estimated to be in the order of 10 million m3 of 
roundwood equivalents (RWE) per year. This leads to an increasing scarcity of wood resources in the 
Sahelian zone2 and around large towns. The gathering of firewood is thus an important driver of deg-
radation and deforestation. 
 
                                               
2 A total ban on the exploitation of growing stock and the production of charcoal in Chad has led to large amounts 
being taken from the bordering Cameroonian Departments. 
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Economic adjustments and the devaluation of the CFA Franc in the 1990s increased the pressure on 
the forest resources in Cameroon.  The devaluation led to a rise in the price of petroleum products, 
increased unemployment and a worsening of economic conditions, generally.  This resulted in a grow-
ing use of wood energy by the population and notably by the urban population (half of the population 
of Cameroon). 
 
The timber industry is an important part of Cameroon’s economy, accounting for around 5% of GDP.  
Wood is the country’s second most important export (13%), behind oil products. After a significant 
growth in exports due in part to the devaluation of the CFA Franc the country exported at its peak 
~3.4 Mm3 RWE annually.  This pressure on forests has declined in recent years; in 2005 exports were 
2.3 Mm3 RWE and in 2008 they were only 1.0 Mm3 RWE3.  
 
Illegal logging by the informal sector for Cameroon’s domestic market and markets in neighbouring 
countries is a significant driver of forest degradation. The best estimate suggests that 540,000 m3 is 
lost annually through illegal harvesting, mainly from the dense forest (Cerrutti & Tacconi, 2006). 
Semi-deciduous forests, the moist savannah zone, are also subject to high levels of pressure, includ-
ing overexploitation of wood for energy and lumber, overgrazing and the clearance for agriculture. 
There is exploitation of designated forest reserves and reforestation.  Finally, open woodland and 
savannas in the north of the country are receding due to pressure from humans and animals, bush 
fires, lack of water and unsuitable agricultural methods. This pressure does not necessarily lead to 
deforestation, but can cause significant forest degradation. 
 
Poorly managed bush fires especially late in the dry season (Sahel and montane zones), are major 
drivers of forest degradation. Fires started to prepare land for cultivation often escape into surround-
ing bush areas because of the very dry conditions at the time.  
 
Small scale agriculture also plays a role in forest degradation. Certain crops, such as cacao, need a 
canopy cover in order to thrive, and are thus planted in forests after a reduction in the density of the 
overstory trees. Crop combinations like this also offer opportunities for expanding wooded areas 
through agroforestry.  
 
 
3.3 Indonesia 
3.3.1 Forests in Indonesia 
There are many types of forest in Indonesia including coastal forests; tidal forests such as mangroves 
and nipah palms; heath forests (kerangas) occur on sandy soils; wetland forests including peat 
swamps; evergreen forests, bamboo, and montane forests. Dipterocarp forests are found throughout 
Indonesia in both lowland and hill areas. These evergreen forests are rich in biodiversity and harbour 
                                               
3 COMCAM (2008). 
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charismatic species including orang-utans, tigers, rhinoceros, elephants, leopards and proboscis 
monkeys (WWF, 2010).  
 
The Planning Agency of the Ministry of Forestry (Bapplan, 2008) has interpreted satellite images from 
2007, classifying approximately 71% of the country as kawasan hutan4 or legal Forest Estate and 
29% as non-forest land area.  Large areas of forest in the national forest estate have been deforest-
ed and degraded due to various activities. Only one-third of the forest estate is covered by primary 
forests, one-third by logged-over areas and one-third by vegetation other than forest. Some of non-
forest estate land is covered by forest. 
 
The Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia divides the forest area into four categories based on function: 
Production Forest, Convertible Forest, Protection Forest and Conservation Forest (Table 3-4).  Produc-
tion forest is for timber and non-timber production and includes natural forests and industrial timber 
plantations. Convertible forest is destined for conversion to other land uses, for example agriculture 
or human settlements. Protection forests are designated to sustain important ecosystem functions 
like protection of the headwaters of river systems, water storage to prevent flooding, erosion control, 
protection against seawater intrusion, and maintenance of soil fertility. Conservation Forest includes 
various types of conservation areas for conservation of biodiversity and unique ecosysems. 
 
                                               
4
  The Forest Estate is land managed by the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). Not all land in the Forest Estate has forest 
vegetation cover but all lands within the Estate fall under MoF jurisdiction. There is also land outside the Forest 
Estate that is covered by forest vegetation that is not managed by MoF. 
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Table 3-4 Land cover classification by Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry and expected changes with deforestation continuing at current rates  
 
 
 
 Forest Non-
forest 
Totala Deforestation rate 
2003–2006 
Relative annual 
deforestation  
rate 
Forest remaining in 
2020 
Kawasan Hutan  
     (Forest Estate) 
(106 ha) (x1000 ha y-1) (%) (106 ha) 
Reserve and  
protection forests 
38.2 9.7 49.6 185.9 0.49 35.6 
Production forests 40.9 18.6 60.5 466.6 1.14 34.4 
Conversion forests 11.0 11.0 22.4 108.7 0.99 9.5 
Total Forest 
Estate 
90.1 39.3 132.5 761.2 0.84 79.4 
       
Non-Forest Estate 8.3 46.5 55.4 412.9 4.97 2.5 
Grand total 98.5 85.8 187.9 1174.1 1.19 82.0 
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3.3.2 Deforestation rates in Indonesia  
Although deforestation rates in the forest estate are below 1%, rates in reserve and protected areas 
that should have no deforestation remain significant. These lands account for 35% of the annual 
deforestation in Indonesia. Deforestation is also widespread outside on the non-forest estate, at 
4.97% per annum, more than five times higher on a relative basis than inside the forest estate, at 
0.84% per annum.  Policies affecting these forests fall under the jurisdiction of several agencies with 
different mandates and priorities. The classification of the way these lands are used, the method for 
assessing the value of the land, including its carbon value, and the assessment of pressure for land 
cover change depend on which agency has jurisdiction. Obtaining consistent data on high carbon 
stock forests and policies to maximise their potential for emissions reductions would require strong 
interagency coordination and alignment of objectives and activities within these areas. 
 
The summary of the most recent National Communication to the UNFCCC by Boer et al. (2009) 
quotes two very different national GHG emission levels from forests and peatlands. The first is based 
on a report by Indonesian organisation PEACE that estimates an emissions level of 3014 million 
tonnes of CO2 annually through 2005 (Sari et al. 2007). The second estimate, presented by the GoI, 
is of 1991 million tonnes for of CO2 in 2005. These differences are significant as are their implications 
for the resources needed and the options available to achieve a 26% (or a 41%) reduction target for 
total national emissions. 
 
3.3.3 Key drivers and processes affecting forest cover and carbon change in Indonesia 
The drivers of deforestation in Indonesia originate from both within the forestry sector and from out-
side the sector in the pursuit of national development goals. According to recent GoI figures, defor-
estation is driven largely by the expansion of plantation crops and pulpwood production. Expansion of 
agriculture for food production contributes a smaller, yet significant proportion. Deforestation can be 
categorized as planned and unplanned deforestation. Forest area which is classified by the Ministry of 
Forestry (MoF) as ‘convertible forest’ and forests on land that is not part of the national forest estate 
are allowed to be converted to other land uses, so deforestation in this area is considered to be in the 
category of ‘planned deforestation’. Unplanned forest losses can result from fires and illegal en-
croachment. A similar definition for planned and unplanned activities can also be applied to forest 
degradation.  Planned degradation is caused primarily by the unsustainable levels of logging from 
legally permitted forest concessions, while unplanned forest degradation is mainly due to illegal log-
ging activities in forested land area.   
 
Forest Fire 
Forest fire in Indonesia has become a common phenomenon and in particular during El Niño events.  
Uncontrolled fires have destroyed and devastated large areas of tropical rainforest.  When forests 
have been previously degraded, repetitive forest fires can cause deforestation as the forests are 
completely burnt.  Once areas are destroyed by fire, they are more likely to be considered for con-
version to other land uses. 
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Forestry activities  
Logging:  Unsustainable practices of forest management in forest concessions, which are owned pri-
vately or managed under state owned enterprises, have caused severe degradation of Indonesian 
forest.  With  current wood industry capacity, timber production from natural forests is insufficient to 
meet mill capacities and this has led to the increase in illegal logging activities.  It is estimated that 
an additional supply of timber from illegal logging may be equal to that from the legal logging. The 
highest logging activities occurred in production forests (60%), followed by protected forests (30%) 
and forest conservation areas (10%). The level of illegal logging is estimated to be very high in the 
non-concession forest area of production forests (Tim Pokja Kementrian Kehutanan, 2010).  
 
Timber plantation: Plantation of timber using Eucalyptus and Acacia predominate the development of 
industrial forest plantations. Indonesia possesses 4 Mha of industrial plantations, primarily to supply 
pulpwood consumptions that make up more than 75% of the concessions licensed by the MoF (MoF 
2009). Plantation occurs on mineral soils, peat lands and degraded imperata grasslands.  While tim-
ber plantation occurs mostly outside of peatlands, the fraction within peatlands contributes dispropor-
tionately to emissions and these emissions are sustained as long as these soils are drained. 
 
Timber plantation by communities: In addition to increasing the supply of raw materials for round-
wood and pulpwood industries, community plantation schemes aim to revitalize the traditional wood-
processing sector such as plywood and sawn-timber. There is a 2016 target in place for the planta-
tions to rehabilitate and improve productivity of degraded 5.4 million hectares of forest lands.  
 
Non-forestry activities 
 
Agriculture:  Agricultural expansion through shifting cultivation, colonization (transmigration, reset-
tlement) and expansion of oil palm plantation (perkebunan) is the largest cause of deforestation. 
Much of this is legally sanctioned by local governments that apply to the Ministry of Forestry to re-
classify forest land area to non-forest land area.   
 
Agricultural encroachment on forest land areas by communities for subsistence is another important 
driver of deforestation.  In many cases the population in these areas gradually grows and new villag-
es are formed.  Based on data from MoF and the Indonesian Statistical Centre (BPS) (2009), in 2008 
there were about 9,800 villages in the forest land area and 38% of these were in the protected forest 
areas, 17% in the forest-conservation areas, 33% in production forest areas and 13% in convertible 
production forest.  Due to the increase of population in the coming decades, without effective policies 
to address this issue, the deforestation due to agricultural encroachment may continue. 
 
Political administration extension: Expansion of administrative regions or the formation of new auton-
omous regions is considered an important factor causing deforestation in Indonesia.  The emergence 
of new district governments is followed by construction and establishment of public infrastructure 
that include transportation, market, services as well as private infrastructure which cause deforesta-
tion.  In many cases, the extent of natural resources, such as forest resources serves as the driver to 
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establish an independent district government. The resource is used to generate revenue for the dis-
trict by issuing permits to log the forest that will result in reduction of carbon stock. 
 
Mining:  Forests in Indonesia contain rich mineral deposits, exploitation of which are part of the de-
velopment plans for the country. Rights to use the resources are granted by the government through 
a land leasing scheme for a fixed period of time. Mining of the deposit starts by clearing, not only 
woody biomass of the forest but also below ground biomasses and dead organic matter. The activities 
produce high emissions and the forest vegetation will be difficult to restore as the fertility of the soil 
will be depleted. In many cases, forest areas are left heavily degraded when the permit expires. 
 
High prices have led to rapid growth in the value and extent of the mining industry in Indonesia. The 
industry's export revenues increased from $ 9.4 billion in 2005 to about $ 21 billion in 2006.  Coal is 
a fast growing commodity in the mining sector, driven in large part by growing demand from China.  
Recent growth rates for this commodity have been on the order of 13 – 15% per annum.  Indonesia’s 
target for growth in 2011 is 19%.  Thus, this sector may continue to be a significant driver of defor-
estation in future. 
 
3.4 Vietnam 
3.4.1 Forests in Vietnam 
Vietnam has an land area of 32,894,398 ha, and a coastline of 3,260 km running from the North 
(Mong Cai, Quang Ninh province) to the South (Ca Mau cape, Ca Mau province).  
 
Between 1943 and 1995, Vietnam lost about 6 Mha of natural forests and the forest cover decreased 
from 43% to 28% of the national territory (Table 3-5). This represents an average loss of about 
100,000 ha/year. However, between 1995 and 2008, the forest area continuously increased. Data 
from the 1999 National Forest Inventory showed that Vietnam began to recover forest area around 
1995, when plantation forests attained 16% of the forest area. Currently the forest cover is almost 
40% and plantations make up about 22% of the forest (MARD 2009). 
 
Table 3-5 Change of forest area and coverage in Vietnam for the period 1943 – 2009 
Year 
 
Total forest area Area by forest types (1,000 ha) 
 
Area (1,000 ha) Coverage (%) Natural  
forest 
Plantation forest 
1943 14,300 43.0 14,300 0 
1976 11,169 33.0 11,077 92 
1980 10,908 32.1 10,486 422 
1985 9,892 30.0 9,308 584 
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1990 9,175 27.0 8,430 745 
1995 9,302 28.0 8,252 1,050 
1999 10,915 33.2 9,444 1,471 
2002 11,784 35.0 9,865 1,919 
2003 12,095 36.1 10,005 2,090 
2004 12,306 36.7 10,088 2,218 
2005 12,616 37.0 10,283 2,333 
2006 12,723 38.0 10,304 2,419 
2007 12,836 38.2 10,283 2,553 
2008 13,118 38.7 10,348 2,770 
2009 13,258 39.1 10,339 2,919 
Source: GSO, http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=390&idmid=3&ItemID=9996 
 
The increase in forest area has been partly the result of plantation development (Bleaney et al. 
2009), and is also explained by the re-categorisation and inclusion of previously omitted limestone 
forests in the category of forest. Natural regeneration of the forest is also a factor in bamboo forest 
areas (Vu et al. 2011). National forest tenure reform, the availability of new technologies, market 
opportunities for cash crops and the liberalisation of agricultural markets contributed to the increase 
in forest area (Sikor 2001).  
 
Despite the significant increase in forest area since 1995, forest quality is still low. Inventory data 
from 2004 showed that primary forest accounted for only 7% of the forest area and most of the re-
maining natural forests were secondary forests.  Primary forests are only found in the central high-
lands. Lowland forests have been almost entirely lost, whilst Vietnam’s mangrove forests have been 
significantly degraded (Vu et al. 2011). Most plantations are monocultures; and the 70% of the forest 
area that is secondary forests are in poor condition or regenerating; fragmentation and degradation 
continue (Forest Protection Department 2004, Meyfroidt and Lambin 2008, Vu et al. 2011). 
 
3.4.2  Key drivers and processes affecting forest carbon change in Vietnam 
The factors driving deforestation in Vietnam have changed over the course of the country’s history. 
The period of greatest forest loss occurred between 1943 and 1995 where it has been estimated that 
forest cover declined from at least 43% to 28%. Much of this was a result of war and agricultural 
expansion by the predominately lowland Kinh people who migrated into forested areas. By the middle 
of the 1990s with the forest estate severely depleted and degraded, there was a change in policy to 
stabilise and increase the forest areas through the introduction of national forest initiatives, most 
notably the 661 Program. The program was successful in reversing the national trends of deforesta-
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tion and forest degradation, but deforestation still occurs in several regions. Although there are other 
drivers of deforestation (such as invasive species, mining and biofuels), currently main direct causes 
of deforestation and forest degradation are generally agreed to be conversion to agriculture (particu-
larly to industrial perennial crops), unsustainable logging (notably illegal logging), impacts of infra-
structure development, and forest fires followed by land use conversion.  
 
Details of deforestation by regions and provinces are shown in Table 3-6 
Table 3-6 Gross deforestation area (ha) by Vietnamese regions from 1995 – 2009 
Source: GSO, http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=390&idmid=3&ItemID=9996 
 
 
Deforestation through conversion of lands for agriculture 
Vietnam is one of the world leaders in the export of agricultural commodities, including coffee, cash-
ew, pepper, shrimps, rice and increasingly rubber. Most of the recent expansion in perennial industri-
al crops has concentrated in two agro-ecological zones: the Central Highlands and the Southeast. 
Region/Province Red 
River 
Delta 
Northern Midlands 
and 
mountain 
areas 
North 
Central 
Area 
and 
Central 
coastal 
area 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River 
Delta 
Total 
1995 115 2,199 2,487 10,134 1,387 2,592 18,914 
1996 66 479 1,440 2,758 779 7 5,527 
1997 517 545 993 3,357 1,257 455 7,123 
1998 518 2,116 713 3,093 751 313 7,503 
1999 9 265 1,040 3,154 714 15 5,196 
2000 212 333 656 1,548 589 206 3,543 
2001 505 218 200 1,305 482 110 2,820 
2002 940 239 383 1,983 949 572 5,066 
2003 536 180 221 567 453 85 2,041 
2004 394 208 269 457 887 40 2,254 
2005 66 239 179 1,009 1,828 27 3,347 
2006 7 241 226 996 1,605 49 3,125 
2007 3 229 125 481 484 26 1,348 
2008 3 360 332 1,041 1,420 17 3,172 
2009 9 309 84 715 428 18 1,563 
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Over the past 10 years these regions have experienced some of the highest levels of deforestation. 
Work carried out by ICRAF in Dak Nong Province (Central Highlands) found that the main direct driv-
er of deforestation and degradation is conversion of natural forest to industrial perennial crops and its 
interaction with shifting cultivation in acquiring land. Local groups, such as ethnic minority groups, 
were found to be acquiring this land in order to sell it on for producing industrial perennial crops. 
There has also been a large increase in the area used for aquaculture, primarily shrimp production. 
The government continues to set high targets for the increase in the value of aquaculture, so the 
trend in mangrove loss is likely to continue. Mangroves typically store 7 – 10 times as much carbon 
as upland forests, so their loss has a disproportionate impact on GHG emissions.  The country lost 
60%of its mangroves between 1945 and 1995 (Vaiela et al 2001).  
 
National statistics show that the area of industrial crops, particularly rubber has increased very quick-
ly (see Table 3-7). The rubber development is growing fast in the south, especially central highland 
region where conditions are favourable. The causes for such a development are demand, and the 
government policies to convert forestland to rubber (Vu Tan Phuong 2010). Cereal crops have also 
expanded by 30% since 1990, but have recently stabilized. 
 
Table 3-7 Area of industrial and cereal crops from 1990 – 2009 (Unit: thousand ha) 
 
Year 
 
Tea 
 
Coffee 
 
Rubber 
 
Pepper 
 
Cashew 
 
Coconut 
 
Cereals 
1990 60.0 119.3 221.7 9.2  212.3 6476.9 
1995 66.7 186.4 278.4 7.0 159.1 172.9 7324.3 
2000 87.7 561.9 412.0 27.9 195.6 161.3 8399.1 
2005 122.5 497.4 482.7 49.1 348.1 132.0 8383.4 
2009 128.1 537.0 674.2 50.5 398.1 139.3 8528.4 
Source: http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=390&idmid=3&ItemID=9996 
 
There continues to be poverty in Vietnam particularly amongst the ethnic minorities who predomi-
nantly live in upland forested areas. Shifting cultivation is applied to produce sufficient food for sub-
sistence in order to alleviate poverty. In the Central Highlands much of the cultivation into new for-
ested areas appears to be motivated by acquiring more land, often sold on for commercial purposes 
to grow industrial crops. In the North Central region, where there are fewer opportunities for indus-
trial crops, shifting cultivation is practiced more for subsistence purposes. It is unclear how much 
current expansion is into newly forested areas.  Further analysis needs to be carried out to under-
stand the potential trends. 
 
A final underlying factor that drives expansion of both industrial crops and subsistence agriculture is 
the growing population from both internal migration and population increase. Generally, migration is 
diminishing due to the scarcity of arable lands, the restriction applied by the host Provinces, and the 
increasing availability of off-farm employment in the home regions. The remaining areas where inter-
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nal migration occurs are areas with available fertile land such as the Eastern parts of the Central 
Highlands. Fertility rates are higher amongst ethnic minority groups (roughly 3.4 children compared 
to 2.1 for Kinh), which may imply that more population growth pressure comes from such groups.  
 
Degradation through unsustainable logging 
 
Forest degradation is caused by unsustainable logging, which is mainly result from poor management 
practices and/or illegal activities. Some illegal activities are committed by local households driven by 
poverty and desperation, while much is driven and controlled by criminal gangs and networks. 
 
There is a large and growing demand for timber for inexpensive furniture made from tropical hard-
wood. Vietnam has become a major hub for the export of furniture, making wood products Vietnam's 
fifth largest export earner. The current rate of domestic timber production does not satisfy the growing 
wood demand for this industry. In addition, policies that restrict harvesting in natural forests are re-
sulting in displaced wood extraction in neighboring countries to meet the demand of forest product 
industries – primarily furniture manufacturing. A recent study suggests that the amount of wood 
sourced from abroad is approximately 40% of the volume of wood regrowth that is taking place in 
Vietnam’s forests (Mayfroidth and Lambin, 2009). 
 
The issue of the illegal trade in timber as well as the illegal extraction in Vietnam has serious implica-
tions for the future of the industry as well as the potential benefits from REDD+. With stricter re-
quirements to show proof of legal provenance (e.g. from the US Lacey Act and the EU FLEG-T initia-
tive) there is a growing incentive for Vietnam to eliminate the use of timber from illegal sources. 
 
The scale of illegal practices is difficult to estimate According to recent statistics in 2009 there were 
25,817 violations of state regulations (with 48,605m3 of timber confiscated) with respect to illegal 
logging, timber and forest products trade. However, due to a lack of monitoring, poor case handling 
and incentives that discourage local authorities from providing accurate and complete reports, it is 
likely that considerably more violations go undetected and unreported.  
 
Another issue for understanding future emissions from the forestry sector is the on-going change to 
the current administration of the forest sector. The process of decentralization that is on-going in 
Vietnam has the potential to bring greater benefits to the local communities, but unless it is carried 
out in a participatory manner there is a risk of further marginalising the poor while creating and plac-
ing greater powers with the local elites. How this issue is resolved will affect future deforestation and 
degradation trajectories. 
 
 
Infrastructure development 
Road building and dam construction are the most destructive of all the potential infrastructural devel-
opments in terms of forest loss and degradation. Vietnam’s roads have more than doubled in length 
since 1990. While the forest cleared to make way for the construction may not be significant, the 
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greater accessibility of such areas to encroachment and unsustainable exploitation can have a multi-
plier effect.  
 
Vietnam faces increasing demand for electricity which is driving a rapid increase in the use of hydro-
power. The North West region of Vietnam currently produces most of the hydropower for the country 
and has the greatest potential for future hydropower development. Construction of dams along the 
Dong Nai River has  destroyed more than 15,000 hectares of natural forest. The estimated impact of 
21 planned large scale dams (with a capacity over 4610MW) will lead to a loss of around 21,133ha 
(including 4,227 ha of natural forests, 1,367 ha of plantations). The total resource value of the forest 
lost (including environmental service functions) is estimated to be $72.4 million. Indirect impacts on 
other forested areas will likely be the result from migration and resettlement of the 60,000 people 
that will be displaced by these schemes. In particular in areas that already have high population den-
sity, such resettlement is considered a serious risk to the surrounding forest areas.  
 
Forest Fires and associated land conversion 
About 6 Mha of Vietnam's forests are considered to be vulnerable to fire. In particular the whole area 
of the Northwest, the Central Highlands, the Southeast and the Mekong Delta have witnessed exten-
sive loss of forests as a result of forest fires. Although forest fires originate from a number of sources, 
slash and burn agriculture practiced by the upland communities is believed to be the main cause. 
Tillage or clearing of fields after the harvest occurs at the same time as the dry season. A further 
underlying cause is the warmer and drier weather conditions. For example, in 2010 there was a large 
increase in fires due to the much drier conditions, which have been attributed to El Niño. Projections 
of climate change show that the North West and the Mekong Delta are two of the areas which will 
likely experience warmer conditions and perhaps greater forest loss due to fire. 
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4 Data for Business As Usual (BAU) development 
This section describes a stepwise approach that could be used to develop business as usual (BAU) 
projections for carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. This chapter considers 
data availability for the four focus countries, and proposes a stepwise model for providing the data on 
drivers on the basis of different countries’ circumstances. These data sets can then be used to devel-
op RLs for REDD+.    
 
4.1 Overview of country data for BAU development 
Five types of data have been considered for each country case:  
 
 Activity data describing the forest area change at the national level 
 Emission factors reflecting the amount of carbon loss per unit area for a specific type of 
forest change due to deforestation, and potentially degradation and other activities) 
 Drivers - to describe how much of the deforestation and associated   emissions are 
caused by each activity 
 Data on existing national monitoring capacities 
 Ancillary data including proxies and spatial factors that feed into the deforestation and 
driver analysis such as road networks, socio-economic and demographic data etc. 
 
4.2 Data on forest area change estimates for three IPCC approaches 
IPCC Good Practice Guidance (2003) introduces three approaches to estimating land areas associated 
with different activities. In principle any approach can be used with any of the three Tiers (i.e. pro-
gressively more detailed methods) of emissions estimation, though in practice higher Tiers are likely 
to use Approaches 2 or 3. Table 4-1 summarizes the Approaches: 
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Table 4-1 Activity data on the national level can be estimated from the different approaches as suggested by the 
IPCC GPG: 
 
 
The table below gives an overview of the available activity data for the four countries.  
 
Table 4-2 Overview of availability of data for the 4 countries for approach 3 activity data 
 Brazil Cameroon Indonesia Vietnam 
Approach 3 
Spatially  
explicit data availa-
ble 
PRODES (Amazon 
region, Landsat 
based gross defor-
estation annual 
since 1988) 
Study by 
JRC/TRESS 3 and 
UCL – increased 
sample for Came-
roon (0,5x0,5 deg.) 
using Landsat 
1990, 2000, 2005 – 
only as statistics 
available 
MOFOR national 
deforestation data 
2000-2010 
 
CRISP data 
(MODIS)  
2000-10 
Deforestation and  
reforestation data  
by province 
 
For Brazil, the present study used the PRODES data. These come from Landsat data analysis and are 
annual and spatially explicit, but limited to the Amazon region. For Cameroon, besides FAO statistics 
and the UNFCCC National Communication, the most suitable data come from a sample-based remote 
sensing analysis that is at this point only available as national numbers and of lower quality than for 
the other countries. For Vietnam, the study uses national data on the province level that are not spa-
tially explicit but allow for sufficient sub-national analysis. The MOFOR national deforestation data are 
from remote sensing analysis and used for the case of Indonesia. 
 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Data on forest 
change (or emis-
sions) following 
IPCC approaches  
Data (e.g. from 
FAO FRA) on net 
forest change for 3 
epochs (i.e. using 
data from 1990, 
2000, 2005, 2010). 
No land use change 
matrix is possible 
unless additional 
information is 
available. 
National level data on 
gross forest changes 
through a change 
matrix (i.e. defor-
estation vs. refor-
estation), ideally 
disaggregated by 
administrative re-
gions 
Time series of spatially ex-
plicit forest change data, 
often from remote sensing.    
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4.3 Carbon stocks and emission factors  
Data on carbon stocks and emissions factors beyond IPCC Tier 1 are generally more rare and uncer-
tain than for activity data. Emission factors often vary depending on different activities and drivers, 
and are not yet commonly available at Tier 2 or Tier 3. In case of deforestation at Tier 1, estimates 
can be limited to biomass and applied consistently for historical periods; in this case changes in emis-
sions are really driven only by activity data, although still reported as emissions using default as-
sumptions. Data on carbon stocks and changes are expected to improve in the medium term in many 
REDD+ readiness countries, but perhaps more slowly than activity data. The use of activity data can 
sometimes distort the historical analysis if there are specific land categories that have significantly 
different emission profiles to others. This is the case for emissions from deforestation on peatlands 
where the emissions from the soils are the most important source pool. This would need to be taken 
into account in future analysis, using country-specific data. 
  
For this study the following approach has been used to calculate deforestation emissions using a sim-
ple and transparent method. For deforestation it is assumed that all of the biomass is removed and 
emitted as part of the deforestation. The study will use Tier 1 estimates and the assumption will gen-
erally be conservative since including additional pools would tend to increase the estimated emissions 
reductions. In the case of  Indonesia the soil carbon pool will be considered because of the im-
portance of peat. Table 4-3 sets out the approach. 
 
Table 4-3 Data sources for the sample countries  
Country Activity data Approach to calculate defor-
estation emissions 
Brazil PRODES annual, spatially explicit 
deforestation data for the Amazon. 
Use 100 tC/ha as conservative 
estimate as suggested in the Ama-
zon fund 
Cameroon National level statistics from FAO, 
NC and JRC study 
Use 1 value for Cameroon (100t/C) 
from Tier 1 map or FAO data 
Indonesia Synergy MOFOR and CRISP data 
for  
Use Tier 1 map from Ruesch and 
Gibbs, 2008 and some proxies to 
account for soil carbon emissions 
in deforested peats 
Vietnam Province level deforestation data 
(5 year sums) 
Use Tier 1 map from Ruesch and 
Gibbs, 2008 for average forest 
carbon stocks on province level 
 
In general, the approach is country specific and provides a suitable solution for each case, but does 
not really allow for direct comparisons of overall emissions for the different countries. It also neglects 
degradation emissions, which would need to be estimated using another default method, e.g. gain-
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loss, with proper allowance for collateral damage, or by using proxy data on the extent of disturb-
ances. 
 
 
4.4 Data on deforestation and degradation drivers 
The UNFCCC negotiations have encouraged Parties to identify land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities in developing countries, in particular those that are linked to the drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation, and to assess their potential contribution to the mitigation of climate change.  
 
Explorations of expected future developments are directly related to specific activities and their un-
derlying causes. Assumptions about expected future developments that differ from the observed his-
torical trends in forest changes and emissions should be justified and underpinned by understanding 
of activities and drivers on the national level. The underlying causes of forest change may be related 
to international (i.e. markets, commodity prices), national (i.e. population growth, domestic markets, 
national policies) and local circumstances (i.e. subsistence land use etc.). Thus, the development of 
reference levels also requires, in addition to data on historical forest area change and associated 
emissions, information on drivers and their specific contribution to the overall national emissions pro-
file. For both forest area change and carbon stock changes different approaches or Tiers are provided 
by the IPCC good practice guidelines (IPCC, 2003) depending on country available data and capaci-
ties.  
 
Estimates of how much of the deforestation emissions in a country is caused by specific activities i.e. 
agriculture expansion versus infrastructure, can in principle be addressed by regression analysis, and 
this study reports some progress in doing this, though currently this the necessary data are available 
for only a few countries, and the role of degradation cannot presently be addressed by this approach. 
Currently the most reliable indicator of future deforestation that is reasonably widely applicable is the 
historical rate. An intermediate approach that allows some consideration of specific drivers is to use 
proxies or international evidence for policy analysis and setting RLs and FIBs. The table below pro-
vides a synthesis for the different country cases from multiple data sources. 
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Table 4-4 The level of information on drivers of deforestation varies 
National data situation Requirements and alternative estimation  
1. No or incomplete na-
tional data available on 
drivers and activities to 
cover all types of defor-
estation or forest deg-
radation 
Assumptions on drivers and activities can be made only 
from local or international studies and proxy indicators 
2. All nationally-relevant 
drivers can be named, 
listed (and qualitatively 
described) or ranked in 
terms of their im-
portance causing defor-
estation and degrada-
tion  
Missing quantitative information may be estimated using 
proxies and empirical international studies 
3. Quantitative and spatial 
data describing activi-
ties and fractional con-
tribution to total na-
tional deforestation and 
(potentially) forest deg-
radation  
Requires approach 3 activity data (spatially explicit) and 
ideally attribution of activity (i.e. from remote sensing 
analysis (i.e. spatial/temporal pattern analysis) and other 
spatial datasets (i.e. concessions, forest allocation, plan-
ning etc.) 
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Table 4-5 provides a summary the importance of different drivers for the four countries discussed 
here. The quantitative estimates are expert judgements based on the references given in the right 
hand column.  
 
Table 4-5 Current deforestation and forest degradation drivers of four developing countries – table shows, as a di-
mensionless index summing to unity the relative importance of deforestation and degradation causes of four tropical 
rainforest countries derived from  readiness reports, and other sources 
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Brazil 76% 23% <1% <1% <1% 100% - <1% 
NC 
Mongabay 
Matthews et al. 
CIFOR 
Cameroon 4% 88% 4% 4%  14% 69% 16% 
CIFOR 
Mongabay 
R-Pin 
Matthews et al. 
Indonesia 52% 20% 
17% 
 
11% 
 
12% 9% <1 <1 
CIFOR 
R-PP 
NC 
Mongabay.com 
Matthews et al. 
Vietnam 
 
72% 27%  2%  82% 
15% 
 
3% 
CIFOR 
R-PP 
Matthews et al. 
. 
 
4.5 A step-wise framework for developing reference levels 
Given the different levels of available data, a stepwise approach may be useful to provide a frame-
work to provide data on drivers and compare different country circumstances and methods for setting 
RLs. Based on the assumptions presented above, a stepwise approach based on the IPCC GPG ap-
proaches (for activity data) and Tiers (for emissions estimation)  is proposed (see also Table 1 in 
Herold et al., 2012). 
 
Step 1 uses coarse national level data only. It will be challenging to provide quantitative evidence for 
deviating from the projected historical trend, and only simple rules in technical terms, agreed at the 
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political level could be used for potential adjustments to take account of national circumstances.  
Examples of a Step 1 methodology are the approaches used for the Brazilian Amazon Fund (a sub-
national approach) and Guyana (a national approach). All countries should be able to undertake a 
Step 1 approach with only modest effort.  
 
Step 2 makes a first attempt to include quantitatively national circumstances, based on a driver-
based assessment to adjust historical rates. However, at this stage historical trend data are likely to 
dominate the estimate of future trends. This is exemplified in the result from the regression analyses 
presented later, where predictions are made based on sub-national activity data for at least decade 
or so in Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam. Currently only a few countries have the data available to un-
dertake a Step 2 approach.  
 
Step 3 develops the Step 2 approach further. This approach may use more spatially explicit defor-
estation data and driver specific data to support, for example, the use of more complex spatial mod-
els. It will also include more precise estimates of the emissions per unit of forest land converted or 
degraded (requiring better emission factors). The approach may actually avoid using historical defor-
estation as the key predictor since specific drivers and activities may be analysed, modeled and pre-
dicted individually (calibrated with historical trends) using more complex econometric approaches. So 
far no REDD+ country has developed RLs at Step 3.  
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5 Reference Level (BAU) estimation 
This section gives an introduction to regression models to predict deforestation, and presents results 
using four different datasets (global, Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam). The results using the global 
dataset correspond to Step 1 in the overall approach suggested in this report, while the three country 
regressions are examples of Step 2 methods.  
 
5.1 Regression models of BAU baselines 
As noted in the introduction, the term baseline, reference level (RL) or reference emission levels 
(REL) are used in at least two different meanings in the current debate and in the literature: First, 
‘baseline’ can refer to the projected business as usual (BAU) scenario, or the counterfactual scenario 
used in project analysis: how would emissions from deforestation and forest degradation evolve with-
out the REDD+ activity? Second, ‘baseline’ can refer to what is sometimes referred to as the crediting 
or compensation baseline (Meridian 2011), which in this report is termed Financial Incentive Bench-
mark (FIB): the level of emissions from which a country would receive payments for its efforts to 
reduce REDD+. The difference between the two meanings is illustrated in Box 1, Chapter 6.  
 
With this terminology a RL is the benchmark for judging the impact of the REDD+ measures imple-
mented relative to BAU and the FIB is the benchmark for international payments. While a distinction 
between RLs and crediting baselines is often not made explicit in the UNFCCC debate, it is useful both 
in analytical work and in assessing the arguments from two different angles: (1) What variables con-
stitute good predictors of future deforestation and degradation (BAU)? This could, in principle, be 
answered based on current knowledge on causes of deforestation and degradation, and is exactly 
what is attempted in this chapter. (2) What are legitimate arguments for setting the FIB? This is ad-
dressed in chapter 5. While the first question is mainly a technical issue, the latter also involves sig-
nificant negotiation or political judgement.  
 
The modelling approach used here is based on changes in area (deforestation). To translate area 
predictions into emission predictions, one typically uses an average forest carbon density and implic-
itly assumes that degradation does not affect behaviour to the extent of undermining the socio-
economic relationships being investigated. These seem necessary assumptions given the present 
state of analysis. Although these assumptions may be relaxed in future it is of interest to see how far 
present model results correspond with expectations.  
 
5.2 Modelling approaches  
Modelling and predicting land use and deforestation have stimulated debate in research as REDD+ 
has become high on the global climate agenda, but land use modelling is not new: in the late 1990s 
there were already over 150 studies focusing on understanding and explaining deforestation through 
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economic modelling (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). The focus has, however, shifted in several 
ways:  
 
First, while the earlier literature focused on understanding what had happened, the current objective 
is oriented to predicting what will occur. Models constructed to predict the future differ from those 
explaining the past, since there is a stronger focus on the general fit of the model, instead of focusing 
on the significance of individual factors affecting land use change. In particular, predictive models can 
use historical deforestation to predict the future, which makes them qualitatively different from ex-
planatory models   
 
Second, use of spatial data has increased substantially, driven by the higher availability of such da-
ta, although for the present this is restricted to a few countries. As our brief review of predictive de-
forestation models finds, only a few models are available, and the work is still heavily constrained by 
the lack of adequate data. Therefore, there are countries that have deforestation models while others 
have none. As such, there are still countries in which no quantitative assessment of deforestation 
drivers has been undertaken, and are often without existing deforestation models. This poses an ex-
tra challenge to determine REDD+ RLs, as costs of collecting data can be considerable. 
 
Third, spatially explicit models are – or at least can potentially be – increasingly used in land use 
planning, policy formulation and targeting conservation efforts to treat high deforestation areas, 
which means that research results can have direct impact on policy actions, with benefits extending 
beyond REDD+.  
 
Fourth, as a consequence of the focus on emissions, recently some models have carbon as an addi-
tional or alternative outcome. REDD+ is concerned with avoiding carbon emissions, which can be 
seen as a function of two factors: (i) changes in land uses (movements between land uses of differ-
ent carbon densities, such as deforestation), and (ii) changes in the carbon densities within one land 
use (such as forest degradation). Since data on carbon density of vegetation remain scarce, most 
authors assume a direct correlation between carbon emissions and area deforested. A notable at-
tempt to overcome the data issue is the work by Gibbs et al. (2007), who combines a series of meth-
ods to create national carbon stock estimates. 
 
Models can be classified according to different criteria (Agarwal et al., 2001), but have overlapping 
characteristics. Sometimes a distinction is made between models based on historical data and for-
ward-looking models, but this too can be an artificial as historical rates of deforestation are important 
predictors of future deforestation.  
 
For this report we have used regression models for at least three reasons. First, regression models 
are less complex than most simulation models, and therefore more likely to be accepted as inputs 
into climate negotiations. Regression models are, however, dependent on good data, assume that the 
past is representative of the future, and that historical data show sufficient variation in the variables 
of interest (because it is hard to predict far outside the range of historical data). Simulation models 
are stylized representations of a reality, and useful to explore the impacts of policies prior to imple-
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mentation, and when one moves into unknown policy territories. The credibility of the predicted 
changes depends on the degree simulation models mirror the forest system, including behaviour of 
key actors and markets.  
 
Second, different and potentially important predictors of deforestation can easily be tested on differ-
ent datasets with regression models, and therefore inform the discussion on, for example, relevant 
national circumstances for setting BAU baselines. Third, once the data are collected, regression mod-
els are straightforward to run with a large number of methods available, suitable for the particular 
data and problem at hand. On the downside, regression models are data-demanding. Regressing BAU 
baselines requires time series data (forest cover for at least three periods in time), and observations 
on lower spatial units rather than higher units (e.g. sub-national data for country studies).  
 
To make predictions based on regression models, coefficients which link the predictors to the out-
come (deforestation) are estimated based on past data. Then future values or predictor variables are 
plugged into the estimated equation to get future deforestation estimates. To make this assumption 
more flexible (and to answer policy questions) authors usually build policy scenarios under which 
some of the variables in the model are constrained. The reliability of these models depends, however, 
on how well the model fits the historic trends, and they are normally not suitable to handle breaks 
with the past (“out of sample predictions”), i.e. the estimated relationships (coefficients) may not 
hold. Another uncertainty – in any type of predictive models - relates to the future values of the pre-
dictors, for example, what agricultural prices will be in 10 years.   
 
5.3 BAU regression methods 
Regression models allow predictions concerning future events to be made with information about past 
or present events. The question of interest is, how a set of country specific factors observed at time t 
is related to the stock of forests from time t to time t+1? This question can be presented in form of 
general equation as follows: 
 
( 1)c t ct ctForstock Natcicurm e    
    (1) 
 
where ( 1)c tForstock   denotes forest stock of a country averaged over the period from time t to time 
t+1 ,   is the intercept (the value at the initial time),   is a vector of slope coefficients, 
ctNatcicurm  denotes a vector of country specific factors or national circumstances, and cte  is the 
error term. To estimate (1), most predictive research has relied on using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression approach, although the statistical inference and model predictability depend on the 
choice of standard errors (Fama and French, 1988; Hodrick, 1992). We use OLS with panel corrected 
standard errors (OLS-PCSE), which assumes errors are heteroschedastic and contemporaneously 
correlated across panels (Beck and Katz, 1995). Estimation of OLS-PCSE allows the use of historical 
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information concerning the dependent variable to be used as a predictor variable. This enables us to 
assess how historical deforestation best predicts current deforestation5.  
 
The OLS approach has been applied in a large number of empirical studies building on predictive 
models of Fama and French (1988) and Hodrick (1992). Beck and Katz’s (1995) review of a number 
of studies using OLS-PCSE on times series cross-sectional data to test key hypotheses concerning the 
political and institutional determinants of economic policies and performances.  
 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
 
ct H HD F ct E ct O ct ctDrate HistDrate Forstock Econfactors Otherfactors           (2) 
 
where ctDrate is the annual deforestation rate for country c in period t. HDHistDrate  is the historical 
deforestation rate given by the loss of forest cover for a specified period of time. ctForstock  is the 
forest stock in period t. ctEconfactors  and ctOtherfactors  are vectors of economic and other factors 
respectively. H O -    are respective parameters to be estimated. ct  is the composite error term 
consisting of unobserved (time variant and invariant) country and time specific effects. We estimate 
(2) without the intercept to be able to determine how well a given variable, holding all else fixed, can 
predict BAU baseline (Santilli et al., 2005). 
 
The regression approach is applied on four datasets: a global dataset largely from FAO with countries 
as the unit analysis for the period 1990 – 2010, and three sub-national level datasets from Brazil for 
the 2000 – 2009 period (municipalities), Vietnam for the 1995 – 2009 period (provinces), and Indo-
nesia for the period 2000 – 2009 (districts). The modelling approach is the same across datasets, 
except for Indonesia where we use OLS with robust standard errors instead OLS-PCSE because of 
data limitations. We restrict the analysis to gross deforestation for which data are available. Data on 
degradation and reforestation are hardly available6.  
 
5.4 Quantification of deforestation 
How to express deforestation quantitatively should be guided by two considerations: (i) the simplicity 
of interpreting the results, and (ii) more importantly, how it may bias the results. Quantification in 
absolute terms, such as in hectares or square km, makes it easier to interpret the results and predict 
carbon emissions. The problem with this choice is that countries or sub-national units vary a lot in 
                                               
5 An alternative to OLS is to use panel least squares approach such as fixed effects or random effects 
estimation (Wooldridge, 2007). Panel least squares approaches account for unobserved country and 
period specific heterogeneity that explains the variation in forest stock across countries and time 
periods. However, the necessary data to apply this approach are expensive to collect and not readily 
available. 
6 In the FAO data, described later, we find only 18 countries, at one point in time between 2000 and 2010, had 
reforestation activities. That is, forest cover increased from one period to the next. We treat such countries to 
have had no deforestation at that specific time. 
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size, which can give rise to outliers that may bias the results. Even if this problem can be lessened by 
transforming deforested area and forest cover using logarithms, studies that have used absolute 
units have yielded mixed results. For example, studies using FAO country-level data (Ehrhardt-
Martinez, 1998; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2002; Jorgenson, 2006; Jorgenson and Burns, 2007), find 
initial forest cover (absolute) reduces the predicted percentage change in forest cover (deforesta-
tion). Using the same data source, Shandra et al. (2009) find that forest cover increases the predict-
ed percentage change in forest cover, albeit insignificantly, while Rudel (1994) shows that forest cov-
er significantly increases predicted deforested area (absolute). The other choice is to use rates of 
deforestation, normally defined in terms of forest loss as a percent of forest area averaged over a 
period of time, either linearly or using the compound interest law (FAO, 1995; Puyravaud, 2003). The 
latter is more appealing – at least theoretically – and normally used. None of these approaches con-
trols for potential bias attributed to different sizes across countries (or sub-national units).  
 
Alternatively deforestation may be expressed relative to total land area (of the country or sub-
national unit), rather than relative to the forest area. This approach is considered for two reasons: 
First controlling the change in forest cover (or deforested area) relative to the total area of the coun-
try lessens the bias which arises from countries having different forest areas relative to total land 
area. That is, a country with vast forest cover is more likely to experience larger deforestation in ab-
solute terms than a country with small forest cover. On the other hand, the rate of change in forest 
cover as a share of the country’s total land area is likely to be lower in a country with vast forest 
cover, but higher in a country with small forest cover. This has implication for the robustness of the 
regression estimates.7  
 
Second, this kind of quantification offers some analytical advantages to test the forest transition (FT) 
hypothesis. Since the FT theory is intended to explain deforestation at country level (Rudel et al., 
2005; Angelsen, 2008), change in forest cover is better analyzed relative to overall competing land 
use changes in the country (Barbier et al., 2010). Indeed, the FT theory is about changes in forest 
stock relative to land area, so regressing forest cover as a share of total land area on the rate of de-
forestation offers a suitable approach to test the FT hypothesis.  
 
The drawback with this definition is that it does not take into account the natural or original forest 
cover of the country. Unfortunately, reliable data on this are not available. To deal with this in the 
case of countries or sub-national units with no current deforestation we generate a deforestation 
dummy variable. This deforestation dummy in addition to historical deforestation together control for 
initial forest stock conditions (Burns et al., 2003).  
 
We estimated a set of models, with an increasing number of predictors. The explanatory variables 
included differ in the global, Brazil, Vietnam and Indonesia analyses due to availability of data. The 
models are summarized in Table 5-1. 
 
                                               
7 More specifically, when using the standard definition of deforestation rates, the variance of the error terms were 
strongly correlated with forest cover.  
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Table 5-1 Models for predicting deforestation 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Historical 
deforestation 
X X X X  
Trend in 
historical 
deforestation 
X X X X X 
Forest cover 
(squared) and 
GDP 
 X X X X 
Agricultural 
GDP share 
and prices 
  X X X 
Other factors    X X 
 
We start with a simple model which only uses historical deforestation and a trend factor. This corre-
sponds to the simplest suggestion in the climate negotiations, and in some proposals on how to set 
reference levels, e.g. the way the Amazon fund sets the reference level for the Brazilian Amazon. 
 
The second model is based on FT logic: at early stages of the FT (represented by countries with high 
forest cover) deforestation is likely to be higher than the historical level. At later stages, the situation 
reverses. These are the most commonly advocated national circumstances and therefore Model 2 is 
relevant to the question posed by Meridian (2009) about how to adjust reference levels. We also in-
clude GDP per capita, which might also be a proxy for the stage in the forest transition (negative sign 
expected), but may be given other interpretations as well, e.g. reflecting high demand for agricultural 
and forest products (positive sign), high opportunity costs of inputs (like labour) in forest clearing 
(negative sign) or better governance and capacity to contain illegal deforestation (negative sign).  
 
The third model includes some of the drivers of deforestation, related to the agricultural sector. This 
includes the overall reliance of agriculture (share of GDP) and agricultural prices.  
 
The fourth model has a comprehensive list of explanatory factors which are commonly included in 
deforestation regression models, including a set of political variables. Finally, the fifth model is the 
same as the fourth, except that historical deforestation is excluded. The comparisons between the 
results of models IV and V can illustrate how much of the historical deforestation is captured by the 
other variables considered.  
 
In addition to using rates of deforestation as share of land area, we estimate several other models 
where we use deforestation in absolute terms. The same approach reported in Table 5-1 is adopted. 
These estimations are aimed at demonstrating how sensitive the FT hypothesis is to different forms 
of quantification. However, the selection of main results depends on how well historical deforestation 
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correlates with current deforestation. This is described in detail in later discussions. Finally, with 
some countries (or sub-national units) expected to have minimal (or zero) deforestation rates, we 
estimate a tobit model (Tobin, 1958) in addition to OLS to test the sensitivity of results. The tobit 
model measures not only the likelihood that deforestation will occur in a country (or sub-national 
unit) given its initial conditions of forest stock and/or other prevailing economic factors, but also 
measures the intensity of deforestation activities. 
 
5.5 Global model 
5.5.1 Data sources and sampling  
Country level panel data come from online databases of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (Population Division). The data, 
accessed as of August 2011, cover the past two decades (1990 – 2010) on forest area and other 
economic related variables for the 2000 – 2010 periods. The sample includes countries in the three 
regions: Africa, Asia and Latin America. The larger share of the sample is included in FAO’s country 
classification of least developed and developing countries, the remaining being countries assumed to 
be transitional countries.8 The overall sample consists of 124 countries (see Appendix A6 Country 
sample). We excluded countries with missing information on key variables, countries with constant 
forest area in more than one year (indicating poor quality data), and countries with less than 10,000 
ha of forest area in 1990. The final sample used in analysis consists of 65 countries. 
 
The forest cover data and deforestation 1990-2010 are from FAO’s Forest Resource Assessments 
(FRA). Annual deforestation rates for 2000 - 2009 are calculated using FAOSTAT data, which are 
largely based on FRA.  
 
Forest cover measured as the area under both natural and planted forests is used to calculate forest 
stock and annual deforestation rate. Forest stock is calculated as the share of country land area. An-
nual deforestation rate is defined as forest loss between two periods and expressed as a percentage 
of country land area. We define deforestation rate as a positive value. That is, a positive value means 
loss of forest cover from period t1 to t2. We calculate historical deforestation – as a reference level – 
for the 1990 – 2000 period. Then “current annual” deforestation rate is calculated for the period 2000 
– 2010.  
 
Economic related variables that require brief explanation include crop price index and governance. 
The crop price index is defined as the measure of change in major crop prices for a given country in 
response to crop exports. It is calculated using FAO data as follows: 
 
                                               
8 These include Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, French Guiana, Guatemala, Mayotte, Mexico, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam. 
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Where CPIct is the crop price index for country c in period t. Pcit is the average international market 
price for crop group i (cereals, pulses, oil crops and sugar (sugar cane and sugar beets)). n is the 
number of crop groups. cit  is the share of country c’s total exports for crop group i weighted with 
export share of crop group i for 2000. cit  allows us to control for effective cross-country compari-
sons unbiased by the scale differences in crop exports. Increasing cit  implies increased crop prices 
which in turn are an incentive for a country to expand its agricultural land area. CPIct
 
thus reflects 
agricultural commodity price fluctuation, taking into account the composition of the country’s agricul-
tural export. 
 
We use four indicators of governance measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes (Kaufmann et al., 2009; 2010). These indicators in-
clude: voice and accountability capturing citizens’ perceptions on government selection, freedom of 
expression and association; political stability and absence of violence capturing perceptions on gov-
ernment destabilization; regulatory quality capturing perceptions on government’s ability to formulate 
and implement policies regulating private sector development; and control of corruption capturing 
perceptions on the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.  
 
Other variables are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (current prices in US$) collected from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), agricultural GDP (as a percentage of national GDP) from World 
Bank, and population density from United Nations (Population Division). 
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Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
 
The mean and standard deviation columns are self-explanatory. The columns headed 1 to 14 give pairwise Pearson correlations).  
 
 
Mean 
(N=650) 
Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Deforested area 
(1000ha) 
114.7 329.1 1.000              
2. Deforested area 
(% of land) 
0.187 0.226 0.220 1.000             
3. Historical defor-
estation (deforest-
ed area for 1990 – 
2000 period as % 
of land) 
0.227 0.281 0.206 0.888 1.000            
4. Historical defor-
estation (deforest-
ed area for 1990 – 
2000 period 
(1000ha)) 
150.0 407.1 0.889 0.184 0.328 1.000           
5. Deforestation 
dummy=1 if no 
deforestation, 0 
otherwise 
0.235 0.425 -0.193 -0.461 -0.402 -0.202 1.000          
6. Lag of forest 
stockc (share of 
0.316 0.213 0.272 0.411 0.419 0.281 -0.176 1.000         
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land) 
7. GDP per capita 1810.2 2081.2 0.158 -0.079 -0.010 0.156 0.047 0.059 1.000        
8. Agricultural GDP 
(% of national 
GDP) 
21.7 13.8 -0.098 0.105 0.036 -0.101 -0.130 0.010 -0.651 1.000       
9. Crop price 
indexC 
15262.2 266075.2 -0.018 -0.044 -0.043 -0.019 0.077 -0.034 0.019 -0.049 1.000      
10. Population 
densityC 
0.862 1.338 -0.115 -0.112 -0.087 -0.097 0.176 -0.215 -0.168 0.009 0.008 1.000     
Governance 
indicators 
                
11. Control of 
corruption 
-0.579 0.560 0.026 -0.255 -0.201 -0.014 0.360 -0.096 0.394 -0.399 0.090 -0.089 1.000    
12. Regulatory 
Quality 
-0.505 0.608 0.054 -0.117 -0.045 0.041 0.215 -0.112 0.450 -0.482 0.024 0.016 0.735 1.000   
13. Political 
Stability 
-0.582 0.804 0.010 -0.016 -0.016 -0.061 0.249 0.063 0.345 -0.327 0.076 -0.167 0.652 0.534 1.000  
14. Voice and 
accountability 
-0.568 0.736 0.177 0.099 0.168 0.157 -0.071 0.075 0.373 -0.333 0.076 0.008 0.608 0.742 0.495 1.000 
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5.6 Regression results  
The bivariate Pearson correlations (or Pearson’s r)  in Table 5-2  show that high deforestation rates 
are strongly correlated with high rates of historical deforestation and the share of forest stock, but 
less correlated with the share of agricultural GDP, population density and governance indicators. The 
correlation between annual deforestation and historical deforestation expressed as percentage of 
total country land area does not change even when expressed in absolute terms (Pearson’s r = 0.89).  
 
This finding may overestimate the significance of the result because current deforestation for many 
countries is simply estimated as an extrapolation of previous estimates. This would bias the result so 
as to exaggerate the significance of historical deforestation in explaining current deforestation. The 
global results should therefore be viewed together with the three country analyses. This bias is likely 
to be smaller for the other variables included in the regressions. In the final discussion and conclusion 
we therefore put more emphasis on the country level results which are based on better quality data.9  
 
Turning to Table 5-3, the results of the first model show that historical deforestation has a strong 
predictive power on current deforestation, with a coefficient of 0.72: an increase in historical defor-
estation of 0.1 percent units (e.g. from 0.50 to 0.60 %) increases expected deforestation in current 
period by 0.072 percent units. The trend variable is positive and significant in this model but becomes 
insignificant when more explanatory variables are included. Also, from this model, one observes that 
historical deforestation alone explains about 88% of the variance in current deforestation (R2 = 
0.877).  
 
The inclusion of forest stock and income (GDP per capita) in model (2) barely increases the explana-
tory power. The forest stock coefficients are statistically significant in models (2) and (5), but become 
weak in models (3) and (4). Since we have included historical deforestation, the interpretation is the 
impact of forest cover on a change in deforestation compared to the historical level. The relative sign 
of the linear and squared coefficients indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship, and model (2) sug-
gests that for forest covers below 60% of country land area the relationship is negative. When we 
exclude historical deforestation but include other variables in model (5); the relationship is negative 
only when forest cover is 51% of country land area. Overall, this result lends support to the forest 
transition (FT) theory (Rudel et al., 2005; Angelsen, 2008), which suggests that countries with initial-
ly large forest cover are more likely to clear forests continuously up to the lowest forest cover area 
after which forest regrowth and reforestation start.  
 
 
                                               
9
 For reasons of data quality, we also eliminated some countries from the analysis, cf. above discussion on data 
used. 
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Table 5-3: Determinants of country level deforestation 2000-2010  
 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Historical 
deforestation (ref. 
period 1990 – 2000) 
(%) 0.719*** 0.660*** 0.654*** 0.639***                
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)                
Trend variable 0.006*** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003    
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)    
Deforestation dum-
my =1 if deforesta-
tion=0, 0 otherwise -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.180*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)    
Lagged forest stock 
(share of land area)  0.168*** 0.100** 0.119** 0.894*** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.099)    
Lagged forest stock 
squared (share of 
land area)  -0.140** -0.059 -0.115* -0.882*** 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.132)    
log of GDP per capita  0.001 -0.000 -0.004** -0.013**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)    
Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP)   0.003*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
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Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP) 
squared   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Crop price index   -0.003** -0.001 -0.001    
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
Population density    0.002 -0.001    
    (0.002) (0.005)    
Governance 
indicators      
Control of corruption    -0.022** -0.099*** 
    (0.010) (0.019)    
Regulatory quality    -0.001 0.001    
    (0.013) (0.027)    
Political stability (no 
violence)    0.035*** 0.071*** 
    (0.009) (0.011)    
Voice & 
accountability    -0.027** -0.007    
    (0.009) (0.014)    
Regional dummies      
Latin America (com-
pared to Africa)    0.043** 0.149*** 
    (0.018) (0.026)    
Asia (compared to 
Africa)    -0.023** 0.010    
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    (0.011) (0.017)    
Wald Chi square 
value 1535.6*** 3212.7*** 3910.9*** 5945.8*** 1119.6*** 
R2 0.877 0.882 0.888 0.895 0.670    
Number of 
observations 650 650 650 650 650    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Figures in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.  
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As expected, we find mixed relationships of forest stock on deforestation when we use absolute terms 
of deforested area Table 5-3. This suggests that the evidence of the FT hypothesis is sensitive to the 
model specification, and we return to this point in section 4.6. 
 
Income per capita is (GDP) negatively related to the deforestation rate, that is, higher income implies 
lower deforestation (i.e. a downward adjustment of historical deforestation). Similar relationships 
have been found in earlier studies (Ehrhardt-Martinez, 1998; Jorgenson, 2006; Jorgenson and Burns, 
2007). Thus, this is in line with the forest transition logic, assuming income is an indicator of the 
stage in the forest transition. 
 
Model (3) attempts to include the agricultural sector as a possible explanation of deforestation. The 
explanatory power of the model (as measured by R2) and magnitude of the coefficient related to his-
torical deforestation almost remain the same as in Model 2. The crop price index is significant and 
negative in model (3) but insignificant in models (4) and (5), which might be due to the small varia-
tion across countries as many agricultural commodity prices move in tandem. The share of agricul-
tural GDP is highly significant and positive in the same models10. Countries dominated by agriculture 
(high share of agricultural GDP) tend to have higher deforestation rates initially, but such countries 
are likely to have lower deforestation rates when agricultural income contributes a larger share to 
national GDP. This suggests that higher agricultural income, for example, in the form of intensifica-
tion of agricultural production, reduces pressure on forest.   
 
The inclusion of population and governance/policy related variables increases the explanatory power 
to about 90% and some of the variables are statistically significant. Control of corruption and ‘voice 
and accountability’ reduce deforestation rates. This seems consistent with efforts to control illegal 
logging. Contrary to many popular views, political stability and absence of violence in general can 
increase deforestation, although it fits well with the observation that instability and violence are de-
structive for economic activities, including deforestation.  
 
The gradual inclusion of forest stock and economic growth related factors appears to have a slight 
effect on the coefficient of historical deforestation rate (reduces from 0.719 to 0.654), but inclusion of 
population and governance variables reduces it to 0.639. Historical deforestation is short of being a 
1:1 predictor of current deforestation. Adding new variables affects the predictive power slightly (R2). 
 
A final observation concerns the difference between model (4) and (5), i.e., how the results change 
when the main predictor – historical deforestation – is left out. The predictive power drops to 67%, 
which is reasonable, but many of the variables significant in model (4) remain so in model (5). Forest 
stock coefficient increases in magnitude, and the significance of an inverted-U relationship remains. 
 
                                               
10 The coefficient on the squared term is significantly negative, indicating an inverted U-shaped relationship, but 
the turning point is well outside the data range.  
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5.7 Regression analysis by country 
We turn to the application of regression techniques to individual countries. 
 
5.7.1 Brazil 
Data sources 
 
Focus on Brazil is justified by the country’s large forest area and significant deforestation rates, as 
well as its position in REDD+ policy discussions and implementation.  Another reason to focus on 
Brazil is the availability of good quality data on deforestation in the Amazon region (approximately 
50% of the country, and the region with most forests) and socio-economic characteristics at the sub-
national (municipal) level. It is the largest contiguous forest region in the world with time series data 
on deforestation. However, no time series data are available on regeneration, which restricts our 
analysis to the downward slope of the forest transition curve.  
 
Our analysis relies mostly on publicly available data from the Brazilian Environmental Agency 
(Ibama), IPEA (Applied Economics Research Institute), INPE (National Spatial Research Institute), 
and also from Imazon (Amazon Institute of People and the Environment). We have data on 719 mu-
nicipalities comprised of yearly observations on area deforested, remaining forest stock, population 
and GDP as well as one time observations on road density. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
included in the analysis are presented in Table 5-4 below. Many initiatives aim to decrease deforesta-
tion by changing policies, for example, land tenure reform and regulatory measures, rather than di-
rect payments to landowners. This means that impacts are broader, that there will be broad partici-
pation in REDD+ across regions, and that effectiveness of nation-wide policies are harder to measure 
through regression analysis, where variation within the sample is key. 
 
The data on deforestation and forest stock are available on a yearly basis from 2000 to 2009 inclu-
sive. This enables us to use average annual deforestation for the period from 2000 to 2004 as an 
index of historical deforestation and use it to predict deforestation for each year in the period 2005-
2009. This reference period is constrained by data availability and is not intended to pre-judge nego-
tiated outcomes under UNFCCC or elsewhere. Simple statistics in Table 5-4 show that the mean an-
nual deforestation rate was 0.34% for 2005 -2009 period compared to 1.5% for the reference level 
(2000 – 2004). Since we measure deforestation rate as a share of total national land area, this 
means the non-forest land use area expanded fairy rapidly by 1.5% in the reference period compared 
to 0.34% annually for the 2005 – 2009 period. 
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Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations 
 
 
Mean 
(N=650) 
Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Deforested 
area (sq. km) 
17.7 56.4 1.000             
2. Deforested 
area (% of 
land) 
0.34 0.65 0.443 1.000            
3. Historical 
deforestation 
(deforested 
area for 2000 
– 2009 period 
(sq. km)) 
45.4 95.2 0.755 0.259 1.000           
4. Historical 
deforestation 
(deforested 
area for 2000 
– 2009 period 
as % of land) 
1.47 3.21 0.030 0.134 0.366 1.000          
5. Deforesta-
tion dummy=1 
if no defor-
estation, 0 
otherwise 
0.252 0.434 -0.183 -0.300 -0.237 -0.069 1.000         
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6. Lag of 
forest cover 
(sq. km) 
4230.9 12467.2 0.330 -0.055 0.303 -0.103 -0.192 1.000        
7. Lag of 
forest cover 
(share of land) 
0.281 0.308 0.279 0.107 0.278 -0.090 -0.461 0.564 1.000       
8. GDP for 
2000 (Reals) 
99802.6 656377.9 0.021 -0.018 0.025 -0.008 -0.050 0.028 0.059 1.000      
9. Cattle & 
agricultural 
GDP for 2000 
(Reals) 
14294.2 21298.1 0.446 0.127 0.486 -0.004 -0.207 0.126 0.077 0.111 1.000     
10. Dummy 
for good soil = 
1, 0 otherwise 
0.481 0.500 0.121 0.158 0.140 0.131 -0.162 -0.082 -0.042 -0.033 0.058 1.000    
11. Population 
density (# of 
people per sq. 
km) 
23.87 131.37 -0.043 0.004 -0.042 0.090 0.032 -0.055 -0.066 0.274 -0.035 -0.059 1.000   
12. Official 
roads in 2000 
(km) 
20.6 38.6 0.089 0.007 0.062 -0.036 -0.046 -0.033 -0.060 0.300 0.302 0.025 0.021 1.000  
13. Unofficial 
roads in 1997 
(km) 
393.1 695.8 0.619 0.170 0.649 -0.037 -0.247 0.270 0.235 0.063 0.687 0.109 -0.075 0.245 1.000 
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5.7.1.1 Regression results 
Similarly to the approach taken for global data analysis, we first do bivariate Pearson correlations 
(Table 5-4). Absolute historical deforestation correlates highly with annual deforestation by about 
76% compared (column 1), compared to only 13% when we use annual percentage rates 
deforestation and historical deforestation (column 2).  
 
Table 5-5 shows the results for the different models. In Model 1, the estimated elasticity of 
historical deforestation is 0.66, indicating that according to this model, for every 1% increase in a 
municipality deforestation rate in the historical period 2000-2004, there is a 0.66% increase in 
deforestation in the period 2005-2009. The trend variable indicates that deforestation decreases 
per year and the results are consistent in all models.  
 
Model (2) includes historical deforestation as well as forest stock and GDP. The elasticity of 
historical deforestation drops to 0.46, and there is an inverted-U relationship with forest stock, 
shown by a positive linear term and a negative quadratic term. The inverted-U relationship 
continues to hold in models (3) through (5), with the turning point changing only slightly from 61% 
in model (4) to 62% in model (5), well above the one in the global model.11 GDP is positive and 
significant in model 2, but consistently negative and significant in model (3) through model (5), 
which include explicitly the contribution to GDP from cattle and agriculture. In model (3), we 
include agricultural related variables. An increase agricultural and cattle GDP increases 
deforestation significantly. This is expected as increased demand for agricultural and grazing land 
may lead to encroachment on forest land. Likewise, municipalities with good soils suitable for 
agriculture are associated with high deforestation rates. The change of sign in the GDP coefficient 
which agriculture is included explicitly may indicate a negative contribution (i.e. a decrease in 
deforestation) from non-agricultural activities collectively, though this might not be true for all 
municipalities individually. 
 
Table 5-5 Determinants of municipality level deforestation in Brazil (2005-2009) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Log of historical 
deforestation 
(2000 – 2004) 
0.656*** 
(0.012) 
0.461*** 
(0.018) 
0.402*** 
(0.018) 
0.395*** 
(0.018) 
               
               
Trend variable -0.035*** 
(0.010) 
-0.136*** 
(0.011) 
-0.141*** 
(0.010) 
-0.136*** 
(0.010) 
-0.145*** 
(0.011)    
Deforestation 
dummy =1 if 
deforestation=0, 
0 otherwise 
-0.235*** 
(0.042) 
-0.372*** 
(0.046) 
-0.396*** 
(0.045) 
-0.373*** 
(0.044) 
-0.773*** 
(0.040)    
Lagged forest 
stock (share of 
land area) 
 2.560*** 
(0.279) 
2.416*** 
(0.269) 
2.180*** 
(0.253) 
4.756*** 
(0.255)    
                                               
11 The turning point is found by considering the two coefficients of the forest stock and forest stock squared variable, and at which level 
of the forest stock the sum of the positive linear and the negative squared effect turn from being positive to negative.  
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Lagged forest 
stock squared 
(share of land 
area) 
 -2.095*** 
(0.287) 
-1.610*** 
(0.279) 
-1.800*** 
(0.266) 
-3.826*** 
(0.285)    
Log of GDP in 
Reals for year 
2000 
 0.051*** 
(0.005) 
-0.132*** 
(0.015) 
-0.034* 
(0.018) 
-0.130*** 
(0.020)    
Log of GDP from 
cattle and agri-
culture in Reals 
in 2000 
  0.215*** 
(0.018) 
0.117*** 
(0.020) 
0.280*** 
(0.022)    
Dummy for 
good soil=1, 0 
otherwise 
  0.206*** 
(0.031) 
0.237*** 
(0.031) 
0.348*** 
(0.034)    
Log of popula-
tion density 
(number of peo-
ple per sq. km) 
   -0.125** 
(0.013) 
-0.081*** 
(0.014)    
Log of official 
roads in 2000 
(km) 
   0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.018*   
(0.010)    
Log of unofficial 
roads in 1997 
(km) 
   0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.076*** 
(0.008)    
Chi square value 8607.4*** 11612.3*** 12480.5*** 13607.7*** 9646.7*** 
R2 0.793 0.814 0.822 0.831 0.789    
Number of  
observations 
3595 3595 3595 3595 3595    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Figures in parentheses are 
panel corrected standard errors. 
 
Model (4) includes several other potential circumstances that could be relevant to the 
determination of RLs. This model includes the explanatory variables in model (3) as well as policy 
variables and other socioeconomic factors that have been discussed in the literature to have 
important influences on deforestation. Here we see that the elasticity of historical deforestation 
further decreases to 0.40. The relationships for all variables and their significance levels hold as 
they do in models (2) and (3), except for GDP. Municipalities with high population density have 
lower deforestation rates. This finding is consistent with earlier work in southern parts of Brazil 
where increasing population is resulting in increasing rates of rural-urban migration and expansion 
of forest cover (Baptista, 2008).  On the other hand, increased road network of both official and 
unofficial roads increases deforested area significantly. Increased road network improves market 
access of both forest and agricultural products all of which accelerate deforestation activities.  
 
Model (5) is the same as model (4), except that it omits historical deforestation. This is similar to 
most econometric models estimated to assess the causes of deforestation. We note that several 
coefficients change in magnitude when comparing models (4) and (5), but qualitatively remain the 
same. More specifically, coefficients are usually bigger in this specification as compared to the 
results in model (4), 
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indicating that historical deforestation absorbs the effects of the other covariates. The R2 only 
drops from 0.83 to 0.79 when historical deforestation is omitted. 
 
5.7.2 Indonesia 
5.7.2.1 Data 
Indonesia is experiencing high rates of deforestation and forest degradation (Mather, 2007) and 
forms a good case study area to identify the causes of deforestation. Figure 3 shows the extent of 
deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia for the period we study (2000 – 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Deforestation and degradation in Indonesia between 2000 – 2009.  
 
Unlike other datasets, annual deforestation data were not available to us for Indonesia. We use 
forest stock data from 371 districts for the years 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 obtained from the 
Ministry of Forestry (MOFOR). Other data for different years like protected zone areas (2005), GDP 
(2006), commercial plantations (2005) among others also come from MOFOR. Road density is 
calculated based on the data from Indonesian Statistical Center (BPS). We use the average of 
deforested area for 2000 – 2003 period as historical deforestation and the dependent variable is 
average of deforested area for the 2006 – 2009 period. Table 5-6 shows descriptive statistics and 
bivariate correlations for selected key variables. 
 
 ICSUK10822  54 
Table 5-6:Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
(N=371) 
Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Deforested area (2006-2009) (ha) 6820.2 28665.4 1.000           
2. Deforested area (2006-2009) (% of 
land) 
0.823 1.736 0.385 1.000          
3. Historical deforestation (deforested 
area for 2000-2003) (ha) 
2803.1 8633.0 0.446 0.164 1.000         
4. Historical deforestation (deforested 
area for 2000-2003) (% of land) 
0.589 2.940 0.009 -0.005 0.369 1.000        
5. Deforestation dummy=1 if no defor-
estation in 2003-2006, 0 otherwise 
0.367 0.483 -0.162 -0.159 -0.234 -0.123 1.000       
6. Forest stock in 2006 (ha) 269614.3 712283.6 0.689 0.116 0.375 -0.011 -0.257 1.000      
7. Forest stock in 2006 (% of land) 30.2 25.4 0.219 0.210 0.230 -0.006 -0.448 0.556 1.000     
8. District GDP per capita in 2006 (mil-
lion IDR) 
14.3 29.7 0.001 0.013 0.055 0.008 0.028 0.044 0.014 1.000    
9. Agricultural GDP as % of  district GDP 31.4 19.0 0.091 0.092 0.078 -0.054 -0.324 0.198 0.436 -0.332 1.000   
10. Population density per sq. km 1081.9 2349.1 -0.105 -0.172 -0.140 -0.055 0.395 -0.164 -0.431 0.145 -0.525 1.000  
11. Road density (km/ha) (%) 0.213 0.192 -0.169 -0.157 -0.170 0.053 0.470 -0.283 -0.466 0.038 -0.355 0.434 1.000 
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The results in Table 5-6 show that deforestation in Indonesia is increasing, from 0.6% in 2000-
2003 to 0.8% in 2006-2009. Because of the stronger relationship observed, based on the bivariate 
correlations in columns (1) and (2), for the modelling we chose to use absolute terms rather than 
rates of deforestation and historical deforestation and Table 5-6 reports the results.  
 
Table 5-7: Determinants of province level deforestation 2006-2009 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
log historical deforestation 
0.934*** 0.324*** 0.310*** 0.259***                
(0.035) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056)                
Deforestation dummy =1 if no 
deforestation, 0 otherwise 
1.310*** -1.410*** -1.632*** -0.541 -1.096**  
(0.285) (0.388) (0.401) (0.441) (0.427)    
Forest stock (share of land) 
 0.121*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 
 (0.178) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)    
Forest stock squared (share 
of land) 
 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**  
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)    
log of district GDP per capita 
(million IDR) 
 0.740*** 0.706*** 1.507*** 1.855*** 
 (0.141) (0.138) (0.190) (0.194)    
Agricultural GDP as a % of 
district GDP 
  0.051* 0.116*** 0.136*** 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)    
Agricultural GDP as a % of 
district GDP squared 
  -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Population density per sq. km 
   -0.428*** -0.549*** 
   (0.085) (0.084)    
Road density (km/ha) (%) 
   -2.042** -1.358    
   (0.908) (0.962)    
F – value 352.5*** 250.5*** 185.2*** 185.6*** 171.7*** 
R2 0.599 0.759 0.764 0.787 0.771    
Number of observations 371 371 371 371 371    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
 
5.7.2.2 Regression results 
From Table 5.7, consistent with the other results, model (1) shows that historical deforestation 
significantly explains the current (or future) deforestation. That is, historical deforestation alone 
explains about 60% of the variation in deforestation rates among Indonesian districts. A 1% in-
crease in previous deforestation causes a about 0.9% increase in current deforestation. Model (1) 
also shows that districts with no deforestation initially are likely to have positive deforestation rates 
in future. However, this finding does not hold when we include more variables in models (2) 
through (5). 
 
The inclusion of forest stock and district GDP (Model 2) reduces the magnitude of the estimated 
dependence on historical deforestation substantially and slightly increases the explanatory power, 
and these effects remain the same in models (3) and (4). The coefficient on historical deforestation 
drops from 0.93 in model (1) to 0.26, and the explanatory power increases from 60% to 79% 
when we add proxy variables for economic growth and forest stock in model (4). Even when we 
drop historical deforestation 
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in model (5), the explanatory power remains as high as 77%. Two implications can be drawn from 
these results: One, historical deforestation is not the only major factor influencing deforestation 
rates in the districts of Indonesia. Secondly, historical deforestation in Indonesia appears, as is to 
be expected, to capture the effects of other variables. Other important factors explaining high de-
forestation rates in districts of Indonesia include: Districts with large forest stocks experience high 
deforestation rates, which start declining only when the forest cover reduces to about 63 – 70% of 
land area as evidenced by the inverted-U relationship in models (2) and (5). However, districts 
with high population densities have lower deforestation rates possibly such districts are progressing 
towards urbanization and industrialization. This is somewhat supported by lower deforestation 
rates in districts with high road density, an indicator increasing urbanization. 
 
Districts with high GDP have high deforestation rates, which can be explained in several ways, e.g. 
market access affecting both the GDP and deforestation rates. Increased share of agricultural GDP 
significantly accelerates deforestation rates, but further increases in agricultural revenues may also 
slow down deforestation rates as producers operate on intensive margin. The robustness of our 
findings is supported by the satellite imagery results as shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.. It shows the drivers of deforestation for the time period 2000-2009. Expansion of subsist-
ence agriculture is a major driver of deforestation (34%), followed by commercial agriculture 
(32%) and aquaculture (3%). Large areas deforested and still open land constitutes 18%, and only 
11% of deforested area has been reforested or regenerated. This includes crop forests like oil palm 
or pulpwood plantations. 
 
5.7.3 Vietnam 
5.7.3.1 Data 
Like Brazil, Vietnam has good data on annual deforestation by province. The data came from Gen-
eral Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) and the Forest Department (KIEMLAM) under the Direc-
torate of Forests12. In general, the data cover land use, forest area and other economic related 
variables for the period 1995 – 2010. Annual deforestation for the 1995 – 2010 and economic re-
lated variables for the period 2005 – 2009 are from GSO, while forest cover area data for the peri-
od 2005 – 2009 come from (KIEMLAM). Table 5-8 reports descriptive statistics and bivariate corre-
lations.  
 
Forest stock is calculated as a share of forest cover in a given province. Results in Table 5-8 show 
that correlation between annual deforestation and historical deforestation expressed as percentage 
of provincial land area is 0.697 compared to 0.480 when annual deforestation and historical defor-
estation are expressed in absolute terms. Historical deforestation is calculated as average forest 
loss for the 1995 – 2004 period and expressed as a percentage of provincial land area. As with 
global data, we choose to use rates of annual deforestation and historical deforestation in the re-
gression analyses. 
 
Table 5-8 reports several other specifications where we use different transformations of deforesta-
tion and forest stock to test the robustness of FT hypothesis. We were unable to obtain data on 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at province level. We instead use GDP per capita and the percent-
age of GDP contributed by agriculture, forestry and fishing at national level. The other variables, 
population density and the volume of passengers carried by road, are at province level. Due to 
missing data, we use data from 61 provinces out of 64 provinces that constitute Vietnam.   
                                               
12The online data were accessed as of October, 2011 from www.gso.gov.vn and www.kiemlam.org.vn 
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Table 5-8 :Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations 
 
 
Mean 
(N=650) 
Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Deforested area 
(ha) 
41.5 170.1 1.000           
2. Deforested area 
(% of land) 
0.019 0.117 0.962 1.000          
3. Historical defor-
estation (deforest-
ed area for 1995 – 
2004 period (ha)) 
98.2 170.5 0.480 0.318 1.000         
4. Historical defor-
estation (deforest-
ed area for 1995 – 
2004 period as % 
of land) 
0.026 0.057 0.736 0.697 0.723 1.000        
5. Deforestation 
dummy=1 if no 
deforestation, 0 
otherwise 
0.415 0.494 -0.206 -0.137 -0.371 -0.292 1.000       
6. Lag of forest 
cover (1000 ha) 
211.82 208.9 -0.050 -0.111 0.148 -0.119 -0.206 1.000      
7. Lag of forest 
cover (share of 
land) 
0.297 0.199 0.010 -0.062 0.284 -0.019 -0.239 0.817 1.000     
8. National GDP per 14.38 3.43 -0.035 -0.039 0.008 0.007 0.141 0.034 0.049 1.000    
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capita 
9. Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing 
as % of national 
GDP 
20.96 0.67 0.040 0.020 0.006 0.005 0.029 0.014 0.028 0.480 1.000   
10. Population 
density 
(persons/ha) 
0.005 0.007 -0.023 0.016 -0.149 0.044 0.025 -0.456 -0.536 0.015 0.005 1.000  
11. Volume of 
passengers carried 
by road (million 
persons) 
23.46 64.65 -0.065 -0.045 -0.138 -0.101 0.106 -0.196 -0.279 0.056 0.022 0.635 1.000 
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5.7.3.2 Regression results  
Results from model (1) estimate that historical deforestation explains about 51% of the variation in 
future (or current) annual deforestation in Vietnam. Comparing model (1) with models (2) through 
(4), the addition of other variables appears to cause little variation in predicted future deforesta-
tion. Including forest stock and other variables such as GDP, population density and road network, 
increases the explanatory power by only about 2%. That is, R2 increases from 50% in model (1) to 
52% in model (3). This is consistent with results obtained using Global and Brazil data indicating 
that historical deforestation plays a significant role in explaining futures deforestation, or captures 
the influence of other variables. 
 
Unlike Global and Brazil data, the coefficient on historical deforestation in the Vietnam data is larg-
er than unity. Model (1) shows that amongst Vietnamese provinces a 1% increase in historical de-
forestation increases annual deforestation by 1.5%. This is consistent with the observation below 
that provinces with large forest cover clear more forests initially before embarking on reforestation. 
 
The coefficient of historical deforestation remains the same when we include forest stock and eco-
nomic growth indicators (GDP) in model (2), population density and road network in model (3). In 
particular, the inclusion of economic indicators appears to have no effect on the coefficient of his-
torical deforestation. Similarly, model (4) shows that with exclusion of economic growth indicators, 
the coefficient on historical deforestation in models (3) and (4) remains fairly similar. This is ex-
pected since we use national instead of province data for GDP and the percentage of GDP contrib-
uted by agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
 
The other key result we observe in Vietnam data is the relationship between annual deforestation 
and forest stock. Consistent with Global and Brazil data, we find an inverted-U relationship be-
tween deforestation rate and forest stock, but with turning points well below 50% forest cover. 
That is, provinces with large forest cover are more likely to clear more forests initially before em-
barking on reforestation activities. 
 
We were able to obtain data on reforestation through plantations in Vietnam. For comparison and 
to check robustness, we regressed the reforestation rate on similar variables included in the defor-
estation models. Reforestation is defined negatively and expressed as a percentage of provincial 
land area. We report results in model (6). We observe opposite relationships: provinces with lower 
historical deforestation rates are less likely to carry out reforestation activities, which is in line with 
a hypothesis that forest scarcity encourages forest planting. Provinces with large forest stocks have 
less incentive to establish forest plantations. 
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Table 5-9: Determinants of province level deforestation 2005-2009 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
M6 
(reforestation) 
Historical 
deforestation 
(1995 – 
2004) (% of 
land) 
1.459*** 
(0.406 
 
 
1.471*** 
(0.413) 
 
 
 
1.484*** 
(0.416) 
1.464*** 
(0.409)                
-0.269*** 
(0.053)    
Trend 
variable 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003    
(0.004)    
                
                
Deforestation 
dummy =1 if 
no deforesta-
tion, 0 oth-
erwise 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
-
0.031**  
(0.013)    
-0.035**  
(0.013)    
Lagged forest 
stock (share 
of land area)  
0.132** 
(0.060) 
0.122* 
(0.064) 
0.067 
(0.041) 
0.260**  
(0.111)    
-0.401*** 
(0.101)    
Lagged forest 
stock 
squared 
(share of 
land area)  
-0.253** 
(0.102) 
-0.250** 
(0.105) 
-0.189** 
(0.073) 
-
0.463**  
(0.207)    
0.351*   
(0.182)    
log of nation-
al GDP per 
capita  
-0.129 
(0.132) 
-0.131 
(0.132)  
               
               
                
                
Agric., forest-
ry and fishing 
as a percent-
age of na-
tional GDP  
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.014)  
               
               
                
                
Population 
density 
(persons/ha)   
-0.867* 
(0.527) 
-1.177* 
(0.631) 
1.036**  
(0.520)    
-4.459*** 
(1.117)    
log of volume 
of passengers 
carried by 
road (mill 
persons)   
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.001    
(0.002)    
0.013*** 
(0.004)    
Chi square 
value 13.0** 19.7** 20.5** 18.1** 12.9**  520.4*** 
R2 0.506 0.516 0.518 0.515 0.052    0.609    
Number of 
observations 301 301 301 301 301    270    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Figures in parentheses are panel corrected 
standard errors. 
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The results on population density and road network are interesting. Population density is negatively 
associated with deforestation rate. A priori, one might expect an increase in population density to 
accelerate deforestation as the demand for agricultural and settlement land increases. However, 
the finding is consistent in Global and Brazil data, which further validates our results and con-
sistency with earlier work that populated countries like Vietnam have increased forest plantations 
(Mather, 2007; Rudel, 2009). The result may also reflect a simple correlation, namely that popula-
tion densities tend to be lower in high forest areas (Sunderlin et al. 2008). An increase in the vol-
ume of passengers carried by road is positively associated with increased deforestation, a similar 
result obtained in Brazilian data.  
 
Model (5) underscores the relative significance of historical deforestation in explaining the annual 
deforestation. Exclusion of historical deforestation reduces the explanatory power from about 51% 
to 5%. This suggests that historical deforestation captures a number of factors that drives defor-
estation (beyond those included in the regression analysis), and possibly also that deforestation 
process have there are evolving with time, with the relative roles of different factors changing.  
 
5.8 Discussion, conclusions and some implications 
Before turning to general discussion, we summarize the key findings from the four datasets ana-
lyzed. We used the similar model specification described earlier for each dataset (Global, Brazil, 
Vietnam and Indonesia). We only consider variables directly related to forestry and economic 
growth. This helps to see which variables are robust across the countries and between the global 
and the country data sets. The selected core variables are presented in Figure 5 and include histor-
ical deforestation as a percentage of land, forest stock as a percentage of land area, national GDP 
per capita, agriculture, forestry and fishing as a percentage of national GDP, population density as 
persons/ha, and an estimate of road use by millions of passengers carried by road. Historical de-
forestation and forest stock appear to be rather robust predictors. The other indicators considered 
mostly have the same sign, the most notable exception being that for Indonesia the GDP is posi-
tively correlated with deforestation, rather than negatively for the other countries. This may reflect 
the high value of agricultural commodities obtainable from deforested land in Indonesia. Population 
density is perhaps surprisingly found to be negatively correlated with deforestation, perhaps be-
cause of its association with increasing urbanization with greater reliance on non-forest resources.  
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Historical deforestation
Forest cover
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Agricultural GDP
Human population
Road net work
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Elasticity estimates with 95% confidence interval
Global Brazil
Vietnam Indonesia
 
 
 
 
Irrespective of data quality and the unit level of analysis (national or sub-national units), historical 
deforestation is positively correlated with the rate of future deforestation. Historical deforestation 
should therefore be a key variable to consider when setting REDD+ reference levels. Given the 
literature on spatial dependencies in deforestation (Laurance et al., 2001; Soares-filho et al., 
2006), it is perhaps surprising that this effect is not even larger. Other than results from Vietnam, 
the coefficient on historical deforestation is consistently less than unity. For Vietnam exclusion of 
historical deforestation as an explanatory variable in the deforestation model makes the explanato-
ry power drop by 70%, indicating the presence of causal relationships not captured adequately by 
the other variables considered. This was not the case with results obtained from global data or for 
Brazil and Indonesia; in these cases exclusion of historical deforestation had a marginal effect on 
the model explanatory power. Unlike Brazil, where forest transition is still in its infant stages in 
much of the Amazon (Baptista and Rudel, 2006; Walker, 2012), and Indonesia, which is experienc-
ing high deforestation rates (Mather, 2007), Vietnam has gone through a noticeable forest transi-
tion period (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2008). Thus, the significant drop we observe in the model ex-
planatory power when we exclude historical deforestation from the regression may be because 
Vietnam is on a different part of the FT curve.  
 
Despite the importance of historical deforestation in predicting future deforestation, we note that 
the coefficient (elasticity) of historical deforestation decreases as more variables are included. This 
indicates that historical deforestation is not a perfect predictor of deforestation, and draws the at-
tention to other underlying causes of deforestation. In particular, we find evidence attesting to the 
forest transition (FT) theory, although some of these results are sensitive to how one measures 
deforestation and forest stock, and the variables included. FT is associated with a wide range of 
interdependent economic, political and institutional processes in agriculture and forestry (Mather, 
1998; Mather et al., 1999), 
Figure 4. Selected predictors of deforestation in Global, Brazil, Vietnam and Indonesia datasets. 
Note: All variables are in logarithmic form 
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thus to relate it in simple ways to factors such as forest cover and income is challenging.  
 
Figure 6 elaborates on the impact of how deforestation and forest cover are measured. Figure 6 
shows how forest stock relates to deforestation, using two different approaches. When measuring 
both deforestation and forest stock in absolute terms, we observe linear relationships as evidenced 
in left panel of Figure 6. This is largely due to what we might call a “big country effect”: Large 
countries (or sub-national units in the country regressions) also tend to have larger areas of defor-
estation (in absolute terms), and this produces an almost linear relationship between forest cover 
and deforestation.  
 
On the other hand, measuring both deforestation and forest stock as share of land area, the FT 
pattern is exposed. From Figure 6, it is easy to identify the country’s location along the FT curve. 
We believe this is the more appropriate formulation of the model, and it avoids the “big country 
effect” in the analysis.  
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Other national or sub-national circumstances can have implications for deforestation that differ 
between countries. For example, we find that income (GDP) is associated with lower deforestation 
rates in global and Brazil data analyses, but associated with higher deforestation rates in 
Indonesia, although in the Brazilian case higher agricultural share of GDP is associated with higher 
deforestation. This suggests that in the case of Indonesia activities that increase GDP put more 
pressure on forests than is the case for Brazil. This may be related to the high value of 
commodities such as palm oil, or the occurrence of resources such as coal in forested areas. There 
is some evidence in the global 
Figure 5. Quadratic prediction of deforestation on forest cover. Dotted lines show 95% confidence 
interval and solid lines show predicted deforestation 
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analysis that whereas an increase agricultural GDP as a share of total GDP initially increases 
deforestation rates, as the share increases further deforestation rate declines. This implies that 
BAU in countries whose economic growth depends heavily on agriculture would eventually reduce 
deforestation rates, though forest cover might by then have been considerably reduced.  
  
The negative relationship between population density and deforestation rates is consistent with the 
preceding discussion. This relationship is generally consistent across a number of model 
specifications, particularly those obtained from country case studies (Brazil, Vietnam and 
Indonesia), although in a few cases a positive relationship between population density and 
deforestation rate was observed. Countries in the process of industrialization are more likely to 
have high rates of rural-urban migration and hence farmland abandonment for reforestation. But 
countries far from industrialization process may accelerate agricultural production by expansion 
into forest areas. This is further supported by the reduction in deforestation rates associated with 
increased road density (an indicator of increased access to markets and urbanization) in Indonesia, 
but contradicted by an opposite relationship observed in Brazil. As earlier mentioned, in Brazil 
deforestation is mainly driven by capital intensive activities and hence increased road density 
amounts pressure on these capital intensive activities and so is increased deforestation rate.  
 
Finally the quality of governance in a country has also mixed relationships: countries with better 
mechanisms to control corruption and oversee good accountability are likely to have lower 
deforestation rates. Perhaps surprisingly, other things being equal the global data suggest that 
countries with political stability are associated with high deforestation rates, a finding consistently 
gaining ground in empirical literature (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2002; Marquart-Pyatt, S. 2004; 
Shandra et al., 2009).  
 
We summarize our main findings in this section as follows: 
 
Historical deforestation is the key single variable to predict future deforestation and explains 
most of the current variation across countries and sub-national units. Countries or regions 
experiencing high rates of deforestation in the recent past are more likely to have high levels of 
current and future deforestation rates. However, the coefficients in most cases are below one, 
suggesting that a simple extrapolation can be misleading, and that other factors might also be 
considered, especially as with one exception in the present study these can account for much of 
the variance even without inclusion of historical deforestation in the model specification.  
 
Evidence of the forest transition (FT) hypothesis is observed. The FT hypothesis suggests that 
some high forest cover-low deforesting countries are experiencing accelerating rates of 
deforestation, while other countries with high deforestation rates experience decreasing rates of 
forest cover loss. However, the robustness of FT theory depends on the way forest stock is 
quantified: FT theory is supported when forest stock is measured relative to the total land area, but 
contradictory results emerge when forest stock is measured in absolute terms. This underscores 
the description of FT as a wide set of interdependent and context-specific economic, political and 
institutional processes in agriculture and forestry, where a regular global pattern is harder to 
detect. 
  
A number of other national circumstances were tested, but with findings across the four 
different data sets and for different models that depend on circumstances. For example, the impact 
of income (GDP per capita) varies across countries. Countries with a high dependence on 
agriculture, as measured by the sector’s share of GDP, are generally observed to have high 
deforestation rates, but 
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eventually deforestation tends to decline as agricultural income increases. Population density is 
found to have different relationships with high deforestation rates, and the same is true for a set of 
governance variables tested.  
 
The different relationships of national circumstances may be – in part – be explained by the quality 
of data used, and that the interrelations of economic, political, cultural and institutional differ 
across countries, which points to the benefit of using national level rather than global analysis to 
predict deforestation rates. Given constraints in data availability and quality, the analyses suggest 
that past deforestation rates and possibly also share of forest cover are the best general predictors 
of future deforestation, although the relationships observed are often understandable in terms of 
underlying causality and understanding improves as data accumulate. 
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6 Costs of REDD+ 
This chapter is based on a literature review on the potential costs of setting up REDD+ pro-
grammes in Cameroon, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil. A data collection framework was used that 
considers opportunity costs, implementation costs, and transaction costs that may arise during 
different phases of REDD+ implementation in the respective countries.  
 
6.1 An overview on issues related to REDD+ cost estimation 
Estimating the costs of REDD+ is not straightforward. This is reflected by the wide range of exist-
ing cost estimates for REDD+ implementation. The Stern Review (2006) presents estimates that 
the opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation range from USD 3 billion to USD 15 billion, resulting 
in carbon prices of USD 1 to USD 5 tCO2e-1. The Stern Review used a macroeconomic modelling 
approach, based on meta-analyses of results from different models. The Eliasch Review (2008) 
used a global partial equilibrium model to predict farmers’ land-use decisions in response to differ-
ent carbon prices, and estimated that USD 17 to USD 33 billion yr-1 would be needed to reduce 
emissions of the forest sector by 50% with average carbon prices of up to USD 15 tCO2e-1.  A wide 
variation of cost estimates is also found in studies that have been produced at regional, national or 
local levels. One reason for this difference in cost estimates is that studies differ in their focus on 
who bears the costs of REDD+, consider different cost categories, or make different assumptions 
on how REDD+ programs would be implemented (Bond et al., 2009). 
 
Costs are incurred by buyers and sellers of REDD+ action. Since stakeholders incur different costs, 
for any cost calculation it is essential to determine whose costs are in the focus of interest. Costs 
can be divided according to who bears them, and may include costs of individual actors, countries, 
government agencies, international donors or buyers in a carbon market. Individual actors, e.g. 
landholders who consider joining a REDD+ program, will focus on the costs of their participation, 
especially if a land-use change is required that affects their current income. Countries with a po-
tential for REDD+ will be interested in knowing more about the costs of implementing REDD+ pro-
grams on the ground, while international donors might seek guidance on where and how to best 
allocate funds in order to achieve cost-effective emission reductions and other co-benefits from 
REDD+. In this study, the focus is mainly on costs incurred by suppliers of REDD+ credits.  
 
Cost categories may include opportunity costs, implementation costs and transaction costs. Oppor-
tunity costs are the most widely considered category and can be defined as forgone economic ben-
efits from the best alternative land use (Lubowski, 2008). A comparison of 29 opportunity cost 
estimates from three different continents finds average costs of USD 2.51 tCO2e-1, indicating that 
land-use activities on deforested or degraded forest land often have a low profitability. The cost 
estimates range from less than zero (meaning that an agricultural activity is generating a loss) to 
USD 13.34 tCO2e
-1 (Boucher, 2008). Few studies adopt a comprehensive approach to estimating 
REDD+ that includes all opportunity costs and other costs. As a result, calculations of payments 
based on existing REDD+ estimates are likely to underestimate total costs. Products or services 
that do not have a market price are usually not considered in opportunity cost calculations, but 
might nevertheless be of great value for rural communities or households. In addition, if the de-
mand for food cannot be met by alternative local production because land has been set-aside for 
REDD+, deforestation might be shifted to other areas. To avoid leakage, measures might be need-
ed to address this unmet demand which will result in higher costs than opportunity cost calcula-
tions suggest (Fisher et al., 
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2011). Grieg-Gran (2006) presents a comprehensive list of factors that affect opportunity costs of 
REDD+, including site quality and climatic conditions, suitability of forest land for alternative uses, 
underlying carbon density estimates, scale of operation, distance to markets and commodity pric-
es. The selected methodology and underlying assumptions for opportunity cost calculation will have 
an important impact on the results. Factors to be considered include the chosen land-use modelling 
method, discount rate and time horizon, the proportion of deforested land that is associated with 
low, average and high return land uses, and assumptions made with regard to additionality and 
leakage. Opportunity costs nevertheless probably have the largest share of the total costs of 
REDD+, assuming that countries and/or individual actors are to be paid for forgone benefits of 
deforestation (Olsen and Bishop, 2009). 
 
The costs of actually implementing and running an REDD+ programme are often neglected. This is 
partly because estimates of these costs can only be speculative as long as full details on how an 
REDD+ programme will operate are not known (Grieg-Gran, 2008). Implementation costs are the 
costs of actions carried out to achieve REDD+ and include, for example, capacity building for insti-
tutions that are involved in MRV, the costs of preventing illegal logging, or costs related to the is-
suance of land titles to land users as an incentive to invest in land use practices that contribute to 
REDD+ (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Studies of REDD+ implementation costs show significant 
economies of scale, i.e., large programmes have lower implementation costs per unit of emission 
reduction or removal compared to smaller programmes (Olsen and Bishop, 2009). Based on a pre-
liminary assessment, the Meridian Institute (2009) estimated the costs for REDD+ readiness and 
implementation for a 50% global reduction in forest emissions to be in the range of USD 15 to USD 
35 billion yr-1. Table 6-1 presents cost range estimates for a list of activities a country might have 
to carry out to reach REDD+ readiness. Estimates cover a five-year planning horizon and are based 
on country estimates and on data from development aid activities. 
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Table 6-1 Cost range estimates for achieving REDD+ readiness (in USD) based on Hoare et al. (2008) in: Meridian 
Institute (2009) 
Action 
 
Cost range estimate 
Strategy development 200,000 – 1,000,000 
Establishment of relevant infrastructure 700,000 – 1,500,000 
Stakeholder consultation 150,000 –   2,000,000 
Pilot testing 250,000 – 500,000 
Establishment of baseline, monitoring system, and inven-
tory 
1,000,000 – 6,610,000 
Land-tenure reform 4,000,000 – 20,000,000 
Land-use planning and zoning 1,750,000 – 10,000,000 
Capacity building for implementation activities 1,750,000 - 10,000,000 
Forest policy and legislation reform 300,000 – 1,000,000 
Tax reform (e.g. removal of subsidies/tax incentives) 300,000 – 1,000,000 
Standards and guidelines 50,000 – 1,000,000 
Enforcement of planning and environmental requirements 500,000 – 2,000,000 
Independent monitoring 1,000,000 – 5,000,000 
NGO capacity building 100,000 – 1,000,000 
Effective juridical system 500,000 - 5,000,000 
Institutional reform 600,000 - 14,000,000 
Treasury reform 500,000 – 5,000,000 
Establishment of ability to process and manage issuance of 
payments to project beneficiaries 
 
100,000 – 5,000,000 
Total 13,750,000 – 91,610,000 
 
 
Transaction costs are the costs that arise in the process of connecting buyers and sellers of emis-
sion reductions and/or removals (Lubowski, 2008), and include, for example, the costs incurred in 
running the the MRV asociated with REDD+ activities.  
 
The list of factors that affect the costs of REDD+ and that should ideally be considered in cost cal-
culations is much longer. The way in which REDD+ targets are achieved will affecy the costs of 
emission reductions and removals. The budgetary costs to a government implementing REDD+ will 
differ according to whether reductions are to be achieved by targeted payments, a protected area 
without targeted payments, an extensive PES program not specifically targeted on REDD+, or an 
agricultural intensification programme. The costs also depend on the policies and measures chosen 
to implement REDD+ and on the ambition to reduce emissions. REDD+ costs will also vary with 
regard to the financing mechanism selected for REDD+, i.e. whether payments will be channelled 
through a direct compliance carbon market mechanism, a market-linked system such as auctions, 
a voluntary market or contributions, or through international public sources (e.g. bilateral or multi-
lateral aids). As an example of these costs, For a REDD+ program in the Brazilian Amazon, the 
national and project-level implementation costs were estimated at USD 0.58 tCO2e-1, once the 
programme would be fully 
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established after a 10-year implementation phase (Nepstad et al., 2007). 
 
The brief overview on issues related to REDD+ cost estimation shows that there is no single answer 
to the question on how much it will cost to implement REDD+ on the ground. Stakeholders bear 
different costs and follow different interests; countries’ forest ecosystems have different potentials 
to remove CO2 from the atmosphere and to store carbon in biomass; and many details on how the 
international REDD+ framework will ultimately look are still unknown. What is possible at present is 
the estimation of cost ranges for REDD+ implementation scenarios that are based on existing data 
and on current assumptions. Assumptions can be replaced by evidence from the ground, once the 
implementation of REDD+ action advances. The mix of existing data and assumptions necessary to 
fill gaps will depend on each countries stage in the process of REDD+ implementation. The cost 
estimates presented here make no attempt to correct for different assumptions on discount rate or 
other macroeconomic variables;  the data have been taken from the sources referenced and are 
compared on the basis that the authors were taking account of representative conditions. 
 
6.2 Approach for REDD+ cost estimation 
This section presents the approach applied in this study to estimate the costs of implementing 
REDD+ action in Cameroon, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil. A literature review was undertaken to 
compile available data on REDD+ costs. Sources of information were peer reviewed articles, 
Readiness Plan Idea Notes (R-PIN), REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PP), UN-REDD+ 
Programme documents, and reports provided by the Informal Working Group on Interim Finance 
for REDD+ (IWG-IFR). Where possible, available data were grouped according to their cost 
category, considering opportunity, implementation and transaction costs as defined in the previous 
section.  
 
Data were further organised within the framework of a phased approach for REDD+. The proposed 
phases consist of (1) initial REDD+ readiness and confidence building, (2) full readiness and 
designing of an REDD+ financing mechanism, and (3) operating of a REDD+ financing mechanism 
(UN-REDD Programme, 2009). Countries are supposed to move from receiving financing for the 
development of national REDD+ strategies (Phase I), to receiving support and incentives for the 
implementation of those strategies based on defined performance indicators (Phase II), to results-
based payments based on quantified changes in GHG emissions and removals (Phase III) (Meridian 
Institute, 2009).  
 
Some additional costs are available in Table A5 that are not country-specific but provide estimates 
of costs for e.g. institutional reform, land-tenure reform etc.  
 
6.3  Costs by country 
6.3.1 Brazil 
6.3.1.1 Expected REDD+ program activity costs in Brazil 
Brazil is neither a member of the UN-REDD, nor of the FCPF. Documents like R-PINs and R-PPs that 
are important sources of information to estimate REDD+ readiness costs are therefore not available 
for Brazil. However, several studies estimate the costs of developing REDD+ programmes in the 
country or focus on the costs of certain elements of such programmes. Nepstad et al. (2007) calcu-
late the costs of developing a REDD+ program for the Brazilian Amazon and estimate that the ten-
year program would cost ap-
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proximately USD 531 million, including expenses for monitoring, forest management and protec-
tion, and  payments for emissions reductions. 
 
Depending on the drivers of deforestation, estimated opportunity costs for Brazil vary widely. Nep-
stad et al. (2007) estimate that it would cost about USD 1.49 tCO2e-1 to reduce deforestation by 
100% while 94% percent of projected levels of deforestation could be avoided at a carbon price of 
USD 0.76 tCO2e-1. Vera Diaz and Schwartzmann (2005) estimate the cost of eliminating deforesta-
tion to be USD 5.44 tCO2e-1 with soybeans and USD 2.34 tCO2e-1 without soybeans. 
 
There is a risk associated with using the costs of a low value driver in estimating costs and there-
fore devising levels of payment.  If the drivers change over time, the low cost driver could be re-
placed by a high value driver, making the basis of payment estimates inappropriate for the new 
circumstances.  
 
Table 6-2 Opportunity cost estimates for deforestation drivers in Brazil 
 
Activity 
(Deforestation driver) 
 
Opportunity cost estimates 
(USD ha-1) 
 
Low 
 
High 
Timber logging 24 2378 
Commercial agriculture 461 1924 
Small scale agriculture 2 332 
Mining n.a. n.a 
Source: Adapted from Olsen and Bishop (2009) 
 
The following overview of opportunity costs is based on Olsen and Bishop (2009). Small scale and 
traditional cattle ranching generates annual profits between USD 2 to USD 332 ha-1 while medi-
um and large scale ranching, extensive ranching and improved pasture are more profitable at USD 
461 to USD 1033 ha-1. Soybean production is highly profitable at between USD 1027 and USD 
1924 ha-1. Agricultural production in more remote Amazonas is based on more varied production of 
food crops, fruits, fibres and some cash crop production (coffee). The profitability of subsistence 
crops is low with manioc and rice (USD 2 ha-1) and perennials and bananas (USD 2 ha-1) the least 
profitable. 
 
The opportunity costs for tree plantations (USD 2 378 ha-1) and for coffee and rubber are also 
relatively high. However, the land area used for tree plantations and tree crops is very small, ac-
counting for only one percent of land use. Returns to one-off timber harvesting vary significantly 
from USD 24 ha-1 in low productivity forest in Amazonas to USD 1 435 ha-1 in high productivity 
forest in the Amazon. Vera Diaz and Schwartzmann (2005) estimate returns of almost USD 1 700 
ha-1 for high productivity logging followed by ranching versus less than USD 450 ha-1 for logging 
low productivity forest followed by ranching, based on information from Ecuador.  Stumpage fee 
estimates from Brazil are lower than in Ecuador13.  
 
6.3.2 Cameroon 
Expected REDD+ program activity costs in Cameroon 
In Cameroon, sources of finance for REDD+ come from developed country organisations and gov-
ernments (for example, DANIDA, KfW, GTZ, EU, DFID), multilateral organisations (for example, 
GEF, World Bank FCPF) and NGOs. Once a R-PP (Readiness Preparation Proposal under the FCPF) 
has been submitted and accepted by the FCPF, Cameroon will be eligible to an additional USD 3.4 
                                               
13 See Grieg-Gran 2006 and Grieg-Gran 2008 
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million for the implementation of its R-PP (REDD Countries Database, 2011). A total of USD 93 
million are committed to Cameroon for REDD+ implementation, of which approximately USD 13 
million are to be forwarded between 2010 and 2012 (see Appendix: Voluntary REDD+ Database, 
2011).  
 
An overview of potential expenditures for REDD+ readiness activities is given in Table 6-3. To date, 
activities have been undertaken in: research and development, REDD+ pilot projects, reinforce-
ment of capacities (IPCC, 2007; FAO, 2008; FCPF, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009). Elements such as the 
development of an MRV system might be realized within the transnational Congo Basin forest con-
servation efforts. The integration of Cameroonian REDD+ investments in existing efforts to realize 
REALU in the whole Congo Basin will be crucial in Phase II. 
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Table 6-3 Overview of cost estimates for REDD+ activities and opportunity costs in Cameroon 
Phas
e 
REDD+ Activity 
 
 
Costs (USD) 
Temporal and spatial 
reference 
Type Source 
            
1 REDD+ Strategy Development*         
 1 Research and development  1,500,000 2010 - ?, Cameroon IC Cameroon R-PIN, 2008 
 1 Reinforcement of capacities  6,000,000 2010 - ?, Cameroon IC Cameroon R-PIN, 2008 
1 Pilots and other activites         
 1 REDD+ pilot projects  3,000,000 2010 - ?, Cameroon IC Cameroon R-PIN, 2008 
1 
MRV:  
data collection, planning and design of monitoring system 
        
 1 Forest survey   896,676       
 1 Field component of a national forest monitoring programme 
 
185,105 
2008, Cameroon IC 
FAO, 2008 cited in UNFCCC, 
2009 
      
 1,2 Institutional Reform 
Not available, 
see appendix14 
   
 1,2 Land Tenure Reform 
 
Not available, 
see appendix 
    
 1,2 Land Use Planning 
Not available, 
see appendix 
   
 1,2 Juridical Reform 
Not available, 
see appendix 
   
 1,2 Treasury Reform 
Not available, 
see appendix 
   
 1,2 Support Services Not available,     
                                               
14 Apendix A5 gives generalised (not country specific) cost estimates. 
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see appendix 
            
            
 MRV: data collection, emission change  monitoring         
 2,3 Forest carbon monitoring system, Tier 3 IPCC  1,034,246 First year, Cameroon TC2, IC Hardcastle and Baird, 2008 
 3 Forest carbon monitoring system, Tier 3 IPCC 389,478 Annually, Cameroon TC, IC Hardcastle and Baird, 2008 
 3 Cost of administering a payment scheme 
8,296,000 
-18,665,000 
Annually, Cameroon TC Grieg-Gran, 2008 
  
  
 
        
 Driver-specific opportunity costs relevant to REDD+ activities     
  Oil palm after forest 1,500 ha-1 Cameroon OC3 Swallow et al. 2007 
  Oil palm after short fallow  950 ha-1 Cameroon OC Swallow et al. 2007 
  Extensive cocoa without fruit sales  450 ha-1 Cameroon OC Swallow et al. 2007 
  
 
Average of land use change 1984-2001 at Akok and Awae study sites 
  
11 - 22 tCO2e-1 
Cameroon OC Swallow et al. 2007 
  Oil palm  6 tCO2e-1 Cameroon OC Minang et al., 2011 
  Extensive cocoa gardens with fruit 7 tCO2e-1 Cameroon   Minang et al., 2009 
  Extensive cocoa gardens in the jungle 3,50 tCO2e-1 Cameroon   Minang et al., 2010 
  Cacao Gardens: shaded intensive cocoa system with fruit trees  11,00  tCO2e-1 Cameroon OC Minang et al., 2011 
  Mixed crops, shifting cultivation    2,50 tCO2e-1 Cameroon OC Minang et al., 2011 
      
 
1IC = Implementation costs; 2TC = Transaction costs; 3OC = Opportunity costs 
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Table 6-4 Opportunity cost estimates for deforestation drivers in Cameroon 
 
Activity 
(Deforestation driver) 
 
Opportunity cost estimates 
 
Low 
 
High 
Timber logging n.a. n.a. 
Commercial agriculture 450 USD ha-1 1500 USD ha-1 
Small scale agriculture 4 USD ha-1 n.a. 
Mining n.a. n.a.- 
Average land use change opportunity 
costs 
11 USD tCO2e
-1 28.00 USD tCO2e
-1 
Sources: (Swallow, van Noordwijk et al., 2007; Robiglio, Ngendakumana et al., 2010; Minang, van Noordwijk et 
al., 2011; Swallow, 2011) 
 
Opportunity cost data found in secondary literature come from bottom-up studies. Opportunity 
costs of avoiding emissions from the conversion of natural forest to small scale agricultural land 
use range from USD 4 to USD 10 for intensive cocoa system with fruit trees and are USD 4 for 
mixed crops that are planted in shifting cultivation food production systems (Minang, van 
Noordwijk et al., 2011). The profitability of commercial agricultural land uses ranges from USD 
450 to USD 1 500 per hectare,. Farm sizes in the reviewed studies range from 5-80 hectares 
(Swallow, 2011). The average land use change opportunity costs of one ton carbon emissions 
ranges from USD 11 to USD 28, depending on the discount rate (Swallow et al., 2007, Robiglio, 
2007). 
 
Forestry tax incomes in 2005 amounted to about USD 24 million (MINEFI, 2006). The figure can 
be used as one indicator for the role of the sector for national development. Household spending 
data is available for the fuelwood and charcoal, which comprise the largest market for forest 
products, especially in terms of volume of felled trees (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski, 2000 ). Each 
urban household spends an average of USD 55 to USD 59 per year for fuelwood and charcoal, 
amounting to some USD 65–70 million spent by 1.3 million urban households (Topa, Karsenty et 
al., 2009). 
 
6.3.3 Indonesia 
 Expected REDD+ program activity costs in Indonesia 
An independent review of REDD+ and global climate change funds found USD 2.9 billion committed 
to Indonesia (as of early 2010) (Wood, 2010). Table A3  provides details regarding the donors and 
partnerships. 
 
Indonesia currently seeks external support in the following areas (FCPF, 2009): 
 Methodologies for determining RL; 
 analysis on financial aspects of REDD+ (readiness), potential markets for REDD+, and 
MRV issues which will affect REDD+ implementation; 
 capacity building at all levels, access to data/information and technology transfer; 
 identification of specific on the ground investment opportunities and other activities 
with a potential for emission reductions and sustainable development. 
 
Underlying causes of Indonesian land-use change emissions include agricultural expansion in the 
context of a land-use planning framework that favours it, timber extraction and migration to the 
forest frontiers. The lack of REDD+ implementation capacities is an obstacle for forest conservation 
(FCPF, 2009). The findings 
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from the first report of the Indonesian-Norwegian Partnership emphasise the following (Caldecott, 
Indrawan et al., 2011): 
 
 Focus in the REDD+ development in Indonesia should be on the quality of processes 
rather than exclusively on outputs and dates; 
 The disbursement of existing funds should be dependent on project documentation and 
compliance with agreed schedules; 
 An extension of the start-up phase (Phase I) should be considered. 
 
With regard to phase I of REDD+ implementation, cost estimates are available for activities related 
to REDD+ strategy development, pilot projects and MRV (see Table 6-5).   
 
Phase II activities such as data collection for MRV and activity change monitoring have started in 
Indonesia. Cost estimates for payment processing, institutional reform, land tenure reform, land 
use planning, juridical reform, treasury reform and support services are available. The reform cost 
estimates are based on Delphi panel results, i.e. they present an estimate of the likelihood of oc-
currence based on expert judgement. Cost estimates for some MRV elements are also available, 
including data collection, activity change monitoring, design of a monitoring and evaluation frame-
work, emission change monitoring and forest carbon monitoring. 
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Table 6-5: Overview of cost estimates for REDD+ activities and opportunity costs in Indonesia 
Phase REDD+ Activity 
 
 
Costs (USD) 
Temporal and spatial reference Type Source 
1 Stakeholder Consultation  n.a.       
    No specific costs available       
1 REDD+ Strategy Development         
  
Assessment of land use, forestry policy and govern-
ance 
138,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
  Develop REDD+ strategy options 2,200,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
  Social and environmental impact assessment 600,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC   
  Design of REDD+ implementation framework  2,300,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
1 Capacity building        
  National readiness management arrangements 713,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
1 MRV: planning and design         
  Design a monitoring system  6,475,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
 Development of  a reference scenario  6,153,000 2011-2013, Indonesia IC 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
      
 1,2 Institutional Reform No specific costs available15    
 1,2 Land Tenure Reform No specific costs available 
 
   
 1,2 Land Use Planning No specific costs available 
 
   
 1,2 Juridical Reform No specific costs available     
                                               
15 Appendix A5 contains generalised, not country specific, cost ranges for these areas. 
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 1,2 Treasury Reform No specific costs available    
 1,2 Support Services No specific costs available    
      
      
 
MRV: data collection, emission change 
monitoring 
        
 2,3 Forest carbon monitoring system (Tier 3 IPCC) 1,997,000 First year, Indonesia  IC 
Hardcastle and 
Baird, 2008 
3  
 
 
Forest carbon monitoring system (Tier 3 IPCC) 
666,000 Annually, Indonesia TC, IC 
Hardcastle and 
Baird, 2008 
 
       
3  Cost of administering a payment scheme 
70,551,000- 158,740,000 
(Administration costs over a 
30 year period, based on an 
annual lower bound of US$ 
4ha-1 and upper bound of 
US$ 9 ha-1) 
Annually, Indonesia TC Grieg-Gran, 2008 
      
 
 
Driver specific opportunity cost 
        
  Agriculture commercial (est. 54% cause of def.) 3.24 – 21.54 tCO2e-1 
Annual, Indonesia -various vegeta-
tion types (e.g. forest, peat land) 
OC  
Zen et al 2005 (in 
Vermeulen and 
Goad 2006); Olsen 
and Bichop, 2009 
(four different 
assumptions); 
Grieg-Gran, 2008; 
Butler et al. 2008; 
Indonesia R-PP, 
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2009 
    3,340 – 9,630 ha-1 
Annual, Indonesia -various vegeta-
tion types (e.g. forest, peat land) 
OC  
Olsen and Bichop, 
2009 (four differ-
ent assumptions) 
  Agriculture local shifting (est. 20% cause of def.)  0.48 - 1.35 ha-1 
Annual, Sumatra, SE Asia – various 
local agricultural activities (e.g. 
upland rice, cassava, fuel wood, 
small scale shifting, small scale 
rubber) 
OC  
Tomich et al. 2005; 
Robledo and 
Blaser, 2008; 
Indonesia R-PP, 
2009 
    
296.75 (39) ha-1 
 (without small scale palm) 
Annual, Sumatra, SE Asia – various 
local agricultural activities (e.g. 
upland rice, cassava, fuel wood, 
small scale shifting, small scale 
rubber) 
OC  Grieg-Gran, 2008 
  Timber/logging (est. 99% cause of degr.) 0 - 1,120.00 ha-1 
Annual, Sumatra, SE Asia, Indonesia 
(e.g. Indonesian pulp sector, 
commercial logging, illegal logging) 
  
Robledo and 
Blaser, 2008; 
Tomich et al 1998; 
Pirard, 2008 
    2.13 (0.3) – 4.78 tCO2e-1 
Annual, Sumatra, SE Asia, Indonesia 
(e.g. Indonesian pulp sector, 
commercial logging, illegal logging) 
 
OC  
Tomich et al. 2005 
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Table 6-6 Opportunity cost estimates for deforestation drivers in Indonesia 
 
Activity 
(Deforestation driver) 
 
Opportunity cost estimates 
(USD ha-1) 
 
Low 
 
High 
Timber logging 0 1200 
Commercial agriculture 3  3000 
Small scale agriculture 0.5 296 
Mining n.a. n.a. 
Sources: (Tomich, van Noordwijk et al., 1998; Tomich, Cattaneo et al., 2005; Zen, Barlow et al., 2005; Butler and 
Laurance, 2008; Grieg-Gran, 2008; Pirard, 2008; Robledo and Blaser, 2008; FCPF, 2009; Olsen and Bishop, 
2009) 
 
Mining is thought to present the most profitable economic activity in Indonesia. Land-use change 
from forest to other land uses due to urban expansion is also assumed to be very profitable.  There 
were no estimates of the opportunity costs of mining16 in Indonesia in the published literature, at the 
time of writing this study.  
 
Opportunity cost estimates of forest conservation in areas suitable for commercial agriculture can 
range from USD 3 up to USD 3,000 ha-1 (Zen, Barlow et al., 2005; Butler and Laurance, 2008; Grieg-
Gran, 2008; Olsen and Bishop, 2009). The large difference between the upper and lower estimate 
can be explained by the different assumptions regarding the suitability of alternative areas for agri-
cultural development, as well as the difference in value of large-scale commercial agriculture as com-
pared to small scale farming. With regards to commercial agriculture, several studies assume that the 
current carbon price levels in different compliance and voluntary schemes cannot compete with the 
profitability of oil palm plantations in Indonesia (Sandker, Suwarno et al., 2007; Butler, Koh et al., 
2009; Sheil, Casson et al., 2009). However, commercial agricultural expansion is possible and profit-
able on degraded land. Strategic land use planning to integrate agricultural development and climate 
change mitigation goals, the reallocation of concessions, and the strengthening of forest conservation 
attempts could lead to REDD+ without significantly reducing agricultural opportunities (Koh and 
Ghazoul, 2010). 
 
Opportunity costs estimates for small scale agriculture are lower although the range is huge, from 
USD 0.48 to USD 296.75 ha-1 (Tomich et al., 1998; Grieg-Gran, 2008; Robledo and Blaser, 2008; 
FCPF, 2009). Where smallholders use their land to cultivate oil palms, higher opportunity cost occur 
compared to areas of shifting cultivation or cassava plantations. The present carbon price levels ena-
ble REDD+ investors to buy out small scale forest dwellers in Indonesia. Hence, REDD+ in areas 
dominated by smallholder agriculture leads to significant social, ethical and environmental (leakage) 
concerns (Brown, Seymour et al., 2008; Minang, van Noordwijk et al., 2010; Wood, 2010). Therefore 
the international REDD+ debate has turned to the discussion on social and environmental safeguards. 
                                               
16 The annual national earnings from mining could be considered as a proxy for the opportunity costs of mining, In such a case the GDP from 
mining could be used as an indicative figure, divided by the area of land used for mining.   Such an estimate would not differentiate between 
the income to different actors in the mining industry though, and therefore might be too broad an estimate to really indicate opportunity 
costs to the landowners.    
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Existing REDD+ projects in Indonesia and the scientific community try to address this issue with the 
design of fair benefit distribution systems.  In general, further careful investigation of how small-
holder land is valued is necessary.  The existing approach only uses the value of yield per hectare, 
underestimating the full value of small-scale agricultural land, including social elements.  
 
Opportunity costs estimates for timber and logging operations range from USD 0 to USD 1 200 ha-1 
(Tomich, van Noordwijk et al., 1998; Pirard, 2008; Robledo and Blaser, 2008). Their occurrence and 
magnitude is subject to the same discussion as opportunity costs of commercial agriculture. Timber 
plantations and sustainable forest management on afforested degraded land could lead to REDD+ 
successes in Indonesia without foregoing the benefits of the wood and wood product sector. Pirards 
(2008) study on opportunity costs of the Indonesian pulp and paper sector gives very valuable in-
sights regarding the reasons why opportunity cost estimates vary between zero and thousands of 
Dollars in Indonesia (Pirard, 2008): strategy matters. A good development plan that takes different 
sectoral developments into account and focuses on land use changes with net GHG benefits, helps to 
reduce the costs of REDD+. However, any activity is dependent on its implementation by stakehold-
ers and their respective transaction costs.  
 
6.3.4 Vietnam 
Expected REDD+ program activity costs in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s R-PP and other REDD+-relevant documents indicate substantial investments in activities 
related to stakeholder consultation, the development of a national REDD+ strategy and a MRV sys-
tem. Table 6-7 provides an overview of actual and potential costs of the REDD+ readiness and the 
other phases. Vietnam is quite advanced regarding the set-up of its institutional framework and the 
enhancement of national REDD+ management capacities. Some funds are needed to strengthen ex-
isting capacities and to further develop an REDD+ enabling political framework.  
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Table 6-7 Overview on cost estimates for REDD+ activities and opportunity costs in Vietnam  
Phase REDD+ Activity 
 
 
Costs (USD) 
Temporal and spatial 
reference 
Type Source 
          
 1 Stakeholder Consultation 950,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
1 REDD+ Strategy Development         
 1 
Assessment of land use, forestry policy and 
governance 
235,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
 1 Development of REDD+ strategy options  1,870,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
1 Social and Environmental  Impact  198,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
 1 
National readiness management 
arrangements 
756,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
 1 
MRV: planning and design, design of a 
monitoring system 
    
1 Design of a monitoring system 3,160,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
1,2 Institutional Reform 
Not available, see 
Appendix17 
   
1,2 Land Tenure Reform 
 Not available, see 
Appendix 
   
1,2 Land Use Planning 
Not available, see 
Appendix 
   
1,2 Juridical Reform 
 Not available, see 
Appendix 
   
1,2 Treasury Reform 
 Not available, see 
Appendix 
   
1,2 Support Services 
Not available, see 
Appendix 
   
1 MRV         
                                               
17 Appendix A5 contains generalised, not country specific, cost ranges for these areas 
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1 
Design of a monitoring and evaluation frame-
work 
230,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
1 RL development 1,000,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
1 
Design of a REDD+ implementation frame-
work 
460,000 2011-2013, Vietnam IC Vietnam  R-PP, 2011 
2,3 
Forest carbon monitoring system (Tier 3, 
IPCC) 
477,000 First year, Vietnam  IC 
Hardcastle and Baird, 
2008 
2,3 
Forest carbon monitoring system (Tier 3, 
IPCC) 
110,000 Annually, Vietnam TC, IC 
Hardcastle and Baird, 
2008 
3 Cost of administering a payment scheme     
 
Driver-specific opportunity costs of 
REDD+ 
 
Not available 
   
  
Opportunity cost of avoided tropical defor-
estation 
Not available    
 
Value of agricultual  produce  (mainly indus-
trial perennial crops) 
55,000,000  
- 70,000,000 
Annually, Vietnam OC UN REDD 2010 
  Coffee and rubber plantations 224.10 tCO2e-1 NPV,Vietnam OC Hoang et al., 2010 
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Table 6-8 Opportunity cost estimates for deforestation drivers in Vietnam 
 
Activity 
(Deforestation driver) 
 
Opportunity cost estimates 
(USD ha-1) 
 
Low 
 
High 
Timber logging 50* 1300** 
Commercial agriculture n.a. 1600 
Small scale agriculture n.a. 400*** 
Mining n.a. n.a. 
   
*Net present value (NPV) of natural forest with a lifecycle of 50 years; **NPV of planted forest (Acacia mangium, 
7 years old); ***NPV of shifting cultivation 
Sources: Hoang et al. (2010), van Noordwijk (2009) in Hoang et al. (2009) 
 
An opportunity analysis carried out using data from Dak Nong province indicated that about 80% of 
emissions linked to economic benefits do not exceed USD 5 tCO2e
-1. The highest carbon abatement 
costs resulted from natural forest conversion to coffee and rubber plantations with costs up to USD 
224.10 tCO2e
-1 (Hoang et al., 2010).  
 
With regard to commercial agriculture, rubber is one of Vietnam’s most important agricultural ex-
port crops, with a net profit per hectare of about USD 1600. Due to the high profitability of rubber 
production, the government plans to expand rubber areas in the country (Hoang et al., 2010). The 
expansion will take place on current agricultural land with low economic returns, derived from house-
hold agricultural production, unused land, and poor quality forest under the “production forest” cate-
gory. A loose definition of “poor quality forest” is responsible for deforestation in many parts of the 
country (Hoang et al., 2010). 
 
The export of wood furniture, mainly to Europe, Japan and North America, is another important 
source of income for Vietnam, which reached a value of USD 2.4 billion in 2007; a ten-fold increase 
since 2000. The increase is possible almost entirely because of growth in imports of roundwood and 
sawnwood, mainly from Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. The domestic demand for furniture, paper 
and pulp is also high (Mayfroidth and Lambin, 2009).     
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter summarises the results of a literature review on potential costs of REDD+ programmes 
for Cameroon, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil.  Opportunity costs, implementation costs, and transac-
tion costs that may arise during different phases of REDD+ implementation were considered.  The 
review focused on estimates of the costs of REDD+ programmes at the country level.  
 
Information on costs was mainly taken from bottom-up studies, although input from larger modelling 
exercises was also considered.  The data from bottom-up studies spread over wide ranges, especially 
for opportunity costs. These ranges make it difficult to come up with cost estimates for REDD+ activi-
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ties. The ranges reflect the uncertainty with regard to how REDD+ programmes will operate, the cur-
rent lack of data in many REDD+ countries and the lack of common methodologies for estimating 
REDD+ programme costs.  The ranges of cost data also illustrate that it may be difficult to devise a 
solid evidence base for payments under a REDD+ framework.  
 
The study indicates a data collection framework that could be used as guidance on REDD+ activities 
and cost categories that should be included in cost calculations to obtain a complete overview on 
potential costs.  The use of a common data collection framework and methodology for cost estimates 
would allow a comparison the costs of REDD+ programmes of different countries, particularly as the-
se are further developed in the future. 
  
The costs presented in this report are country specific, but they may be able to provide some guid-
ance for countries with similar circumstances, e.g. a similar forest cover and stage of REDD+ imple-
mentation, where local data are not available. 
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7 Financial incentive benchmarks (FIB) for 
REDD+ 
The financial incentive benchmark (FIB), sometimes referred to as the crediting or payment baseline, 
is conceptually in this report the basis for rewarding countries, projects or other entities for success-
ful REDD+ efforts. The payment for a given time period is defined by: (emissions - FIB) x carbon 
price. The simplest option is to set FIB = RL (which we have previously defined as the BAU baseline). 
There are, however, several considerations that suggest that this might not be optimal. The approach 
taken is that the RL is the starting point for arriving at a FIB, but that these considerations could lead 
to a significantly lower FIB, as illustrated in the example at the end of the chapter.  
 
7.1 Additionality  
The idea of additionality as applied to funding has widespread support in REDD+ negotiations. The 
concept has, however, different meanings and can also be applied at different scales (Meridian Insti-
tute, 2011). A strong formulation of additionality is that all international funding should be for mitiga-
tion efforts additional to those which would have been undertaken without it, i.e. FIB ≤ RL. A weaker 
formulation is that the realised emissions, after REDD+, should be lower than the BAU scenario, i.e. 
emissions < RL. Weak additionality applied to groups of countries might also imply that some REDD+ 
funding is for emission reductions that are not additional, but seen as a whole REDD+ is additional.  A 
further implication of weak additionality is that we might have FIB > RL, which - if REDD+ credits are 
traded in a carbon market – could imply paying for an increase in emissions, or paying in the absence 
of any reductions at all. In the following, we will mainly refer to the additionality in the strong ver-
sion, i.e. a requirement that FIB ≤ RL.  
 
As discussed in Meridian (2011), additionality can be applied at different scales. National additionality 
implies setting FIB ≤ RL emissions for each participating country. Aggregate additionality implies that 
the sum of FIBs for participating countries in a REDD+ mechanism should be below the sum of their 
RLs. Global additionality also considers emissions from non-participating countries, and potential in-
ternational leakage.  For the purposes of this report, the concept of national additionality is most 
relevant. This would automatically imply aggregate additionality, but not necessarily global addition-
ality. However, it would seem unreasonable if participating REDD+ countries were held responsible 
for increases in emissions in other countries.  
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7.2 Participation constraints, expected gain and leakage 
Bali Action Plan assumes that REDD+ will be based on voluntary participation and positive incentives 
(UNFCCC, 2007). This might be interpreted as a expected gain principle, i.e., the REDD+ countries 
should have a positive net benefit from any REDD+ agreement it enters, with:  
 
Net benefits (REDD+ rent) = Total international REDD+ transfers - total costs of REDD+ 
 
This principle is at times interpreted as setting FIB equal to the RL, but FIB can be below the RL and 
still be compatible with an expected gain principle, as illustrated in Box 5.1. The reason is that initial 
reductions are cheap, and setting FIB = RL will make REDD+ countries earn large rents (transfers are 
higher than costs). FIB can be set lower, as long as the REDD+ rent earned on the reductions below 
the FIB is sufficiently high to cover the costs of the initial reductions.  
 
A key question is how large the FIB must be in order for the country to expect a positive net gain. If 
the marginal cost curve is linear, and a country is paid for at least 50% of the emissions reductions 
(with emission reduction being defined as the difference between the actual emissions and the RL) 
there will be a net gain. But costs curves are typically convex, thus the FIB can be set further to the 
right, i.e. payments can be less than 50% of the realised REDD+, and the country still benefits.  
 
Minimising international leakage (displaced emissions) is linked to participation, i.e. successful 
REDD+ intervention in one country should not lead to higher emissions in other countries due to, for 
example, logging or agricultural companies moving across the border. In the simple logic displayed in 
Box 1, the way to avoid this is to ensure that all potential REDD+ countries will benefit from partici-
pation.  
 
 
Figure 6 Illustration of different principles for setting financial incentive baselines (FIB) 
 
Box 1. The first three considerations (additionality, ensuring maximum participation through epecta-
tion of gain and effectiveness) are illustrated by the figure below. The marginal costs of reducing 
deforestation and degradation start at zero in the RL (i.e. the BAU scenario), and they increase as 
reductions become more costly (e.g. increasingly profitable alternative land uses are being excluded 
or being re-organised, say by increasing agricultural productivity). Given an international price for 
REDD+ credits, the country will reduce emissions up to the point where the marginal costs equal the 
price, which will determine the realised emissions. The price might be the credit price in a carbon 
market or the agreed price in a bilateral agreement (such as USD 5 per tCO2 in the agreements be-
tween Norway and Brazil or Guyana). The total cost of these reductions is equal to the area A + B. A 
financial incentive baseline (FIB) is given, and the country receives revenue from selling REDD+ cred-
its for reductions beyond the FIB, i.e. equal to the area B + C. Thus, the country’s net gain equals C 
– A. If the FIB is set equal to RL, the country will gain the area C + D.  
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The four principles discussed in the text can be summarized as follows, listed in the order of 
strength in the way of setting lower FIBs 
 Additionality (weak): Realised emissions < RL 
 Additionality (strong): FIB ≤ RL 
 Participation  (expectation of gain requirement): FIB set such that A ≤ C 
The REDD+ rent from the reductions below the FIB (area C) is least sufficiently large to 
cover the costs of the initial reductions (A) for which there is no international payment. 
 Maximize effectiveness of the transfer payment, given participation constraint: FIB set 
such that A = C 
For a given amount of funding, this will ensure that the payment received (B+C) just co-
vers the costs of the emissions reductions (A+B).   
 
7.3 Effectiveness and efficiency 
Following an increasingly accepted terminology, we define effectiveness of a policy as the absolute 
level reductions of GHG emissions (measured in tCO2e) in a country, while efficiency refers to the 
costs per emission reduction units (tCO2e/USD). Concern for effectiveness is closely linked to the idea 
of “environmental integrity”, i.e. achievement of sufficient emissions reductions to avoid dangerous 
climate change as required by the UNFCCC.  
 
Setting FIB has implications for effectiveness and efficiency, but the link depends on the design of the 
REDD+ mechanism. We consider three stylized cases. Further, as discussed earlier in this report, cost 
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can refer to different things. In this sub-section we adopt a narrow interpretation of costs as the 
payment by the buyers of REDD+ credits.  Effectiveness is therefore interpreted as the volume of 
emission reductions stimulated directly (in response to the payment) and indirectly (to reach the FIB) 
by a REDD+ payment at a given FIB.  Efficiency is interpreted as effectiveness divided by costs.  
 
Case 1: Fixed demand. This system implies that an upper limit is set on the number of REDD+ 
credits that can enter the carbon market. A proposal for such a system was considered in the 2009 
discussion on climate legislation in the United States, i.e. the idea that US companies could use 
REDD+ up to a fixed overall limit to achieve their assigned GHG emission caps. As REDD+ was con-
sidered a cheap offset mechanism, this cap was expected to be binding. A tighter FIB will increase 
the emission reduction by the same amount of tCO2e, thus there is a certain gain in effectiveness. 
The change in efficiency is uncertain, as both the price and the emissions reductions will increase.18  
 
Case 2: REDD+ Fund. In this system a fund with a fixed amount of money is assigned to buy 
REDD+ credits.19 This might be a reasonable approximation of the international REDD+ system over 
the short-medium term, where different national and multinational funds such as the Norwegian In-
ternational Climate and Forest Initiative are being set up. Although used for different purposes, some 
of these, such as Norway’s bilateral agreement with Brazil and with Guyana are close to this stylized 
case. Many analyses (eg Borner and Wunder, 2008) find that the curve is relatively flat initially, be-
fore it rises. Thus, effectiveness gain from a tighter FIB can be expected to be large for relatively 
small funds. Since the amount of money allocated to REDD+ is fixed, the effectiveness and efficiency 
criteria are equivalent in this case.  
 
Case 3: Carbon market. The third system is one where REDD+ credits are made fully fungible in a 
carbon market. We assume first that the carbon market price is fixed, i.e. the amount of REDD+ 
credits brought to the market is too small to affect the price (demand assumed to be perfectly elas-
tic). While this might be a reasonable approximation in initial phases, where many countries lack the 
MRV systems necessary to participate, a key argument for bringing REDD+ credits into the markets 
is that they can supply large amount of comparatively cheap emissions reductions. Yet this fixed price 
assumption is often applied in some models and options assessment (e.g. Busch et al). Under this 
assumption, the emissions reductions are only determined by the carbon price, and changes in FIBs 
have no impact on the realised emissions and therefore effectiveness. It should, however, increase 
efficiency as the costs of achieving these reductions are smaller.  
 
                                               
18
 Since demand is constrained, and markets therefore do not clear, the REDD credit price could be anywhere 
between the MC of REDD, and the carbon price in, say, a US carbon market. If we assume that REDD countries 
are paid a price equal to MC, we can conclude that the price will increase when RLs are set tighter.   
19
 A fund may not necessarily have a fixed amount of money available, but a fixed amount for REDD+ credit pur-
chases is assumed here to discuss this stylized case. In real life, the finance may be added based on good results.  
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Overall, this suggests that we often have a trade-off between (i) generous FIBs to ensure participa-
tion and net gains to poor countries, and (ii) effectiveness and efficiency. The maximum emissions 
reductions is achieved by setting RLs such that the REDD+ rent is minimized (as close to zero as 
possible), and the REDD+ funds are just enough to pay for the domestic costs of emission reductions. 
This does not consider the role of rent in encouraging participation. 
 
A conclusion from the discussion so far in this chapter, and as illustrated in Box 5.1, is that the prin-
ciple of additionality (even in its strongest form) is a weak one compared to a requirement about 
maximum effectiveness. Additionality (strong version) only requires FIB is not set higher than BAU, 
while effectiveness says it should be set well below BAU. Thus strong additionality should be consid-
ered a minimum requirement, while efficient use of funds and maximising climate impact are argu-
mants for going further in reducing FIB, consistent with maintaining participation. In the example 
illustration at the end of the chapter, we apply the principle of effectiveness (and efficiency) of 
REDD+ funding.  
 
7.4 Payment for costs incurred 
A consideration related to the effectiveness argument is that international payments should cover the 
net costs of a country in terms of forgone benefits from forest conversion and unsustainable uses 
(opportunity costs) and transaction costs related to the implementation of REDD+. Fig 7 shows that 
this implies that FIB set such that A=C. For a given amount of funding, this will ensure that the pay-
ment received (B+C) just covers the costs of the emissions reductions (A+B), less any own action 
undertaken by the country which is considered more below.  
 
Thus, at the limit, the principle of “Payment for costs incurred taking own action into account” is iden-
tical to “maximize effectiveness”, and would imply no REDD+ rent for the country. However, setting 
the FIB such that this is achieved is only one of several possible options to maximize effectiveness. 
We briefly review these options in Table 7-1. Three criteria are used to assess the five options listed: 
(i) the incentives provided to the country, and thereby the overall reductions achieved; (ii) the infor-
mation requirements, e.g. about the REDD+ potential and associated costs, and (iii) how uncertainty 
is handled, e.g. about opportunity costs or changes in external factors such as global agricultural 
commodity prices.  
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Table 7-1 Options to maximize effectiveness of a given REDD+ transfer20. 
                                               
20 These different FIB approaches could be chosen to reflect different national circumstances or based on e.g. income per capita  
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Based on the three criteria, a system of differentiated payments (option 3, and partly also option 4) 
appears attractive. It provides strong incentives (at the margin) and handles risk relatively well. As a 
drawback, the informational requirements are high, and costs should be split disaggregated by area, 
actor, and sector. Aggregate costs estimates are needed in option 1 (stricter FIB) and 5 (fixed con-
Option Elaboration 
Incentives 
(overall reduc-
tions) 
Information 
requirements 
Risk handling 
1.Stricter FIB  
 
Might include a 
safety margin to 
account for un-
certainty 
Good; correct 
incentives on the 
margin (does 
not affect overall 
reductions) 
Medium - high 
Countries adjust 
efforts based on 
new information, 
but may opt out if 
costs seriously 
underestimated (& 
FIB set tightly) 
2.Lower price  
 
Set price per 
tCO2e below the 
marginal rate 
Incentives on 
the margin re-
duced; less 
emissions reduc-
tions 
Low 
Aim to set the 
price to control 
risks both of ex-
cessive rent and 
underestimating 
costs 
3.Differentiated 
payment 
 
Example: corri-
dor approach, 
with higher 
payment per 
tCO2e the larger 
the reductions 
are 
Good, payment 
mimics the MC 
curve 
High, must 
know differenti-
ated costs  
Would need inter-
action to incorpo-
rate new infor-
mation 
4.Sub-FIB s  
Sub-FIBs for 
areas or sectors 
(drivers)  
A version of the 
option above 
Good, as above 
High, detailed 
information 
about costs 
Would need inter-
action to incorpo-
rate new infor-
mation 
5.Fixed con-
tract 
A deal about 
fixed reductions 
and fixed pay-
ment (based on 
estimated costs)   
Uncertain; must 
include condi-
tions target un-
der-/over- 
achieved  
High 
Poor, REDD+ 
countries assume 
high risk. 
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tract), but these must to some extent be based on such detailed information (although the level of 
precision could be lower). We return to option 3 below. The least attractive appears to be lowering 
the carbon price (2) or a fixed contract (5). The fixed contract option must also include elements 
from the other options to cover situations where achieved emissions reductions are not achieved (or 
overachieved). It may, therefore in practice be similar to either options 1 or 2. 
 
Overall, a system of differential payments, for example, in the form of a corridor approach, or a sys-
tem of stricter FIBs, seems to be the systems that best meet the three criteria. 
 
7.5 FIBs to reflect a fair benefit and cost sharing 
The considerations discussed so far do not differentiate between countries, except for the differences 
reflected in REDD+ costs. Differences in opportunity costs of REDD+ is an argument for setting FIBs 
differently in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Some have noted the potentially perverse 
distributional effects of these: countries with low opportunity costs tend to be poorer (low agricultural 
productivity and poverty are related), with the implication, based on cost arguments alone, that 
REDD+ transfers should be lower too.  
 
There are other, normative, arguments for adjusting FIBs, to let some countries receive an REDD+ 
rent and/or other countries not be fully paid for the REDD+ costs. For example, middle-income coun-
tries (with high forestry emissions) should be expected to shoulder some of the REDD+ costs them-
selves. Differentiation among non-Annex I countries is politically sensitive. However, the Durban Plat-
form approved by COP17 (UNFCCC, 2011) states that all parties should take on commitments (“... a 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention appli-
cable to all Parties”).    
 
This issue has been reflected in the REDD+ discussion: (1) Should REDD+ be considered as an inter-
national payment for environmental services system  (IPES), i.e. Annex I countries paying non-Annex 
I countries in full for REDD+, or (2) Should REDD+ become part of an international agreement where 
middle income non-Annex I countries assume legally binding emission targets for REDD+, either for 
REDD+ separately or as part of their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)? In the latter 
case, REDD+ could become part of a global cap and trade (CAT) system. 
 
The arguments for a differentiation among REDD+ countries fall into several categories:  
 
1. Differences in capabilities: While capabilities cover several dimensions, e.g. governments’ ca-
pacity to monitor forest stocks and implement REDD+ policies, the predominant suggestion is to use 
income (GDP) per capita as a proxy for capabilities. 
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2. Differences in responsibilities: Some argue that countries’ commitments and the burden-
sharing should be based on how much countries currently emit, or the accumulated historical emis-
sions. Another line of argument is linking responsibilities to capabilities, i.e. that higher income 
means assuming higher responsibility in terms of covering the costs of climate mitigation. 
 
3. REDD+ transfers for development and adaptation: A third line of argument is that REDD+ 
should enable economic development of poor countries, and enable a low-carbon development path. 
REDD+ transfers should therefore go beyond covering the REDD+ costs. Similarly, poor countries are 
most vulnerable to climate change, and mitigation and adaptations need to be linked.  
 
Thus there are at least three possible ways to operate the benefit and cost sharing principle:  
(i) income per capita, 
(ii) emissions (current or accumulated),  
(iii) individual assessments of capabilities and needs.  
 
Using per capita income as a factor for differentiation might be, politically, one way of differentiating 
across countries. One early proposal in the debate (e.g. by Coalition for Rainforest Nations) was to 
include a development adjustment factor (DAF) in reference level setting. A costs sharing factor, 
based on the country’s income per capita, is therefore included as an element in the example illustra-
tion at the end of this chapter.   
 
7.6 Dealing with uncertainty 
Setting RLs and FIBs and is uncertain due to several factors. First, estimating BAU has several inher-
ent uncertainties: the future values of drivers of deforestation and degradation are not known, e.g. 
the prices of palm oil and soy beans, and the relationship between such drivers and the agricultural 
land expansion into forests are uncertain.  
 
Second, the costs of avoided deforestation and degradation are uncertain, e.g. the agricultural in-
come that could have been obtained from cleared land (output prices and technologies). Third, the 
effectiveness of the REDD+ policies implemented is not fully known, e.g., how farmers will respond to 
particular incentives aimed to constrain forest clearing.  
 
Some of the consequences of getting RLs and FIBs wrong have already been discussed under effec-
tiveness and efficiency. Depending on the effect on FIB, setting RLs too high risks over-payment and 
reduced effectiveness, and potentially also no additionality with the risk of ‘hot air’ in a market based 
system.  
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Setting RLs and FIBs too low risks under-payment, and potential drop-out by some countries if the 
participation constraint is no longer met. This increases the potential for international leakage, which 
also will undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the system.   
 
A system for RL and FIB setting should therefore take the uncertainty into account, both for reasons 
of effectiveness (and efficiency), and also to get a ‘fair risk sharing’ between the countries. Several 
options have been proposed in the literature, and are briefly discussed in Table 7-2 . 
 
Table 7-2 Options to deal with uncertainty in RL and FIB setting 
Option Elaboration Pros Cons 
1.Ex-post  
adjustment 
Formula agreed, final level 
set when parameters (e.g. 
agric. prices) are known 
Predictable, and po-
litically robust 
Hard to establish 
the formula.  
2.Corridor approach 
Gradually increasing pay-
ments within a  corridor.  
Flexible, payments 
could mimics MC 
curve 
Political ac-
ceptance a chal-
lenge 
3.Stepwise approach 
Estimated level multiplied by 
an uncertainty or conserva-
tiveness factor (<1), based 
on assessment of data quali-
ty   
 May allow participa-
tion earlier than 
would otherwise be 
the case. Incentivises 
countries to produce 
better data.  
Lower rate of 
payment for 
countries with 
poor data. Does 
not address un-
certainties in 
drivers 
4.Renegotiations 
Renegotiate based an initial 
agreement  
Flexible, can incorpo-
rate unforeseen fac-
tors 
Political gaming 
5.Insurance  
Could design insurance con-
tract based approaches in 1 
and 2.   
Well developed mar-
kets for insurance 
Probably expen-
sive, complex 
formula 
 
One major proposal in the REDD+ debate is the suggestion of an ex-post adjustment of the RL (and 
hence FIB), initially proposed as the “Compensated Successful Efforts” by Combes Motel et al. 
(2009). Deforestation pressures in, for example, the Brazilian Amazon are closely linked to the profit-
ability of cattle and soy bean production, and adjusting RLs based on the prices of these commodities 
should better reflect the true BAU scenario, and therefore better measure the real emissions reduc-
tions.  
 
Another approach is the Stepwise approach, presented earlier in the report. An adjustment factor is 
introduced to reflect the degree of uncertainty of the emissions and RL estimates. This addresses of 
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the problems of uncertainty linked to emissions estimates and may increase participation, and incen-
tivise improvements in data quality. 
 
Two other options to deal with uncertainty are contract renegotiation or insurance, but these have 
not so far been explored in the context of REDD+ RLs.  
 
The corridor approach was proposed by Schlamadinger et al (2005). This recognises that any point 
estimate of the RL is uncertain. A discount factor is therefore introduced, where deeper emissions 
reductions get an increasingly lower discount factor (i.e. higher payment). The approach defines an 
interval (corridor) around the point estimate of the RL, with the discount factor increasing from 0 to 1 
(no to full payment) within this interval. Thus REDD+ countries will (so long as they are within an 
agreed uncertainty range of the FIB) get some payment even if they are unlucky and face strong 
deforestation drivers, making the policies less successful than anticipated in reducing deforestation. 
On the other hand, a donor country will, as a result of the discount factor,  not make full payments in 
the opposite case, i.e. deforestation is reduced for other reasons than successful REDD+ policies.  
 
The corridor approach is illustrated by the following example. Assume the best guess for the FIB 
(based on a best guess BAU baseline and any other considerations) is that annual emissions from 
deforestation are 0.5% of the forest carbon stock. These are uncertain, and an interval from 0.7 to 
0.3% is identified (say the 95% interval) for the FIB. The following scheme can then be agreed on: 
 
Emissions above 0.7%: no payment 
Emissions between 0.7-0.6%: 20% payment  
Emissions between 0.6-0.5%: 40% payment  
Emissions between 0.5-0.4%: 60% payment  
Emissions between 0.4-0.3%: 80% payment  
Emissions below 0.3%: 100 % payment  
 
 
Further, as already noted, the payment scheme will tend to mimic the marginal cost curve, and 
hence contribute to higher effectiveness.   
 
The corridor approach has, to our knowledge, not been applied in any agreements so far. One reason 
might be that few agreements actually are in place using this Phase III approach of emissions based 
payments. Uncertainty may also not be explicitly acknowledged. Finally, there is a fear of making 
agreements too complex, although conceptually the approach is rather simple, particularly compared 
to the many other complexities involved in designing and measuring a system of emissions based 
payments. The corridor approach may therefore be an idea worth pursuing.  
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8 Concluding remarks  
This study’s analysis of available data suggests that, whilst historical deforestation rates are the most 
important single predictor of business-as-usual deforestation, including other socio-economic varia-
bles in regression analysis increases the amount of variance explained, and in three out of the four 
countries analysed in detail, the other variables by themselves can explain most of the variance that 
is explained by historical deforestation. For one country analysed this is not the case, although the 
reasons for this are not clear. This suggests that consideration of specific causal factors (in addition 
to the general expectation based on historical deforestation rates) is likely to increase understanding 
of the drivers of deforestation and hence of reference levels. Because of data limitations these results 
do not include consideration of degradation. The results are nevertheless suggestive enough to en-
courage further investigation, to broaden the scope to more countries using existing data sources, 
and, as suitable data become available, to include degradation and eventually other REDD+ activities.   
 
The study distinguishes between reference levels as a business-as-usual projection and financial in-
centive benchmarks as the agreed level below which international incentive payments would be 
made. The text uses the abbreviation RL exclusively in the former sense, and FIB exclusively in the 
latter. Although a formulaic approach is unlikely to succeed in setting FIBs, the study provides argu-
ments from international equity and environmental and economic effectiveness and efficiency why 
FIBs should not necessarily equal RLs.  
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Appendix A 
Appendix A contains information on REDD+ funding from the Voluntary REDD+ database. 
Source: http://reddplusdatabase.org/ Difference from the sum per country given in the list 
and the sum of funds reported by donor countries in the text can be explained by rounding 
to million US$ in the voluntary REDD+ database overview per country and the different 
time spans under consideration . In the text the total incoming funding per country calcu-
lated by the voluntary REDD+ database project team is given.  
 
A1 Brazil (Voluntary REDD+ Database, 2011) 
Table A1 - 1 Voluntary REDD+ Database, 2011 
Timespan Funder Recipient US $ million 
2008-2009 Germany Brazil $15 
2008-2012 Germany Brazil $30 
2008-2009 Germany Brazil $14 
2008-2009 Germany Brazil $6 
2008-2008 Germany Brazil $3 
2008-2009 Germany Brazil $2 
2008-2012 Germany Brazil $3 
2008-2009 Germany Brazil $5 
2009-2012 Germany Brazil $4 
2009-2012 Germany Brazil $9 
2008-2012 Japan Brazil $27 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Brazil $10 
2010-2012 GEF - Global Envir... Brazil $18 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Brazil $5 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Brazil $7 
2010-2010 United States of A... Brazil $4 
2010-2010 United States of A... Brazil $1 
2010-2013 Germany Brazil $5 
2010-2015 Germany Brazil $4 
2008-2009 Brazil Brazil $100 
2010-2010 France Brazil $2 
2009-2010 Norway Brazil $49 
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  Sum $323 
    
 
INCOMING FUNDING, 2008 - 2009   
$400.83M Reported by Brazil 
$216.64M Reported by others 
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A2 Cameroon 
Table A2 REDD Funding to Cameron (VRD, 2011) 
Timespan Funder Recipient 
US $ 
million 
2008-2009 Germany Cameroon $1 
2008-2012 Germany Cameroon $2 
2008-2015 
WCS - Wildlife 
Con... 
Cameroon $0 
2010-2012 Cameroon Cameroon $27 
2010-2012 
FCPF - Forest 
Carb... 
Cameroon $0 
2010-2012 
FCPF - Forest 
Carb... 
Cameroon $36 
2010-2012 
GEF - Global 
Envir... 
Cameroon $4 
2010-2012 
GEF - Global 
Envir... 
Cameroon $2 
2010-2012 
GEF - Global 
Envir... 
Cameroon $8 
2010-2012 
GEF - Global 
Envir... 
Cameroon $5 
2008-2009 
FCPF - Forest 
Carb... 
Cameroon $3 
2010-2012 
FCPF - Forest 
Carb... 
Cameroon $5 
2010-2011 France Cameroon $0 
  Sum $93 
    
 
INCOMING FUNDING, 2010 – 
2012 
  
$0.0M Reported by Cameroon   
$13.37M Reported by others   
 
Source: http://reddplusdatabase.org/ Difference form the sum per country given in the list and the sum of funds 
reported by donor countries in the text can be explained by rounding to million US$ in the voluntary REDD+ data-
base overview per country and the different time spans under consideration . In the text the total incoming fund-
ing per country calculated by the voluntary REDD+ database project team is given.  
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A3 Indonesia 
Table A3 REDD Funding to Indonesia (VRD, 2011) 
Timespan Funder Recipient 
US $ 
million 
2008-2012 Australia Indonesia $28 
2010-2012 Australia Indonesia $28 
2008-2009 Germany Indonesia $29 
2008-2009 Germany Indonesia $11 
2008-2011 Germany Indonesia $2 
2008-2015 United Kingdom Indonesia $29 
2007-2012 Australia Indonesia $9 
2010-2012 WCS - Wildlife Con... Indonesia $0 
2008-2009 
Indonesia  (National 
Programme) 
Indonesia $6 
2008-2015 UN-REDD Programme Indonesia $6 
2008-2012 CI - Conservation ... Indonesia $9 
2011-2014 Finland Indonesia $5 
2008-2012 Japan Indonesia $31 
2008-2012 Japan Indonesia $29 
2008-2015 TNC - The Nature C... Indonesia $5 
2010-2013 ITTO - Internation... Indonesia $1 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Indonesia $5 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Indonesia $8 
2008-2009 GEF - Global Envir... Indonesia $4 
2008-2009 FCPF - Forest Carb... Indonesia $3 
2010-2012 FCPF - Forest Carb... Indonesia $5 
2010-2010 United States of A... Indonesia $6 
2010-2010 United States of A... Indonesia $5 
2010-2010 United States of A... Indonesia $2 
2010-2010 United States of A... Indonesia $20 
2010-2010 United States of A... Indonesia $2 
2010-2015 Germany Indonesia $4 
2008-2012 Germany Indonesia $1 
2009-2011 Germany Indonesia $1 
2009-2012 Germany Indonesia $10 
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2010-2011 ITTO - Internation... Indonesia $0 
2009-2011 Germany Indonesia $1 
2010-2010 Norway Indonesia $31 
  Sum $336 
 
INCOMING FUNDING, 2008 - 2009 
$157.6M Reported by Indonesia 
$314.93M Reported by others 
 
Source: http://reddplusdatabase.org/ Difference form the sum per country given in the list and the sum of funds 
reported by donor countries in the text can be explained by rounding to million US$ in the voluntary REDD+ data-
base overview per country and the different time spans under consideration . In the text the total incoming fund-
ing per country calculated by the voluntary REDD+ database project team is given.  
 
For the Indonesian case in addition to the voluntary REDD+ database information is available from 
(Wood, 2010): 
Table A3 Donors to REDD+ in Indonesia (Wood, 2011) 
Multilateral and bilateral donors in REDD+ and associated GCC programs in Indonesia 
(May 2010)1  
Country/ Institu-
tion  
Program  Value (commit-
ment)  
Notes  
United Nations  
(UNDP, UNEP, 
FAO)  
UNREDD  5.644 million USD  combination of policy 
support and demonstra-
tion activity [70]  
World Bank  Forest Carbon Partnership 
Fund (FCPF) – Readiness 
Fund  
3.6 million USD  technical support  
World Bank  Forest Investment Pro-
gram (FIP)  
80 million USD  allocated, but disburse-
ment not yet decided  
International 
Tropical Timber 
Organisation (IT-
TO)2  
REDD-environmental ser-
vices program (REDDES)  
814,590 USD  demonstration activity 
[90, 85, 86]  
Australia  Indonesia- Australian For-
est Carbon Partnership  
61 million USD (70 
million AUD)  
2007-2012, demonstra-
tion activities and tech-
nical support [90]  
France  Climate Change Program 
Loan  
800 million USD 
[07]  
budget support loan (co-
funding Japan) 
Germany  FORCLIME, Merang REDD 
pilot, policy development, 
etc  
48.19 million USD 
(32.34 million 
euro)  
2009-2016, 
demonstration activities 
and technical support 
[90]  
Japan  Forest Preservation Pro-
gram (grant) and Climate 
Change Program Loan 
(budget support loan)  
751 million USD 
loan, 11 million 
USD grant [17]  
forest monitoring and 
reforestation support, 
climate change mitigation 
loan (co-financing 
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France)  
Norway  Norway-Indonesia REDD+ 
program  
1 billion USD  3 phase grant linked to 
policy reform, strategy 
development, and emis-
sions reductions  
United Kingdom  Multistakeholder forestry 
program (part REDD+) 
and Fast Start Facility  
84 million USD (55 
million UKP)  
5 years technical assis-
tance to national gov-
ernment and selected 
regions [90, 51]  
South Korea2  Korea-Indonesia Joint Pro-
gram on Adaptation and 
Mitigation of Climate 
Change in Forestry  
5 million USD  2008 – 2013, 
afforestation/ 
reforestation and REDD+ 
[31, 90, 92]  
United States of 
America2  
Indonesia Forest and Cli-
mate Support Project 
(IFACS)  
around 30 million 
USD  
demonstration activities 
and forest management 
activities  
 
This table does not include NGO and private sector initiatives, although one of these, TNC’s Bureau 
Carbon Project has been recognised as an official demonstration activity [105]  
ITTO, USA and South Korea were are not analysed further in this report because South Korea and 
ITTO are only involved in single pilot projects, and the USA has yet to commit climate funds to Indo-
nesia, although a program is in the process of tender. 
 
The study identifies approximately $ 2.9 billion committed funding in association with multilateral and 
bilateral donors in REDD+ and associated Global Climate Change (GCC) programs in Indonesia. 
 
A4 Vietnam 
Table A4  REDD+ Funding to Vietnam (VRD, 2011)  
Timespan Funder Recipient 
US $ 
million 
2008-
2015 
UN-REDD Programme Vietnam $4 
2009-
2012 
Finland Vietnam $5 
2009-
2010 
Finland Vietnam $0 
2010-
2012 
Finland Vietnam $0 
2008-
2009 
Japan Vietnam $23 
2008-
2009 
Japan Vietnam $81 
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2010-
2012 
FCPF - Forest Carb... Vietnam $36 
2008-
2009 
FCPF - Forest Carb... Vietnam $3 
2010-
2012 
FCPF - Forest Carb... Vietnam $5 
2010-
2013 
Germany Vietnam $1 
2010-
2015 
Germany Vietnam $10 
2010-
2010 
United States of A... Vietnam $0 
  Sum $168 
 
INCOMING FUNDING, 2005 - 
2014 
$0.0M Reported by Vietnam 
$124.14M Reported by others 
 
Source: http://reddplusdatabase.org/ Difference form the sum per country given in the list and the sum of funds 
reported by donor countries in the text can be explained by rounding to million US$ in the voluntary REDD+ data-
base overview per country and the different time spans under consideration . In the text the total incoming fund-
ing per country calculated by the voluntary REDD+ database project team is given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A5 General costs 
 
For some phases of REDD+ implementation, only general country costs are available, and these are provided 
below.  These costs come from the information given by a Delphi panel of experts: 
Table A5 General estimates of Costs for REDD+ implementation 
Phase REDD+ Activity  Temporal and Type Source 
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Costs (USD) 
spatial reference 
          
1,2 Institutional Reform 
13,000,000 
 – 
14,000,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
1,2 Land Tenure Reform 
 > 
21,000,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
1,2 Land Use Planning 
  4,500,000  
- 10,000,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
1,2 Juridical Reform  > 4,500,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
1,2 Treasury Reform  > 4,500,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
1,2 Support Services 
 4,500,000 
 - 
10,000,000 
Likely national cost 
(low-high Delphi ex-
pert panel estimate) 
any country 
IC IWG-IFR, 2009 
 
 
A6 Country sample 
A6 Table 1 Country Sample 
Country 
Missing 
data 
Suspicious 
data 
Forest 
area < 
10,000ha 
Country 
Missing 
data 
Suspicious 
data 
Forest 
area < 
10,000ha 
Afghanistan  x  Jordan  x  
Algeria    Kazakhstan    
Angola    Kenya    
Anguilla   x Kyrgyzstan    
Antigua and  x  Lao People's DR    
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Barbuda 
Argentina    Lesotho x   
Armenia    Liberia    
Aruba   x Madagascar    
Azerbaijan  x  Malawi    
Bahamas  x  Maldives   x 
Bahrain   x Mali    
Bangladesh    Mauritania    
Barbados   x Mauritius x   
Belize    Mayotte x   
Benin    Mexico    
Bhutan    Mongolia    
Bolivia     Montserrat   x 
Botswana    Morocco    
Brazil    Mozambique    
British Virgin 
Islands 
  x Myanmar    
Burkina Faso    Namibia    
Burundi    Nepal  x  
Cambodia    
Netherlands 
Antilles 
  x 
Cameroon    Nicaragua    
Cape Verde    Niger    
Cayman 
Islands 
 x  Nigeria    
Central African 
Republic 
   Pakistan    
Chad    Panama    
Chile    Paraguay    
China    Peru    
Colombia    Philippines    
Comoros x   Puerto Rico    
Congo    Rwanda    
Costa Rica    
St Kitts and 
Nevis 
 x  
Cuba    St Lucia  x  
Côte d'Ivoire    
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
x   
DR Congo    
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
 x  
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Djibouti   x Senegal    
Dominica x   Seychelles  x  
Dominican 
Republic 
 x  Sierra Leone    
Ecuador    Somalia    
Egypt    South Africa  x  
El Salvador    Sri Lanka    
Equatorial 
Guinea 
   Sudan    
Eritrea    Suriname  x  
Ethiopia    Swaziland    
French Guiana    
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
   
Gabon  x  Tajikistan  x  
Gambia    Timor-Leste    
Georgia    Togo    
Ghana    
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   
Grenada  x  Tunisia    
Guatemala    Turkmenistan  x  
Guinea    Uganda    
Guinea-Bissau    
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
   
Guyana  x  
United States 
Virgin Islands 
x   
Haiti    Uzbekistan    
Honduras    Venezuela     
India    Vietnam    
Indonesia    Yemen  x  
Iraq  x  Zambia    
Jamaica x   Zimbabwe    
Countries marked with “x” were dropped 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B contains more detail behind the data displayed in Chapter 5 which presents the regres-
sion analysis.  
 
Table B 1 Determinants of country level deforestation 2000-2010 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Rates of def., historical def., estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.733*** 0.696*** 0.695*** 0.666***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  0.155*** 0.084* 0.065 0.830*** 
Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 -0.118* -0.036 -0.047 -0.774*** 
R2 0.873 0.876 0.881 0.889 0.628    
Rates of def., historical def. estimated with tobit model 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.768*** 0.757*** 0.756*** 0.707***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  0.152** 0.070 -0.005 0.917*** 
Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 -0.095 -0.001 0.036 -0.876*** 
Absolute terms of def. & historical def. (not in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation 
(absolute) 
0.722*** 0.712*** 0.711*** 0.718***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  -179.263** -181.017** 
-
353.229*** 
-320.308*   
Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 315.800*** 312.018*** 491.820*** 940.467**  
R2 0.813 0.816 0.816 0.833 0.239    
Absolute terms of def. & historical def. (in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
log of historical def. (absolute) 0.942*** 0.946*** 0.942*** 0.927***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  -0.287 -0.527* -0.298 2.479**  
Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 0.638** 0.930** 0.501 -0.511    
R2 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.816    
Number of observations (all 
models above) 
650 650 650 650 650    
Rates of def., historical def., data averaged over periods by country estimated with OLS 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.780*** 0.719*** 0.715*** 0.681***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  0.156 0.106 0.098 0.972**  
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Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 -0.127 -0.073 -0.101 -0.981**  
R2 0.890 0.895 0.898 0.906 0.664    
Absolute terms of def. & historical def, data averaged over periods by country estimated with OLS 
log of historical deforestation 
(absolute) 
0.949*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.931***                
Lagged forest stock (share)  -0.200 -0.362 -0.040 4.103    
Lagged forest stock squared 
(share) 
 0.463 0.626 0.119 -3.227    
R2 0.978 0.978 0.979 0.979 0.826    
Number of observations (for last 
2 panels) 
79 79 79 79 79    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. The explanatory variables included in the 
models M1 – M5 are same as those in Table 3, except deforestation dummy is excluded, and models using aver-
aged data over periods exclude the trend variable. def. denotes deforestation. “share” refers to forest cover as a 
ratio of forest area to country area. Details of these results are available on request. 
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Table B 2 Determinants of municipality level deforestation 2005-2009 (Brazil) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.676*** 0.500*** 0.446*** 0.425***  
lagged forest stock (share)  2.998*** 2.884*** 2.494*** 5.974*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -2.459*** -2.012*** -2.088*** -4.843*** 
R2 0.791 0.810 0.818 0.828 0.775    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (ALL other variables not in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (absolute) 0.456*** 0.438*** 0.401*** 0.353***  
lagged forest stock (share)  14.701 -6.837 -14.028 21.014    
lagged forest stock squared (share)  2.071 27.546* 31.422** 4.387    
R2 0.614 0.621 0.633 0.651 0.477    
Rates of def.,  historical def. estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.011**                
lagged forest stock (share of land)  -0.991*** -0.889*** -0.545*** -0.454*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share of land)  0.506*** 0.455*** 0.297*** 0.253*** 
R2 0.153 0.275 0.305 0.333 0.331    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.676*** 0.517*** 0.464*** 0.467***                
log of lagged forest stock (absolute)  -1.338*** -1.332*** -1.254*** -1.294*** 
log of lagged forest stock squared (absolute)  0.711*** 0.716*** 0.648*** 0.753*** 
R2 0.791 0.808 0.814 0.823 0.763    
Rates of def.,  historical def., estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.009**                
lagged forest stock (share)  2.635*** 2.372*** 2.439*** 2.476*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)   -2.881*** -2.520*** -2.321*** -2.349*** 
R2 0.153 0.348 0.359 0.374 0.373    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (ALL other variables not in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (absolute) 0.456*** 0.434*** 0.391*** 0.346***  
lagged forest stock (absolute)  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
lagged forest stock squared (absolute)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
R2 0.614 0.625 0.637 0.653 0.487    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. estimated with Tobit model 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.789*** 0.646*** 0.589*** 0.538***  
lagged forest stock (share)  4.402*** 4.253*** 3.690*** 7.970*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -3.673*** -3.201*** -2.946*** -6.255*** 
Rates of def.,  historical def. estimated with Tobit model 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.016***  
lagged forest stock (share)  4.291*** 3.927*** 3.690*** 3.747*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -4.320*** -3.821*** -3.216*** -3.258*** 
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Number of observations (all models above) 3595 3595 3595 3595 3595    
***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. All explanatory variables (including their 
respective transformations unless otherwise stated) included in the models M1 – M5 are same as those in Table 5, 
except we exclude deforestation dummy and models using averaged data over periods exclude the trend variable. 
Details of these results are available on request. 
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Table B 3 Determinants of municipality level deforestation 2005-2009 (Brazil) - continued 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Absolute terms of def, historical def. (in logs), data averaged over periods by municipality estimated with OLS 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.683*** 0.530*** 0.469*** 0.442***  
lagged forest stock (share)  3.447*** 3.360*** 3.008*** 6.961*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -2.969*** -2.502*** -2.561*** -5.754*** 
R2 0.859 0.873 0.883 0.893 0.842    
Rates of def.,  historical def., data averaged over periods by municipality estimated with OLS 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.062*** 0.018*** 0.016** 0.008  
lagged forest stock (share)  2.878*** 2.624*** 2.621*** 2.657*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -3.155*** -2.806*** -2.511*** -2.538*** 
R2 0.150 0.554 0.571 0.596 0.594    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (in logs), data averaged over periods by municipality estimated with tobit 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.682*** 0.607*** 0.540*** 0.491***  
lagged forest stock (share)  4.413*** 4.298*** 3.814*** 8.259*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -3.851*** -3.338*** -3.070*** -6.618*** 
Rates of def.,  historical def., data averaged over periods by municipality estimated with tobit 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.060*** 0.023*** 0.020** 0.011*  
lagged forest stock (share)  3.680*** 3.378*** 3.212*** 3.258*** 
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -3.878*** -3.461*** -2.905*** -2.939*** 
Number of observations (all models above) 719 719 719 719 719    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (in logs), data averaged by year and state estimated with OLS 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.850*** 0.702*** 0.495** 2.137***  
lagged forest stock (share)  2.195 6.235** -9.984 5.592    
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -2.194 -5.924** 3.358 -3.526    
R2 0.958 0.961 0.968 0.980 0.968    
Rates of def.,  historical def., data averaged by year and state estimated with OLS 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.181*** 0.113** 0.083** 0.594***  
lagged forest stock (share)  1.242** 0.703 -1.277 0.794    
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -1.510** -0.477 -0.984 0.166    
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R2 0.524 0.718 0.746 0.814 0.761    
Absolute terms of def.,  historical def. (in logs), data averaged by year and state estimated with tobit 
log of historical deforestation (absolute) 0.853*** 0.719*** 0.511** 2.142***  
lagged forest stock (share of land)  2.289 6.290** -9.805* 5.889    
lagged forest stock squared (share of land)  -2.247 -5.955** 3.215 -3.746    
Rates of def.,  historical def., data averaged by year and state estimated with tobit 
Historical deforestation (%) 0.185*** 0.116** 0.086** 0.575***  
lagged forest stock (share)  1.188** 0.696 -1.079 0.976    
lagged forest stock squared (share)  -1.447** -0.450 -0.970 0.137    
Number of observations (for models in last 
four panels 45 45 45 45 45    
 
Table B 4 Determinants of province level deforestation 2005-2009 (Vietnam) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5   
Rates of def.,  historical def., excluding squared term of forest stock estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (%) 1.424*** 1.429*** 1.453*** 1.457***  
Lagged forest stock (share)  -0.028 -0.044** -0.041* 0.017    
R2 0.502 0.505 0.510 0.509 0.019    
Rates of def.,  historical def., estimated with OLS-PCSE 
Historical deforestation (%) 1.424*** 1.428*** 1.453*** 1.443***                
Forest stock (share)  0.128** 0.115* 0.076* 0.240**  
Forest stock squared (share)  -0.265** -0.257** -0.212** -0.406**  
R2 0.502 0.512 0.516 0.514 0.037    
Rates of def.,  historical def. estimated with tobit  
Historical deforestation (%) 1.685*** 1.738*** 1.721*** 1.676***  
Forest stock (share)  0.214** 0.255** 0.032 0.222    
Forest stock squared (share)  -0.261* -0.297* -0.034 -0.217    
Absolute terms of def. & historical def. (not in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
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Historical deforestation 
(absolute) 
0.486*** 0.528*** 0.526*** 0.529***  
Forest stock (share)  162.748 166.424 223.021** 286.219**  
Forest stock squared (share)  -479.230* -479.215* 
-
547.117** 
-391.355    
R2 0.275 0.304 0.304 0.302 0.060    
Absolute terms of def. & historical def. (in logs) estimated with OLS-PCSE 
log of historical deforestation 
(absolute) 
0.574*** 0.545*** 0.533*** 0.561***  
Forest stock (share)  -0.926 -2.001 -0.663 5.325*** 
Forest stock squared (share)  2.349 3.498 1.750 -2.217    
 
Table B 5: Determinants of province level deforestation 2006-2009 (Indonesia) 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Absolute terms of def. & 
historical def. (plus ALL 
other variables not in 
logs) estimated with OLS 
     
Historical deforestation 
(absolute) 1.572* 0.759*** 0.685** 0.677**                
Forest stock (absolute)  -0.007 -0.011** -0.012** -0.009    
Forest stock squared 
(absolute)  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
R2 0.235 0.774 0.788 0.790 0.757    
Absolute terms of def. & 
historical def. (plus ALL 
other variables in logs) 
estimated with OLS      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 0.946*** 0.359*** 0.335*** 0.231***                
log of forest stock (abso-
lute)  0.463 3.454*** 6.777*** 9.351*** 
log of forest stock 
squared (absolute)  -0.041 -1.466** -3.196*** -4.439*** 
R2 0.582 0.767 0.772 0.799 0.786    
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Absolute terms of def. & 
historical def., (in logs),  
forest stock as share of 
land  estimated with OLS      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 0.946*** 0.390*** 0.389*** 0.277***                
log of forest stock (abso-
lute)  12.973*** 10.419*** 7.996*** 10.428*** 
log of forest stock 
squared (absolute)  -9.415*** -7.025** -6.870** -8.600*** 
R2 0.582 0.749 0.752 0.786 0.767    
Absolute terms  of def. & 
historical def. (in logs) 
estimated with tobit      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 0.906*** 0.537*** 0.539*** 0.304***                
Forest stock (share)  0.168*** 0.183*** 0.143*** 0.178*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
Absolute terms  of def. & 
historical def. (in logs) 
estimated with tobit      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 0.049 -0.019* -0.020* -0.018                
Def. dummy =1 if no 
def., 0 otherwise 0.456** -0.287 -0.254 0.164 0.185    
Forest stock (share)  4.019*** 4.599*** 4.252*** 4.227*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -3.777** -4.255** -4.682** -4.646**  
R2 0.027 0.259 0.260 0.297 0.296    
Rates  of def. & historical 
def., estimated with OLS      
Historical deforestation 
(%) 0.051 -0.013 -0.015 -0.022*                
Forest stock (share)  4.360*** 5.080*** 4.056*** 3.996*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -4.007*** -4.609*** -4.483** -4.409**  
R2 0.006 0.254 0.257 0.296 0.295    
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Rates  of def. & historical 
def., estimated with tobit      
Historical deforestation 
(%) -0.014 -0.036 -0.044 -0.075**                
Forest stock (share)  0.075*** 0.110*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Number of observations 
(all models above) 371 371 371 371 371    
Absolute terms  of def. & 
historical def. (in logs), 
data averaged by prov-
ince estimated with OLS      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 1.060*** 0.314** 0.294** 0.286**                
Forest stock (share)  0.076* -0.004 -0.0004 0.017    
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
R2 0.933 0.982 0.985 0.986 0.981    
Absolute terms  of def. & 
historical def. (in logs), 
data averaged by prov-
ince estimated with tobit      
log of historical defor-
estation (absolute) 1.060*** 0.341** 0.314** 0.303**                
Forest stock (share)  0.074* -0.001 0.0001 0.019    
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -0.001 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.000    
Number of observations 
(two panels above) 29 29 29 29 29 
Rates  of def. & historical 
def., data averaged by 
province estimated with 
OLS      
Historical deforestation 
(%) 0.247 -0.108 -0.126 -0.143**                
Forest stock (share)  0.030 0.055 0.024 0.013    
Forest stock squared  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000    
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(share) 
R2 0.077 0.518 0.527 0.667 0.650    
Number of observations 30 30 30 30 30    
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Table B 6 Determinants of province level deforestation 2006-2009 (Indonesia) 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5    
Absolute terms of 
def. & historical def. 
(plus ALL other vari-
ables not in logs) 
estimated with OLS 
     
Historical 
deforestation 
(absolute) 1.572* 0.759*** 0.685** 0.677**                
Forest stock 
(absolute)  -0.007 -0.011** -0.012** -0.009    
Forest stock squared 
(absolute)  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
R2 
0.235 0.774 0.788 0.790 0.757    
Absolute terms of 
def. & historical def. 
(plus ALL other vari-
ables in logs) esti-
mated with OLS      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 0.946*** 0.359*** 0.335*** 0.231***                
log of forest stock 
(absolute)  0.463 3.454*** 6.777*** 9.351*** 
log of forest stock 
squared (absolute)  -0.041 -1.466** -3.196*** -4.439*** 
R2 
0.582 0.767 0.772 0.799 0.786    
Absolute terms of 
def. & historical def., 
(in logs),  forest 
stock as share of 
land  estimated with 
OLS      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 0.946*** 0.390*** 0.389*** 0.277***                
log of forest stock 
(absolute)  12.973*** 10.419*** 7.996*** 10.428*** 
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log of forest stock 
squared (absolute)  -9.415*** -7.025** -6.870** -8.600*** 
R2 
0.582 0.749 0.752 0.786 0.767    
Absolute terms  of 
def. & historical def. 
(in logs) estimated 
with tobit      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 0.906*** 0.537*** 0.539*** 0.304***                
Forest stock (share)  16.815*** 18.332*** 14.349*** 17.834*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -12.396*** -13.665*** -14.604*** -17.436*** 
Absolute terms  of 
def. & historical def. 
(in logs) estimated 
with tobit      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 0.049 -0.019* -0.020* -0.018                
Def. dummy =1 if no 
def., 0 otherwise 0.456** -0.287 -0.254 0.164 0.185    
Forest stock (share)  4.019*** 4.599*** 4.252*** 4.227*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -3.777** -4.255** -4.682** -4.646**  
R2 0.027 0.259 0.260 0.297 0.296    
Rates  of def. & his-
torical def., estimat-
ed with OLS      
Historical 
deforestation (%) 0.051 -0.013 -0.015 -0.022*                
Forest stock (share)  4.360*** 5.080*** 4.056*** 3.996*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -4.007*** -4.609*** -4.483** -4.409**  
R2 0.006 0.254 0.257 0.296 0.295    
Rates  of def. & his-
torical def., estimat-
ed with tobit      
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Historical 
deforestation (%) -0.014 -0.036 -0.044 -0.075**                
Forest stock (share)  7.529*** 11.044*** 8.613*** 8.424*** 
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -6.244*** -9.338*** -9.652*** -9.425*** 
Number of observa-
tions (all models 
above) 371 371 371 371 371    
Absolute terms  of 
def. & historical def. 
(in logs), data aver-
aged by province 
estimated with OLS      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 1.060*** 0.314** 0.294** 0.286**                
Forest stock (share)  7.587* -0.414 -0.038 1.717    
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -6.993 0.380 -0.571 -1.726    
R2 0.933 0.982 0.985 0.986 0.981    
Absolute terms  of 
def. & historical def. 
(in logs), data aver-
aged by province 
estimated with tobit      
log of historical de-
forestation (absolute) 1.060*** 0.341** 0.314** 0.303**                
Forest stock (share)  7.359* -0.047 0.013 1.851    
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -6.802 -0.067 -0.695 -1.895    
Number of observa-
tions (two panels 
above) 29 29 29 29 29 
Rates  of def. & his-
torical def., data 
averaged by province 
estimated with OLS      
Historical 0.247 -0.108 -0.126 -0.143**                
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deforestation (%) 
Forest stock (share)  2.989 5.459 2.389 1.350    
Forest stock squared 
(share)  -3.469 -5.863 -4.673 -3.506    
R2 
0.077 0.518 0.527 0.667 0.650    
Number of 
observations 30 30 30 30 30    
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Appendix C 
Figure 7 Data on forest sources and Predicted deforestation 
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